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Abstract 
This thesis in Political Economy is a case study of the Government Pension Fund 
Global (GPFG) and the climate change strategy in the period 2006 to 2012. 
Climate change is a topic of growing interest among investors, and especially 
universal owners, due to the financial risks it might entail across all markets. The 
main methodological distinction in this study is the historical approach. The 
objective has been to find out how climate change is on the agenda, and whether it 
has been a consistent strategy over the period. The GPFG is placed within a 
distinctive institutional design, which is given attention also in this thesis, and the 
three most relevant actors in this regard has been the overall manger of the Fund, 
The Ministry of Finance, the operational manager, Norges Banks investment 
Management (NBIM), and the independent Council on Ethics.  It was found that 
climate change is an issue which has gained increased attention over the period. 
Among others, it is a focus area in NBIM’s ownership activity and the Ministry 
has initiated large research projects on the financial effect of climate change. 
There has however been some inconsistency in how the actors communicate their 
climate change strategy with the owners of the GPFG, the Norwegian people.  
 
 
 
Reference style: Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition (Author-Date References). 
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1. Introduction and problem definition 
1.1. The topic – context, rationale and contribution 
The research area in this master thesis in Political Economy is climate change and 
responsible investments (RI). A case study of the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund Global’s (GPFG)1 most significant activities and strategies related to climate 
change in the period 2006 to 2012 will be carried out. The GPFG is a large state 
owned fund, entirely invested abroad and managed by the Norwegian Bank 
Investment Management (NBIM) which is part of the Norwegian Central Bank, 
Norges Bank (Ministry of Finance 2011b). The Fund had a market value of 3448 
billion NOK the 17th April 2012, but the value is continuously changing (NBIM 
2012a). The Fund’s portfolio is broadly diversified, see §2-1(2) in the 
Management Mandate (see table 1). By the end of 2011 58.7 percent of the Fund 
was invested in equities, whereas 41 percent was invested in fixed-income and 0.3 
percent in real estate (NBIM 2011a, 14). The equities, bonds, and real estate 
investments were spread out on 68 different countries, and the Fund owned shares 
in 8005 listed companies by the end of 2011 (NBIM 2011a, 38,21).  
 
Three involved actors will be particularly relevant for this research; the above 
mentioned operational manager of the Fund, NBIM, and the overall manager of 
the Fund, the Ministry of Finance. The third actor is the independent Council on 
Ethics. A figure in chapter 3.1 shows the relationship between the three actors, in 
addition to the role of other relevant, but less central, actors. Climate change is a 
field of growing interest among institutional investors such as pension funds, 
investment banks and insurance companies. There is an increasing awareness 
rising about the challenge future climate change might pose for so-called universal 
asset owners, and thus environmental focus is becoming an integrated part of RI, 
both at the theoretical and practical level. Climate change has been one of NBIM's 
focus’ areas in the corporate governance strategy for the period 2007-2010 (NBIM 
2007, 89) and in NBIM’s strategy for 2011-2013 (NBIM 2011f, 6). The Ministry 
of Finance has initiated a large research project with emphasize on climate 
change. Furthermore, the Ministry decided in 2008 that approximately 20 billion 
                                                 
1
 Commonly known as the Petroleum Fund, or “Oljefondet” in the Norwegian debate. The 
abbreviation SPU (Statens Pensjonsfond Utland) is also often used. In this research the Fund or the 
GPFG will be used. A variety of abbreviations exist in the literature, but the GPFG is the one used 
by the involved actors.   
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NOK should be allocated to an environmental program (Ministry of Finance 
2008e, 16). It is interesting to note that environmental concerns, although not 
climate change as such, not only has been a focus in NBIMs ownership 
engagement and in the Ministry, but also in the work performed by the Council on 
Ethics. According to the Ethical Guidelines, if there is a risk that a company 
contributes to severe environmental damages, the company should be excluded 
from the portfolio (Ministry of Finance 2010c). However, since climate change 
explicitly is not a part of the Council on Ethics mandate, the analysis of this actor 
will be somewhat different from the two others. Focus on climate change has 
nevertheless been an integrated part of the strategy for the Fund as a responsible 
investor for some years. An interesting question is as such whether there has been 
consistency, or if there has been any disruptions in the climate change focus in the 
period 2006-2012?  
 
Another interesting question is why it was decided to emphasize on climate 
change in the first place? Was it in line with the principle of overlapping 
consensus, i.e. what most Norwegians find appropriate to focus on? In 2002 the 
Graver Committee2, led by professor Hans Petter Graver, got a mandate from the 
government; to design a set of ethical guidelines for the then-called Petroleum 
Fond (Ministry of Finance 2012b). The Graver Committee discussed the principle 
of overlapping consensus. The general idea is that even in a pluralistic society 
there are some principles which will be accepted by more or less the whole 
population, even though the argumentation behind might be different. The 
suggested ethical guidelines were supposed to be in line with “main normative 
characteristics that are consistent over time” (Graver Committee 2003b, chapter 
2.1, third paragraph). Another plausible explanation, as to why climate changes is 
on the agenda, is that the actors were concerned with how climate change will 
affect the financial markets and the probability of securing long term return? After 
all the primary motivation with the Fund is to secure long term financial wealth 
for future generations of Norwegians (Lovdata 2010).  
 
The three actors possess quite different tools in their work with responsible 
investments, this will be thoroughly discussed below, but briefly it can be said 
that the Ministry has the overall responsibility and authority. This has been 
                                                 
2
 Sometimes called the Graver Commission 
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delegated to the Ministry by the Parliament. The Ministry decides for instance the 
negative screening strategy, i.e. which companies that should never be invested in 
based on a product-based argumentation. This is for instance the case for 
companies involved in the production of tobacco, and certain kinds of weapons. 
The Ministry also decides if companies should be excluded from the Fund on a 
conduct-based argumentation. This decision is taken based on an advice from the 
Council on Ethics. The rationale behind is that a company can be responsible for a 
certain conduct that is regarded unethical. NBIM, on their side, decides which 
companies should be included in the portfolio, and what to focus on in the 
ownership engagement. Consequently, the Fund is operating with several tools 
that interact with climate change and environment.  
 
A conceptualizing of the research will be necessary; this is relevant for concepts 
used in the introduction which might not be familiar to the reader, but also for a 
concept which has almost been a fuzzy word during the last decade, namely 
climate change. As will be carefully outlined below, the concept of climate 
change does not necessarily mean the same for a long-term institutional owner, 
which primary objective is to generate high returns, as for a scientist or an 
environmental organization. This research is not about climate change per se, and 
it will not discuss climate change to any particular extent. This research is about 
how a financial actor uses different responsible investment tools to consider the 
challenge climate change might pose for the financial return. Nevertheless, an 
understanding of how climate change is understood by the three different actors, 
and why investors consider climate change an important externality, is necessary.  
 
It ought be mentioned that this thesis is only relevant for the 58.7 percent of the 
Fund that is invested in the global equity market, and not for the remaining 41 
percent invested in fixed-income3. The reason is that the Ethical Guidelines, as 
well as the ownership engagement of NBIM, only is applicable to companies, and 
thus only on the equity part of the Fund. The lack of ethical principles for the 
fixed-income part of the Fund has been subject to major criticism, but will not be 
further discussed in this thesis. The real estate investments are so far quite limited 
(0.3 percent), but they will nevertheless be touched upon in the thesis.  
                                                 
3
 Note that the distribution is changing, but according to the investment mandate the equity part 
should be around 60 percent and the fixed-income around 40 percent. When the investments in 
real estate increase, the fixed-income part will be decreased to around 35 percent (Lovdata 2010). 
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Despite the somewhat agreeable statement that the GPFG is a pioneer in RI with 
its ethical framework for investment and the work performed by the Council on 
Ethics, this might not be the case for the work with climate challenges (Alm 
2010). Even being a large investor, in this case the second largest Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF)4 in the world (Mercer 2012a, 52) one single actor cannot 
alone influence climate change, so this research aims to contribute with a 
conceptualizing discussion on what is being done in GFPG, and why, rather than 
actually measuring the outcome or the impact of what is being done. The research 
seeks to understand how climate change is on the agenda for the period 2006-
2012. Why is this topic interesting and relevant? Climate change is a highly 
relevant research area, which has been on the international agenda for several 
decades. As will be shown in chapter 4.1, climate change is also a topic of 
growing interest among investors, and especially universal owners which are 
particularly affected by negative externalities like climate change. A proof of this 
topic’s relevance is the fact that the Ministry of Finance in 2009 initiated a 
research project in which the consequences of climate change for the asset 
markets were discussed. The topic was also discussed at the conference “Do 
Investors care about the Environment” arranged by the Ministry of the 
Environment and BI Norwegian Business School in June 2012.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 finance crisis a more responsible financial sector has 
also been a heated debate topic. The "Occupy Wall Street" movement is an 
example of ordinary peoples continued demand for a responsible finance sector. It 
is no longer only a matter of anti-globalization movements, many ordinary people 
have lost faith in the financial sector’s capability of being self-regulatory and act 
responsibly. In this setting it is very interesting to study large and long-term 
institutional investor, and how it considers one of the most challenging issues 
today. Acting in a responsible way as an investor is of course a very broad idea, 
and there is no commonly accepted definition of RI. As will be shown later, 
definitions often include what is called ESG principles, the incorporation of 
Environmental, Social and Governance aspects in the investment decisions 
(Louche 2009).  Furthermore, Political Economy is an academic field which seeks 
to understand the interaction between economics and politics. The GPFG is placed 
                                                 
4
 Sovereign Wealth Fund is a quite new term, which refers to public owned investment funds. 
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in such a setting by being a public owned investment fund, subject to government 
regulation, but still operating in the private market through their investments. As 
such it is also interesting to look at why and how the Fund is regulated by the 
Norwegian state. 
 
Instead of focusing on the whole ethical framework, the narrower emphasis on 
climate change makes the research more interesting and also operational. It is also 
part of a less researched field. Research conducted on the Fund does 
unfortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, not emphasize climate change to any 
particular extent. On the other side, the lack of research on exactly this part of the 
Fund is also the reason for why the topic has been chosen in this thesis. A 
comprehensive discussion of how climate change is on the agenda does to my 
knowledge not exist. The GPFG receives quite a lot of attention in the Norwegian 
media debate, but the focus is quite concentrated around specific investments, 
rather than the overall picture.  
 
1.2. Research question and operationalization  
Based on the above outline of the research area, the developed research topic that 
will form basis for this research is: 
How is climate change embedded in the RI agenda for the Government 
Pension Fund Global, and what were the major strategies in the period 
2006-2012?  
To operationalize the study several research questions will be used, which broadly 
can be divided into two bulks. The following research questions will serve to set 
the scene. They are definitional and conceptualizing research questions, which 
will be answered in chapter 3, 4 and 5:  
1. What are the relevant actors, and how is the organizational structure 
and role-division between them? 
2. What is the regulatory pattern of the GPFG, and is climate change 
incorporated in the legal mandate of the Fund? 
3. What does climate change mean for a long-term institutional investor 
like GPFG? 
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4. What is RI, and how can it be conceptualized for the GPFG? 
5. What are the RI instruments available for investors? 
6. What are the relevant principal-agent relationships, are there any 
conflicts, and if so, can they have influenced the climate change work? 
The next set of research questions will form the basis for the analysis and 
discussion in chapter 6: 
7. How is climate change on the agenda for the three different actors; 
NBIM, the Council on Ethics, and the Ministry of Finance? 
8. What were the major happenings/strategies, and is it possible to 
identify a leading role among the actors? 
9. Has there been consistency and continuity in the three actors’ work 
with climate change in the period 2006-2012? 
10. How are the four different instruments negative screening, positive 
screening, withdrawal, and corporate governance used in the work with 
climate change?  
These research questions will together form the basis for the thesis, and will be 
systematically discussed in the coming chapters. Ten research questions might 
seem ambitious, but it should be précised that they form the basis for the whole 
thesis, background, literature and theory included. Moreover, some of them can be 
answered quite concisely. All the ten research questions are necessary in order to 
get an overall picture, and they do together form the basis for answering the 
research problem; how is climate change on the agenda for the period 2006 to 
2012.  
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2. Methodology  
This chapter presents the research design, or the methodology, adapted in this 
thesis. It will start by describing the research approach, which is characterized by 
triangulation, i.e. the use of combined methods and data (Patton 2002, 247). The 
research is mainly qualitative and the historical perspective will be the main 
approach, but some quantitative method like a simplified content analysis is used 
as a supporting instrument. The data sources and the data collection process will 
also be discussed. In the end the structure of the thesis is presented. 
 
2.1. The methods adapted in this research  
2.1.1. A qualitative main approach: a case study with a historical 
perspective 
The main methodological distinction in this case study is the historical 
perspective. According to Della Porta (2008, 217) the use of historical approaches 
is especially useful in case studies, since cases are not independent from the 
context in which they operate. As a matter of fact this will be a qualitative case 
study of the GPFG with emphasize on climate change as a part of the three actors 
RI strategy. Case studies are interested in the complexity of a single entity, like an 
organization or an event, performing a detailed examination of that particular case 
(Bryman 2004, 48-49). The single entity in this case study is the GPFG. The 
GPFG is however embedded in an institutional context, in which several actors 
together form a distinctive institutional design. A common misunderstanding 
about the GPFG should be sorted out; the Fund in itself is not an independent 
actor. In the Norwegian media one can often se headlines claiming that “the oil 
fund has invested in company X”. The GPFG as such is the revenue in itself, and 
thus “it” cannot take investment decisions. The Fund is invested companies, but it 
has not invested in companies. The actors who take investment decisions are the 
manager and owner of the Fund. This is also emphasized in a report from Norges 
Bank’s Supervisory Council (2011, 13) in which it is stated that “the GPFG is not 
a legal entity, but the name of a given amount of the state’s assets (…)”.5 It could 
therefore be argued that each actor in the institutional context surrounding the 
                                                 
5 My translation 
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Fund constitutes a separate case. In this thesis there are three main actors which 
together form the context. It could therefore be legitimate to place this study 
within what Bryman (2004, 55) calls multiple-case study.  
 
This research is not so explicitly connected to theory that it aims to accept or 
reject whether one specific theory can explain the empirical findings. Rather 
theory and literature is used and discussed together with empiricism to construct a 
meaningful picture together. As such the study is neither clearly deductive, nor 
clearly inductive. The reason for this is that the case has a distinctive character, 
which cannot easily be captured by a couple of theories. There is no single 
theoretical framework that can capture the dynamic of the institutional design 
related to the GPFG. A thoroughly description of this distinctive character has 
been given importance, but I will argue that this does not make the study a-
theoretical. Literature, theory and general concepts are presented before the 
specific analysis. Assumptions are however also drawn after reviewing the 
empirical material.    
 
The objective with the historical perspective is to investigate whether any red 
thread in the strategies throughout the period 2006-2012 can be identified. 
According to Bartolini (1993, 132), time is an important factor in comparative 
social research, arguing that time should be interpreted as a dimension of 
variation. Contrarily, has there been any change in the guiding principles? In 
chapter 6 there will be a thorough analysis of how climate change has been on the 
agenda for the three actors. The actors’ consistency, or eventually inconsistency, 
in their climate change approach is important. Does climate change seem to be on 
the agenda to the extent to which the actors claim? Is there consistency between 
what is actually done, and what is expressed in the actors’ written material? The 
actors’ continuity, or eventually discontinuity, is similarly important. By 
continuity I mean whether the actors climate change strategy has evolved and 
been expanded throughout the period. The historical approach will enable me to 
systematically analyze the actors over the given period. During the analysis it will 
be essential to accept the possibility of plural explanations, which is important in 
order to understand a phenomenon (Kratochwil 2008, 96-97). This will clearly 
come to expression in chapter 6.  
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Once the topic was narrowed down (why climate change was chosen was 
explained in the introduction), and the role and the importance of the different 
actors was clarified, a time frame had to be selected. Every study has to be 
limited, and this applies also for this thesis. Periodization is, according to Della 
Porta (2008, 220), a challenging and important step in research. It is easier to 
define a spatial unit that has clear boarders, than a time unit with less clear 
boarders. It is however important to choose a time frame which accounts for all 
the changes in the relevant variables. The periodization can moreover be both 
deductive and inductive. The latter refers to empirical evidence as the basis for the 
periodization (Della Porta 2008, 222), and is the most suited in this thesis because 
some particular events made it relevant to focus on the period 2006-2012.  
 
The GPFG is a large and complex fund, with a distinctive institutional character 
with several actors. Therefore the timeframe could not be too long, in order to be 
operationalized within the space constraint and scope of a thesis. As already 
mentioned the chosen time frame is the period of 2006-2012, due to several 
reasons. The key question was whether to use the Ministry of Finance or NBIM as 
the reference point, in addition to identifying the key variables. In 2006 NBIM 
stated that they had decided on six focus areas for a corporate governance strategy 
for the period 2007-2010, among them climate change. As such 2006 is a natural 
starting point for a study of NBIM and climate change. The ethical guidelines 
were established in 2004, and thus before the main period of this study. The 
ethical guidelines do not emphasize on climate change in any particular grade, and 
thus it was found more natural to use NBIM’s starting point as a time frame. 2006 
is also the year in which the Fund was named the Government Pension Fund 
Global. Besides, it is also interesting to skew the timeframe towards today, both 
because in a field where there are constantly changes it is necessary to be updated, 
but also in order to include an important happening in the study; the Ministry’s 
initiative towards a joint research project on climate change and investors. This 
resulted in two reports written by Mercer, published in 2011 and 2012. The most 
relevant is the one from 2012, since it is tailored for the GPFG. To sum up; this 
will be a study of the most decisive happenings and the central strategies which 
found place during 2006-2012, related to the GPFG and climate change. A few 
issues from the years before will however be touch upon when necessary. This is 
especially the case for the Graver Report and the subsequent establishment of the 
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ethical guidelines, since these sat the premises for the coming years. Another issue 
which I will briefly refer to is the establishment of the environmental program 
within the then called Petroleum Fund in 2001, since it is argued that the 
Ministry’s later on inclusion of a similar programme is a continuation of the 
former. 
2.1.2. A quantitative approach: a simplified content analysis as a 
supporting method 
As indicated in the title of this chapter, a simplified content analysis will be used 
as a supporting method. The rationale behind is explicitly connected to the 
historical perspective, and is thus a way to operationalize this. Since three actors’ 
climate change strategy is studied over a six-year time period, a simplified content 
analysis, or a structured document analysis, might be used to systematically 
observe eventually changes in how the actors express the climate strategy in their 
written material. If for instance an actor says that they are very concerned with 
climate change, but only mentions it a couple of times in their central documents, 
then there might be inconsistency between how that actor would like to appear, 
and what is actually done. Content analysis has been a common method for 
analyzing documents and is, according to Bryman (2004, 183) an approach that 
quantifies content in a given document in a organized and replicable manner. 
According to Bryman (2004, 195-196) there are several advantages with content 
analysis; among others that it permits the researcher to analyze changes over time. 
This is relevant for this research, since the objective with the content analysis is to 
find out to what extent climate change is on the agenda in the central documents, 
but also whether there has occurred any changes. Content analysis is not used to 
find out why climate change is on the agenda, but rather if it is on the agenda in 
the written material.   
 
Bryman (2004, 185-187) discusses how a the sample, or units of analysis, should 
be selected. In this case the sample is quite clear; content analysis will be carried 
out on the reports to the Storting and the annual reports from NBIM. It will not be 
systematically carried out on the Council on Ethics, since climate change not is an 
explicit part of their mandate. A simplified content analysis, i.e. there was not 
counting and coding of several variables,  was therefore performed on the above 
mentioned documents from 2006 to 2012, in addition to the Graver Report. The 
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latter was included because it is regarded as an agenda-setting document, meaning 
that it form the basis for the whole RI framework related to the Fund. Other 
primary sources, like for instance NBIM’s Investor Expectation document, have 
been left out of this methodological approach. The reason is that the aim with the 
content analysis is to measure to what extent climate is on the agenda by looking 
at the general documents, and not only by looking at the targeted documents. The 
simplified content analysis was performed on the word climate. When the number 
of words containing climate in the Graver Report resulted to be 23, it means that 
this included all the times climate appears in the text, also in combinations like for 
instance climate change or climate questions6. The extended result of the analysis 
can be found in appendix 1 and 2, and the general results are discussed in chapter 
6. In addition to counting the frequency of the word climate, chapter 6 also 
include a more general, but still systematical analysis of NBIM’s annual reports. It 
was for instance discussed whether there has been continuation in the amount of 
space dedicated to climate change in their written material.      
 
2.2. Data sources and data collection 
Sitter and Andersen (2010) divide data into three categories; the first is public, 
indirect and fabricated data, the second is specific indirect and the last is personal 
and direct data. Examples are, respectively, documents, existing studies, and 
interviews. This research will be conducted by using multiple data sources, and as 
such data from all three categories will be used. Triangulation, or the use of 
different types of data and methodology, makes a research sounder (Patton 2002, 
247). When both interviews and document analysis is used, the researcher can test 
for consistency in the data by comparing the results. Interview respondents might 
for instance be biased, and comparing the results with analysis of documents will 
make the research less vulnerable (Patton 2002, 248).  
 
It is moreover important to keep track of the difference between the primary 
sources, the basic documents provided by the involved actors, and secondary 
sources like the academic interpretation and analysis of the primary sources. This 
                                                 
6
 When climate appeared in the references and footnotes it was not counted, whereas results from 
tables and figures was included. A few times the word climate showed up in contexts clearly not 
referring to climate change, such as the international climate for negotiations etcetera. These cases 
have been left out. Results from headings and the content list were also included. 
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is important because the use of primary sources entitles me the possibility to 
analyze the original material, whereas use of secondary source is the analysis of 
somebody else's interpretation of the primary sources. The distinction between 
primary and secondary sources goes back to the Renaissance and Luther’s idea 
about “ad fontes”, or “to the sources”. When you have the original sources, you 
can interpret them independently, or almost independently, of what others mean, 
and as such create an independent opinion about the issue at stake. Thus, to create 
my own independent opinion primary sources are essential, but of course 
secondary sources will be very important data sources as well. According to 
Patton (2002, 293) documents like annual reports can give the researcher valuable 
information, and if carefully analyzed, such sources can also be used to find for 
instance inconsistency.  
2.2.1. Primary sources – documents 
The primary sources used in this thesis will be official reports from the Ministry 
of Finance, the Council on Ethics and of course NBIM. The annual Reports to the 
Storting from the Ministry of Finance will be analyzed from 2006 to 2011. The 
same applies for NBIM’s Annual Reports for the same time period7. Furthermore 
NBIM’s Investor Expectation Document from 2009 and the updated version from 
2010, as well as the Sector Compliance Reports from 2009, 2010 and 2011 will be 
discussed. When it comes to the reports from the Council on Ethics they will not 
be assessed on a yearly basis like the material from the other two actors. The 
reasons are described above. The legal mandate of the management of the Fund 
will be an important source to find out what the premises for the actors are. The 
above mentioned report from the Graver Committee NOU 2003:22 Management 
for the Future
8 will also be included, despite being from 2003. The Graver Report 
has an intrinsic value as an agenda-setting document. Getting access to the data 
has not caused major problems, all the relevant actors have the material easily 
available on their home pages. In the end it should be mentioned that material 
from the actors has been used both in Norwegian and English (there is often two 
versions of each document). The exact cites are almost always from the English 
versions. Thus, if it is not specified diversely, the citations are not translated by 
                                                 
7 The reports are in general published around Easter the subsequent year. The report about 2011 is 
thus published in the spring 2012. As such the reports sometimes refer to happenings in the first 
months of the subsequent year. In the thesis the reports are named with the content year, and not 
the publication year. This makes it more clear and easy for the reader to follow the argument.  
8
 In Norwegian known as “NOU 2003:22 Forvaltning for fremtiden”. 
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me. Only the English version of the reports are listed in the bibliography (unless 
in those case where only a Norwegian version exists). 
2.2.2. Primary sources – interviews 
To get additional information apart from the documents, interviews have been 
conducted. A tape recorder was used in order to transcribe the interviews and turn 
it into a written primary source. The unit of analysis should be what the 
informants actually said, not what the interviewer noted herself. A case-analysis 
approach, in which a case is written for each person interviewed (Patton 2002, 
440) was used. The interviews were semi-structured, as this was found most 
suited. It should be noted that I found it important to be open for the spontaneity 
in the conversations, in order to get as much information from the interviewees as 
possible. In an interviewing situation it is difficult to not be influenced by the 
informants, the use of tape recorder will partly cancel out the problem. One 
employee it NBIM’s corporate governance team, and three employees in the 
Ministry of Finance have been interviewed (only two of them are cited in the 
thesis). These employees represent the Ministry and NBIM, and are therefore not 
named. Furthermore Dag Hessen, member in the Council on Ethics and Henrik 
Syse, former head of the corporate governance section in NBIM, Jeanett Bergan 
from KLP, and former Minister of the Environment minister Erik Solheim9, has 
been interviewed.  Two environmental NGOs have also been interviewed; Bellona 
and the Future in Our Hands (FiOH)10. I have also attended the 2012 hearing in 
the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Parliament 
(hereinafter the Committee on Finance) about the GPFG, participated in several 
relevant conferences, and discussed the thesis with other relevant persons like 
professor in climate strategy Jørgen Randers. What was the rationale for selecting 
exactly these interviewees? First of all it was crucial to interview at least one 
person from each of the three actors. It was also important to speak to Syse, since 
he was the “founding father” of the corporate governance section in NBIM. The 
two NGOs were selected because they have both been active in the debate about 
the GPFG. To get another viewpoint it was fruitful to interview another investor, 
and KLP was chosen since they also have extensive responsible investment 
strategies. Erik Solheim voiced clear opinions about the GPFG and climate during 
                                                 
9 A shorter telephone interview. 
10 In Norwegian: Framtiden i våre hender. The abbreviation has been made by myself. 
                                                 
Page 14 
the period in which he left the position as minister, and it was as such very 
interesting to speak to him.  
2.2.3. Secondary sources 
Several secondary sources have been used to enlighten my understanding and 
analysis of the primary sources. Most important is of course academic literature. 
Material from Mercer will also be a substantial source since they have conducted 
research on climate change and investors in general and about GPFG in particular. 
Another important source in this regard is the 53 contributions submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance in 2008 as a part of an evaluation of the ethical guidelines. A 
few things should be mentioned about the academic literature; many of the 
authors are also actors from the field, rather than researchers only. As Joly (2011, 
195) puts it “this chapter is written from the perspective of an investment 
professional and RI activist. It is not a detached piece of academic research”. Part 
of the literature is also from international organizations, like UN bodies or various 
investment organizations. It has sometimes been challenging to isolate purely 
academic literature from more biased literature from the sector itself. Also, the 
purely academic literature is far less extensive. Head of Climate Change Center in 
HSBC bank, Robins (2012) explicitly argued that business schools, and thus 
academia, are lagging behind the investment sector. As a consequence investors 
are lacking a good theoretical fundament when it comes to responsible and/or 
green investments. Even though a comprehensive amount of literature has been 
used in this thesis, there are few peer-reviewed articles, or articles published in 
level two journals, in the bibliography. There is moreover also a lack of literature 
discussing the GPFG, as also noted by Reiche (2010, 3569) and this is also 
reflected in this thesis.  
 
2.3. Structure of the thesis 
The research will be divided into two main parts. Part one will be more general, 
reviewing literature and clarifying important issues. Chapter 3 will consist of a 
presentation of the three actors and the structure between them, in addition to the 
RI agenda of the Fund. In chapter 4 there is a conceptualizing of what climate 
change mean for investors and how this might necessitate a rethinking of fiduciary 
duties. In chapter 4 a reviewing of some literature discussing RI in general and the 
Fund in particular will follow. The theoretical framework in chapter 5 will include 
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a presentation of various RI instruments, as well as agency theory. Part two will 
be a more specific discussion, analyzing explicitly the GPFG. This will take place 
in chapter 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Page 16 
 
3. The Fund and the three actors – NBIM, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Council on Ethics 
In this chapter the Fund and the responsible investment agenda will be presented. 
Thereafter follows a description of each of the three actors. The first two research 
questions presented in chapter 1.2 will be answered here, i.e. what are the relevant 
actors, and how is the organizational structure and role-division between them? 
And what is the regulatory pattern of the GPFG, and is climate change 
incorporated in the legal mandate of the Fund? A presentation of the actors and 
the institutional distinction has an intrinsic value for the scope of this thesis, since 
it forms a necessary knowledge for understanding the climate change strategies. It 
is also important to remember that coping with climate change never can be the 
primary motivation for a fund like the GPFG. There is also a necessary logic of 
consequence in the following; by presenting how climate change is not on the 
agenda in some important parts of the Fund like the laws and mandates, it 
becomes more clear to what extent climate change actually is on the agenda.  
 
3.1. The Government Pension Fund Global 
In 1990 the Fund was established with the label the Norwegian Petroleum Fund, 
since it was based on revenues gained through fossil resources in Norway. The 
first transaction took place in 1996. The objective of the establishment was to 
safeguard the long term financial security of the Norwegian population. In 2006 
the Fund was renamed the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global, 
however the Fund is not earmarked pension expenses (Ministry of Finance 
2011b). As will be shown in the analysis below, some of the informants argued 
that this change of name was a purely strategic act, in order to de-couple the Fund 
from the somewhat criticized oil production.  
 
Figure 1 below shows the relationship between the Fund and the involved actors 
relevant for this research. The map is based on the research conducted in this 
thesis, and is my own interpretation of the various sources. The three most 
relevant actors are outlined in blue, and each of them will be presented in the 
sections below. The Council on Ethics has intentionally been given a lighter color, 
since this actor today has a more limited role in regard of climate change.  
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Figure 1: Map of the Fund and the involved actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The owners of the Fund are the Norwegian population. The Parliament is 
managing the Fund on behalf of the Norwegian population, but has delegated the 
management of the Fund to the Ministry of Finance, which again has delegated 
the operational management to Norges Bank. The Committee on Finance in the 
Parliament has the responsibility for the administrative procedures in the 
Parliament. The Ministry submits a report to the Storting11 about the Fund each 
year. When the Parliament received the 2011 Report on the management of the 
Fund from the Ministry, the Committee organized a hearing. In this hearing both 
the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Central Bank Governor Øystein Olsen and 
the Director of NBIM Yngve Slyngstad participated. In addition several NGOs 
                                                 
11 In Norwegian: Stortingsmelding 
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were invited. When the Committee has finished its treatment of the report, there is 
a hearing in the Parliament. There are usually several comments and proposals 
from various political parties. A few examples will be discussed in chapter 6.   
 
The Ministry has delegated the operational management to the Norwegian Bank, 
which again has delegated the day-to-day responsibility to NBIM. NBIM submit 
both an annual report and quarterly reports to the Ministry. The Council on Ethics 
was established by Royal Decree in 2004, and has a separate secretariat (The 
Government 2012a). The circles in the figure represent relevant stakeholders, like 
media and NGOs, as well as international networks that NBIM and the Ministry 
are part of. The concrete action in each of the arrows will be discussed later in the 
thesis, see for instance chapter 5.  
3.1.1 The responsible investment agenda and climate change 
NBIM seeks to both maximize long term financial return from the Fund, and 
invest in accordance with the ethical standards of the Funds owner, the Norwegian 
people (represented by the Parliament and the Ministry). Since 2004 the Fund has 
been subject to a set of ethical guidelines, which were evaluated in 2008. The 
evaluation process resulted in new guidelines for the responsible investment 
activity launched 1st March 2010 (Ministry of Finance 2011b). The GPFG’s 
primary motivation is still to ensure intra-generation solidarity by securing future 
generations of Norwegians a stable financial situation.  
 
The first Ethical Guidelines derived from a report written by the Graver 
Committee in 2003, NOU 2003:22 Forvaltning for fremtiden. The report was 
written on behalf of the Ministry and emphasized that the ethical principles were 
supposed to be in anchored in the general ethical standards of the Fund's owner, 
namely the Norwegian people (Graver Committee 2003b). It is of course difficult 
to identify a common ethical standard that applies for everybody in Norway, but 
the report was concerned with overlapping consensus, i.e. that investments should 
be in line with what most Norwegians find appropriate. The Graver Committee 
(Graver Committee 2003b, paragraph 5.1) launched three instruments that should 
be used when managing the Fund: 
- Exercise of ownership rights, or corporate governance. 
- Negative screening/selection, i.e. not invest in certain companies. 
                                                 
Page 19 
- Withdrawal, i.e. the Fund divests from companies that violate the ethical 
standards promoted by the Fund. 
These instruments will be thoroughly presented in the theory chapter, and 
thereafter discussed in chapter 6. The same applies to positive screening, i.e. 
invest in certain companies or sectors, which was not among the instruments 
suggested by the Graver committee. Positive screening has, on the other side, been 
a topic in the public debate in Norway.  
 
3.2. The Ministry of Finance 
The Ministry of Finance has the formal responsibility for the management of the 
Fund. Within the Ministry, the Asset Management Department has the day-to-day 
responsibility. They handle the general investment strategy, hereunder the 
responsible investment strategy and the ethical guidelines (Ministry of Finance 
2012e). Since the GPFG is publicly owned it is subject to government regulation, 
and as also shown in figure 1, the political actors are on top of the hierarchy. 
There is a variety of definitions and ways to understand regulation. The objective 
of regulation can be understood as “producing outcomes that are in the interests of 
everyone” (Hix and Høyland 2011, 189). This is a broad and not very applicable 
definition, but in the GPFG case it can be understood as regulation should be in 
place to ensure everyone’s interest. The challenge is then both to define interest, 
but also everyone. In economic theory everyone would normally be understood as 
all agents, or all players. In the GPFG case it is not so easy to sort out. Should 
everyone be understood as every Norwegian citizen, and furthermore should it 
include every future Norwegian citizen? Or does everyone refer to all 
contemporary human beings? It is stated in the written material about the Fund , 
see for instance (Ministry of Finance 2011a, 9), that we can understand everyone 
as every contemporary and future Norwegian inhabitant, but it is also stated that 
the interest of these is dependent on sustainable development in economic, 
environmental and social terms, see §2-1 (1) in table 1 below. Thus there is both 
an inter- and intra-generational aspect when defining who the fund should operate 
in the interest of.   
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The legal mandate of the Fund is found in the Law on the Government Pension 
Fund of 200512, derived from the original law which established the Fund in 1990, 
in which it is stated in §2 that the Fund should be managed by the Ministry. 
(Lovdata 2012). The more detailed management of the Fund is regulated through 
several mandates and regulations. The most important is the Management 
Mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global13. For this thesis the most 
relevant parts of the mandate are found in table 1 on next page.  
Table 1 (Lovdata 2010) 
§1-1 (2) The Bank shall seek to achieve the highest possible return after management costs 
measured in the currency basket of the actual benchmark index.  
§1-1 (3) The Bank shall make investment decisions independently of the Ministry. 
§1-7 (1) The Bank shall advise the Ministry on the investment strategy for the GPFG. 
Advice may be provided on the initiative of the Bank or on request from the 
Ministry 
§2-1 (1) The management of the Fund’s capital shall be based on the goal of achieving the 
highest possible return, cf. section 1-1, second paragraph. A good return in the long 
term is regarded as being dependent upon sustainable development in economic, 
environmental and social terms, as well as well-functioning, legitimate and effective 
markets. 
§2-1 (2) The Bank shall have internal guidelines for integrating considerations of good 
corporate governance and environmental and social issues in investment activities, 
in line with internationally recognized principles for responsible investment. The 
integration of these considerations shall occur in respect of the GPFG’s investment 
strategy and role as financial manager. In executing its management assignment, the 
Bank shall give priority to a long-term horizon for investments and the investments 
being broadly placed in the markets included in the investment universe. 
§2-1 (3) In its management of the real estate portfolio, the Bank shall in the area of 
environmental protection give priority to i.e. considerations of energy efficiency, 
water consumption and waste management. 
§2-2 (1) The Bank’s primary goal in its active ownership is to safeguard GPFG’s financial 
interests. 
§2-2 (2) Active ownership shall be based on the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
The Bank shall have internal guidelines for its exercise of ownership rights that 
indicate how these principles are integrated. 
                                                 
12 In Norwegian: Lov om statens pensjonsfond LOV-2005-12-21-123 
13 In Norwegian: FOR: 2010-11-08 nr 1414: Mandat for forvaltningen av Statens Pensjonsfond 
utland. The original source from Lovdata (2010) is in Norwegian, an unofficial English translation 
from the Ministry of Finance’s webpage has been used for the exact citing 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/the-
guidelines-for-the-management-of-the.html?id=434605)  
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§2-2 (3) Major amendments to the Bank’s priorities in its active ownership shall be sent to 
the Ministry for comment before a final decision is made. The Bank’s plans shall be 
subject to public consultation before being submitted to the Ministry. 
§2-3 The Bank shall actively contribute to the development of good international 
standards in the area of responsible investment and active ownership. 
§2-4 The Bank shall, within the frame of § 3-5, establish environmental mandates. The 
marked value of the environmental investments should normally be 20-30 billion 
NOK14.  
 
What is interesting to note in regard to this research is that climate change is not 
explicitly mentioned in the legal mandate of the fund. However, the last sentence 
in § 2-1(1) "a good return in the long term is regarded as being dependent upon 
sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms" makes the 
premises of the Fund quite clear. According to the Ministry this sentence reflects 
how they consider the reality in which the Fund operates (Ministry of Finance 
2012d). Even though the primary motivation is the financial aspect, future return 
is seen as dependent of some non-financial factors. Moreover it is interesting to 
note that energy efficiency with regards to the real estate portfolio, and the 
environmental mandates are included in the mandate, cf. §2-1 (3) and §2-4. This 
is a clear sign of commitment. The extracted parts of the mandated will be used 
later in the thesis, both in chapter 5 and 6.  
 
Why is part of the Management Mandate included in the thesis when climate 
change is not included in this? Again, according to a kind of inverse logic, it is 
important to demonstrate that climate is not included in the mandate and the law. 
The reason is that the law and the mandate are the ultimate documents, ranging 
over all other documents related to the Fund. Despite not being unchangeable, 
they are much more binding than for instance internal principles from one of the 
actors. When something is included in these documents, it says something about 
how this specific issue is valued. When climate change is not included, it means 
that there is nothing that obliges future actors to focus on climate change. Or, 
there is nothing preventing them from not focusing on climate change. One could 
imagine a hypothetical situation in which for instance the Progress Party (FrP) 
                                                 
14
 Included in the Mandate in 2012. My own translation, since § 2-4 was not included in the 
Ministry’s unofficial translation.  
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gets a majority in the Parliament. This party is known for openly questioning 
whether climate change is man-made. They have furthermore questioned the cost 
of the ethical guidelines (E24 2012; Tybbring-Gjedde 2012). It is a hypothetical 
question, but how can future commitment be ensured when there is nothing in the 
governing documents about climate change?  
 
3.3. The Norwegian Bank Investment Management 
The Norwegian Bank Investment Management (NBIM) is the operational 
manager of the Fund. The activity related to the Fund is subject to several 
governing documents, which are also relevant for this research. The following are 
the most relevant, presented in table 2 in hierarchical sequencing. 
Table 2 
The Parliament 
Law on the Government Pension Fund of 2005 from the Parliament 
 
The Ministry 
 Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global from 
 
The Executive Board of the Central Bank 
 Central principles  (the investment mandate & the principles for ownership 
management) 
 
NBIM 
 Guidelines from the Chief Executive Officer (the responsible investment policy) 
 
The Corporate Governance section in NBIM 
 Focus areas 
 
The Corporate Governance section in NBIM 
Investor Expectation document on Climate Change Risk Management 
 
 
The two first were presented in the previous chapter. The Executive Board of the 
Central Bank has issued an investment mandate to NBIM, in which it is stated, as 
in all other relevant documents, that the fund should maximize the highest 
possible return (NBIM 2011b). NBIM is furthermore an active manager, meaning 
that the objective is to create higher return than the index (NBIM 2010a). In the 
investment mandate there is furthermore a paragraph on responsible investment, 
in which the following is made clear (NBIM 2011b, 1): 
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- Corporate governance should be exercised to ensure the financial interests 
of the Fund. 
- ESG issues should be incorporated in the investment decision, in line with 
international principles, and taking into account long-term aspect, as well 
as the role as a universal owner. 
- The real estate portfolio should emphasize energy efficiency. 
- Active ownership should be based on Global Compact, and OECD’s 
guidelines for corporate governance and multinational enterprises.  
At this level, there is another governing document, the central principles for 
ownership management. There is nothing concrete about climate change in either 
of these documents from the Executive Board. In NBIM’s own policy documents 
issued from the Chief Executive Officer, in this case the responsible investment 
policy document, several issues are clarified. First of all responsible investment is 
defined as “an investor who incorporates material ESG related risk factor 
considerations into fund management practices in order to improve long-term 
returns” (NBIM 2011c, 1).  As will be shown in chapter 5.1., this definition is 
slightly different from most other RI definitions. Furthermore the E for 
environment in ESG factors is defined as: climate change (greenhouse gas 
emission), energy efficiency, biodiversity, waste management, water 
management, and other air and water pollution (NBIM 2011c, 1). Hence, climate 
change is included in NBIM’s own understanding of ESG issues and as a 
consequence also of their understating of responsible investment.  
 
It is furthermore stated that NBIM regards long-term return to be dependent on 
sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms, which is in 
line with §2-1 (1) in the overall investment mandate from the Ministry. In the 
responsible investment policy (NBIM 2011c, 2-3) it is stated that NBIM should 
concentrate ownership activity to areas of particular importance for the Fund 
through; communication of their principles, dialogue with companies, 
contributing to the development of good international standards and regulation, 
voting at company meetings, collaboration with investors, organisations and 
networks, and finally by legal action. These instruments are very much in line 
with the principles from the Executive Board, and are more concerned with how 
NBIM should take action, rather than stating what areas should be of particular 
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importance. This is left to the governance section within NBIM, which must be 
considered the “lowest”, but also the most concrete, level. Here it is explicitly 
stated that climate change is one of six present focus areas in the ownership 
engagement (NBIM 2011d). According to NBIM, dialogue with companies and 
regulating authorities, as well as influencing other actors to take action, are the 
most important tools to combat climate change for an investor (NBIM 2012b). 
 
In the annual report for 2006 NBIM launched that they had an ambition to become 
a leading actor in perusing of ownership rights or good corporate governance. 
Furthermore, environmental issues was one of two focus areas in the years to 
come (the other one was children's rights, despite being interesting and important, 
it will not be discussed in this thesis). The focus on environment was narrowed 
down to how companies interact with national and supranational governments in 
questions related to climate change. Thus, the focus was on how companies lobby, 
and how NBIM could encourage to more transparency and responsibility in these 
lobbying processes (NBIM 2006, 72-73).  
 
Furthermore, in the 2006 report NBIM did put forward some arguments 
explaining why the two focus areas were chosen. First of all it was important for 
NBIM to focus on areas with relevance for investors. The Stern report and the 
possible scenario that climate change can affect the economic markets negatively 
in the future was one reason. Furthermore it was emphasized that the possibility of 
achieving good dialogues within the selected area, and of course ensuring 
financial return (NBIM 2006). From the beginning of 2006 climate change as a 
focus area has evolved. Today the focus is no longer only on lobbying, but on 
climate change in general. This process will be assessed in chapter 6. NBIM has 
developed an investor expectation document on climate change, and this 
document will also be discussed in chapter 6.  
 
3.4. The Council on Ethics 
As mentioned above the Council on Ethics was established by a Royal Decree in 
2004, as a result of the Graver Report and a broad political unanimity about 
strengthening the ethical profile of the Fund. The Council on Ethics has five 
members and a separate secretariat (The Government 2012a). The members are 
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not permanent, and they have varied background. As of today professor Dag O. 
Hessen is the member with the most relevant background for this thesis, and 
therefore he has been interviewed. As showed in paragraph 3.1.1, the responsible 
investment work related to the Fund is expressed by several instruments. Whereas 
NBIM has the responsibility for the ownership engagement, the Council on Ethics 
has the responsibility for recommending which companies should be excluded. 
The Ministry has both the responsibility for the negative screening, and also 
whether or not to follow up the Council on Ethics recommendations for 
divestment. In addition to the running recommendations from the Council, they 
sum up their work in an annual report each year. The Council has no independent 
instruments, but the power to decide which companies they want to investigate 
further should of course not be underestimated. The Council on Ethics has no 
governing documents apart from the guidelines from the Ministry. Since climate 
change is not explicitly mentioned in these guidelines, the Council has as such no 
mandate to focus particularly on this. This is very important, and set the premises 
for their work. It also set the premises for this thesis and there will be less 
emphasize on the Council on Ethics in this thesis than what might have seem 
naturally at a first sight.  In chapter 5.1 there will be a presentation of the different 
RI instruments, and the Council on Ethics is mainly responsible for exclusion of 
companies based on conduct, with regards to this thesis it is most relevant that 
companies can be excluded if they contribute to severe environmental damage. In 
chapter 6 the role of the Council will be discussed further, with emphasize on how 
this is interpreted. Is severe environmental damage interpreted in a restrictively 
manner? Or is it interpreted broadly, i.e. is climate change understood as part of 
severe environmental damage?  
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4. Literature and conceptualizing 
In this chapter research question 3 and 4, presented in chapter 1.2, will be 
discussed: what do climate change means for a long-term institutional investor 
like GPFG? And what is RI, and how can it be conceptualized for the GPFG? 
The review of literature and definition of central concepts will consists of three 
parts; first there will be a short presentation of why climate change is a relevant 
issue for investors. This serves to set the scene and give some possible 
explanations for why the three actors have chosen to focus on climate change. 
Secondly, a review of literature discussing the concept of responsible investment 
will follow. This is relevant for this thesis since climate change is part of the 
responsible investment agenda for the Fund. Moreover, it is useful to see the 
GPFG within a broader picture by looking at how NBIM’s and the Ministry’s 
understanding of RI fit with the general literature. Lastly, there will be a short 
section presenting literature discussing the Fund.  
 
It should be mentioned that this conceptualizing discussion might not be a 
traditional literature review, as also non-academic sources are included. These 
sources are often written by actors in the field, or published by various UN bodies. 
An interesting question is why academia shows less interest, or less innovative 
capacity, within this field. One gets the impression that the updated research 
seems to be driven from the corporate world, whereas academia seems to be 
somewhat lagging behind and discussing only more general aspects. A challenge 
with this is that much of the literature is quite a-theoretical. 
 
4.1. Climate change and investors: from market failure to pro-activeness? 
4.1.1. When externalities become internal: the universal owner nexus  
Climate change per se is not the topic in this thesis, and thus there will be no 
independent discussion of this challenge. As a very brief background is should 
however be mentioned that climate change was made known as a global challenge 
in the early 1990’s, when the UN published its first report on the issue (UNFCCC 
2012)15. In the following years it was established that global temperature had to 
                                                 
15
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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increase by no more than 2 degrees over pre-industrial level, otherwise serious 
climate change damages would become a reality (UNFCCC 2012). It was, 
however, not until the mid-2000s with the Stern Review (2006) that the 
economics of climate change was made really clear, and as a consequence the 
issue became increasingly relevant for investors. In the review it was argued that 
“climate change is a result of the externality associated with greenhouse-gas 
emissions – it entails costs that are not paid for by those who create the 
emissions” (Stern Review 2006, 23)16. This is at the core of the whole problem, 
which is also reflected in the title of this chapter; the corporate world, and index 
based investors, has not considered these externalities sufficiently, resulting in a 
great market failure. Kiernan (2007, 478) argues that failure to recognize 
externalities is the 21st Century’s “tragedy of the commons”.  
 
The relevance of climate change was especially relevant for universal owners like 
NBIM, since they are expected to be more affected by the effects of climate 
change, than less differentiated funds. The reason is that climate change is 
expected to be costly and create harm across all markets and thus the broader the 
portfolio, the higher the risk. This view is present in for instance the report 
Universal Ownership: Why environmental externalities matter to institutional 
investors written by UN's Principles of Responsible Investments (UNPRI) and 
UN’s Environmental Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) (UNPRI and 
UNEPFI 2011) in which it is argued that universal owners are especially exposed 
to the costs and risks posed by environmental damage. Universal owners are 
defined as “Universal Owners typically have diversified investments across asset 
classes, sectors and geographies with long time horizons” (UNPRI and UNEPFI 
2011, 8). This definition fits well with NBIM, which has been defined as a 
universal owner also by Gjessing and Syse (2007).  
 
One main assumption in this thesis is therefore that the universal owner nexus is 
the main reason for why NBIM and the Ministry focus’ on climate change.  
 
Since future climate change policies or regulation are somewhat uncertain, i.e., 
there is no long-term global agreements or commitment by policy makers, 
investors face a dual risk. According to Sullivan et al. (2011, 203) investors might 
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 Part 1, chapter 2, page 23 
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both suffer from the direct costs of climate change, as well as the risk posted by 
government policy initiatives or future regulation. This might be the case for 
traditional investments in for instance fossil fuels, which might not be as 
convenient in the future if tougher regulation is imposed on the sector. It might 
however also be the case for investments in the renewable sector, where 
profitability might depend on uncertain government incentives. 
 
In the report from UNEPFI and UNPRI (2011, 17) it was found that the global 
costs of environmental externalities was 6.6 trillion USD in 2008, and in line with 
the Stern review it is argued that mitigation is far less costly than the future 
damages. This was however not the first report, during the 2000s UNEPFI 
published several reports about this climate change, emphasizing its relevance for 
investors. Among them is The materiality of climate change: How finance cope 
with the ticking clock  (UNEPFI 2009) in which it is argued that “responsible 
investors have been integrating climate change into their asset management for 
some time now, but mainstream investors still view the issue with some 
skepticism” (UNEPFI 2009, 8). It is furthermore argued that there it is now so 
much evidence of the risks and cost affiliated with climate change, that all 
investors should take action by include climate change as an issue in the asset 
management, communicate with policy makers, and collaborate with other 
investors (UNEPFI 2009, 8-9). One should of course be somewhat critical to these 
reports, but the fact that UN bodies clearly focus on the finance of climate change, 
and its relevance for investors, should not be underestimated either.  
 
When it comes to collaboration and networking Tang and Dlugolecki (2005, 7) 
argue that the “climate change initiatives are exploding” and mention the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), the Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change 
(IIGCG) and the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) as important. Neither 
NBIM nor the Ministry is members in the two latter. NBIM is however the main 
sponsor in part of CDP’s activity (NBIM 2009a), which is a non-profit initiative 
working for reduced green-house gas emissions (CDP 2012). Another UN body 
with relevance for investors is UNEPFI, UN’s Environmental Programme’s 
Finance Initiative, a joint initiative between UN and the finance sector (UNEPFI 
2012). Among their initiatives is the “2011 Global Investor Statement on Climate 
Change” which has been signed by 285 investors. The statement was made in 
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collaboration with the UNPRI, as well as the above mentioned IIGCG and the 
INCR (UNEPFI 2011). NBIM has signed this statement, and furthermore one of 
their employees wrote about the statement and the importance of climate change 
in Aftenposten (Wright 2011). It is quite unusual that NBIM employees write 
chronicles, so one could argue that the fact that it was done in regards to climate 
change, might signify that this particular issue is of outmost importance for 
NBIM.   
 
As mirrored in the title of this subchapter, there is a growing acceptance among 
investors about the importance of climate change, see for instance Sullivan et.al. 
(2005) and Ceres (2011). According to Nordhaus, climate change has a many-
faced nature. He argues that climate change is a particular difficult issue since 
“ecologists may see it as a threat to ecosystems (…) businesses may view global 
warming as either an opportunity or a hazard, politicians as a great issue as long 
as they don’t need to mention taxes (…)” (Nordhaus 2007, 5). An interesting 
aspect in this regard is how climate change actually is conceptualized by investors. 
Climate change does not necessarily mean the same for universal owners as for 
other actors in the society like environmental NGOs, part of the media, political 
parties and maybe the general population in a country like Norway. The general 
debate about climate change is generally centered on arguments about our 
common future and what we can do to avoid future problems. In the investment 
sector discussions on climate change are more concerned with the financial risks 
climate change pose in the long run, and how investors can insure them self 
against such risks. This is of course legitimate, since investors after all are profit 
maximizing actors. Still, it is useful to have this in mind. To investors, focusing 
on climate change is often only a mean to ensure future returns. This is part of a 
more philosophical discussion about what the rationale for conducting good 
actions should be. Does good actions in se, or doing good for others, have an 
intrinsic value? Or is self-interest a legitimate rationale for good actions? Syse 
(2007) discusses the motivation behind ethics when it comes to the GPFG, 
arguing that the ethics of the Fund can be said to have some intrinsic value. Still, 
the primary motivation of the Fund is, and should be according to Syse (2007), to 
be a traditional financial investor.  
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Another assumption is then that climate change is not necessarily understood in 
the same way for investors and the general society.   
 
As reflected in the title of this chapter there is a link between market failures and 
climate change. Market failure is a situation in which markets fails to achieve a 
situation which is to the benefit of the whole society. One reason is the lack of 
considering externalities, for instance pollution and carbon emission, which 
traditionally has been part of negative externalities. Another market failure is 
related to so-called public goods, which are goods belonging to everybody and as 
such often over-utilized. One example is clean water or fresh air (MacKenzie 
2006, 22-23). According to Joly (2008) today’s financial markets does not 
sufficiently price the cost of externalities like climate change. Financial greed and 
a non-existing concern with for instance climate change and the overall long term 
benefit of the society also fits well into Hardin’s (1968) idea about the tragedy of 
the commons. The whole climate change challenge can be regarded as a classical 
prisoner’s dilemma17. In a very simplified version you can imagine two investors 
considering whether to include the climate change risk or not in the investment 
decision. In the short term it would certainly be expensive for investor A to 
consider this if investor B does not also do so. If on the other side both investors 
cooperated about the issue, it would benefit them both in the long term. In a 
classical prisoner’s dilemma the outcome would be that neither of the investors 
considered the climate change risk, since they would not risk bearing the costs 
alone. Thus, a very clear market failure, since the opposite outcome would be 
better for the investors in the long term. As stated in §2-1 (2) in the Management 
Mandate (see table 1), the long-term perspective should be emphasized in the 
Fund’s investments.  
 
According to Sullivan et al. (2005, 197) most investors have not been particularly 
interested in climate change, arguing that “most investor intervention has tended 
to be reactive rather than proactive”.  However, they argue that this is changing, 
due to mainly two issues; first, climate change is increasingly regarded as a 
fiduciary issue which might affect long-term returns if action is not taken. 
Secondly, investors are increasingly concerned with how non-financial issues 
affect companies value and thus return (Sullivan et al. 2005, 198).  More recent 
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 See Shepsle (2010, 235-238) for a general introduction to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
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research suggests however that there has been a change in investors attitude the 
last five years, and that investors now are a driving force for policy initiatives 
(Ambachtsheer 2012). In a report from 2006 it is also stated that investors are in 
fact interested in climate change, and that this also is apparent in proxy voting in 
the US, where the number of filings on climate change resolutions increased 
remarkably from early- to mid-2000s (Cogan 2006, 15-16). Seitchik (2009, 295) 
is moreover arguing that investors are ahead of governments in this regard, and 
that investors are the leading actors also in climate related research. This supports 
the above claim about research being mainly driven from the sector itself. The 
positive effect of research from the sector itself is that it might be more rooted in 
reality and the concrete knowledge needs investors have.   
 
Nevertheless, there is still a large gap between the needed investments in green 
technology and renewables and the de-facto investments, called the clean energy 
investment gap by Sullivan (2011, 6). According to the World Energy Agency 
500 billion USD in investments are need yearly up to 2035. In 2010 only 211 
billion USD was invested in such activity. This was a 39 percent increase from 
2009, and much of the growth took place in developing countries like China 
(Sullivan 2011, 6-7)18. There are however several challenges with investments in 
renewable energy, as discussed also by the Ministry (2008e, 66-68), among them 
the tight tie between profitability in this sector and the fossil fuel prices, as well as 
the sector’s dependency on government incentives and regulation.  
4.1.2. Obligations towards whom – rethinking fiduciary duties? 
Fiduciary duties are relevant for all investors and is defined by “a relationship in 
which one party (the fiduciary) is bound to act for the benefit of and in the interest 
of another, the beneficiary” (Nagell 2011, 80). This is relevant for the GPFG, 
since its establishment was undertaken with the objective to secure the financial 
wealth of future generations. Fiduciary duty is in the Norwegian case as such 
understood as an ethical obligation, as part of the intra-generational solidarity 
discussion. Nevertheless, fiduciary duty is different for the GPFG since it is not 
earmarked the future pension of actor X and Y, like a traditional pension fund. 
According to Sullivan (2011, 8) the fiduciary aspect signifies that:  
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Other than in those situations where a client or beneficiary has made 
an explicit request in this regard, most institutional investors will only 
invest in areas such as low-carbon technology or clean energy if there 
is a compelling financial case for making such investments.  
This is the classical understanding of fiduciary duties, which one could imagine 
might have been used as an excuse by investors to not re-allocate investments in a 
more green direction.  
 
However, as Nagell (2011, 80-81) points out, fiduciary duties are no longer 
understood as exclusively an obligation to maximize financial returns. Several 
aspects have recently been included in the discussion about fiduciary duty; firstly, 
fiduciary duties do no longer require the optimization of single investments, but 
rather the whole portfolio as such. Secondly, non-financial aspect has to an 
increasingly extent been included in investment considerations. Thirdly, the 
definition of beneficiary’s interest has been extended from purely financial terms. 
The last  factor pushing the fiduciary discussion, as emphasized by Nagell (Nagell 
2011) is the emergence of voluntary networks. Kiernan (2005, 212) also argues 
that environmental factors traditionally have been neglected by investors, since 
such concerns have been regarded either irrelevant or even damaging in their cost-
return equation, but that this has been completely turned around over the last 
years. Several reasons can be identified as to why investors now are increasingly 
incorporating climate change in the investment decisions. Among them is the 
increased scientific consensus about the threat climate change pose, the physical 
costs of climate change, regulation of green-house gas emissions as well as other 
government initiatives. Lastly climate change is being increasingly accepted as a 
fiduciary issue (2005, 211-212). Dickinson (2005, 196) even argues that “taking 
climate risk into account is now becoming part of smart financial management. 
Failure to do so may well tantamount to an abdication of fiduciary responsibility”.  
 
According to Bellona, the change of name of the Fund from Petroleum Fund to 
Government Pension Fund Global was made in order to avoid excessive spending 
of oil revenues. It is harder to criticize the investments following international 
indices rather than betting on for instance green investments when the involved 
actors can hide behind “this is our future pensions” arguments (Bellona 2012). As 
such the change of name can be regarded as an attempt to re-couple the Fund to 
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fiduciary duties. A pension fund has different, and more concrete, obligations 
towards the beneficiary, than a SWF based on fossil revenues. Still, even though 
there was a name change, GPFG is not a traditional pension fund. KLP for 
instance, a pension fund for employees in Norwegian municipalities, argues that 
their direct fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries is what their first of all must 
ensure (KLP 2012).   
 
4.3 The concept of Responsible Investments in general 
A responsible way of investing is a concept that has been extensively debated in 
academia, but both the space constraint as well as the scope of this thesis makes it 
little fruitful to review all this literature. Instead a selection of literature 
considered most relevant, or eventually often-cited literature, will be reviewed. 
Based on the literature it can be argued that the responsible investment movement 
can broadly be divided into two general stands; the first is mainstream investment 
actors who encapsulate some kind of non-financial concerns into their investment 
decisions, or into their ownership activity. The primary motivation of these funds 
is often to maximize financial return, but the sub-motivation is often that financial 
return should be achieved in a responsible ways. There are as many variations of 
how this is understood and achieved as there are actors. The other category, which 
is less relevant for this research, is more specialized investment actors, investing 
only according to some kind of social or ethical criteria. This can also be called 
community investing or socially directed investment which, according to Sparkes 
(2001, 195) “accept below market returns in order to help others; this is certainly 
not the intention of SRI”. The GPFG clearly belongs to the first category, since 
the motivation is first and foremost to generate the highest possible returns. 
Sparkes  (2001, 201) reminds us about this important distinction arguing that 
“some commentators on SRI seem to over-emphasize the social and 
environmental considerations and neglect the financial ones”. Hence, a first 
misunderstanding about responsible investments can be sorted out; it is not about 
charity. 
 
The historical background for social and moral constraints in investment 
principles can be traced back to ancient biblical times and Jewish Law, as well as 
from more recent times with the anti-slave campaigns from the 19th century. 
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However, RI in the more present context saw its rise in the past century with 
important features like the anti-apartheid movements (Eccles 2011, 21-22). 
According to Sparkes (2006) environmental crisis, corporate scandals like the 
Enron case, and globalization have been major drivers the last decades (Sparkes 
2006). In Europe institutional investors19 stand for 92 percent of the RI assets 
(Eurosif 2010, 7).  
 
Despite being an old concept, there is a lack of agreement both in the academic 
literature, as well as among actors claiming to be responsible investors about what 
RI is, and how it should be denoted. There exists certainly what Sandberg (2009, 
520-521) calls a terminological heterogeneity, and as reviewed by Sparkes and 
Cowton (2004, 46) terms like green, strategic, development, social and creative 
are found in the literature on responsible investments. RI is sometimes also 
referred to as shareholder activism, especially in the US (Louche 2009), but 
according to Sparkes (2001) this should not be confused with responsible 
investing. Nevertheless, the most used terms appears to be ethical investment and 
(social) responsible investment (Sparkes and Cowton 2004, 46). There is however 
a time-relevant difference, since ethical investment was used up to the 1990s, 
whereas the latter is more frequent today (Sparkes 2006, 40). Responsible 
investment (RI), or eventually social responsible investment (SRI), is also the 
term used by relevant actors like the Ministry of Finance and NBIM, and thus the 
selected term in this study. Moreover, there is not a clear and universal 
understanding among investors of what RI implies. According to the European 
Fund and Asset Management Association (Efama), the concept of RI cannot be 
understood by a single framework (Efama 2011). Sandberg et al. (2009, 521) 
argue that there is a heterogeneity aspect also at the definitional, strategic and 
practical level, in addition to the above mentioned terminological level. They 
argue that the diffusion of UNPRI might have contributed to a convergence or 
standardization of RI definitions (Sandberg et al. 2009, 522). This line of 
reasoning seems quite sensible, given that UNPRI has grown to become a large 
actor. This is also in line with another fruitful approach, outlined by Louche 
(2009, 55-62); the understanding of RI through new institutionalism. According to 
Louche (2009) RI is in a dual, and to some extent conflicting process; RI is on one 
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hand in a process of global convergence and isomorphism in which norms and 
laws will become more similar through the expansion of networks like UNPRI. 
On the other hand RI can be understood as a process of local divergence where the 
development will follow national specific patterns. Louche (2009, 62) points out 
that RI is “a concept that becomes global in its diffusion but fragmented/diverging 
in its practices”.   
 
The “integration of certain non-financial concerns” is present in almost all 
definitions of RI (Sandberg et al. 2009, 251). This is also in line with the 
definition used by Sparkes (2001, 201) which emphasize RI as the combination of 
social concerns and financial returns. The same applies to the following definition 
by Louche; “SRI is defined as the constructing and managing of investment funds 
through the use of social, environmental and ethical considerations in addition to 
conventional financial criteria” (Louche 2009, 53). Furthermore, Eurosif (2010, 8) 
a forum for sustainable investments in Europe, points out that  two issues are 
crucial in order for investments to be regarded responsible: a concern with long-
term investment, and ESG issues as important criteria in determining long-term 
investment performance. This fits well with the GPFG, since it is a very long-term 
perspective for the fund, and since there is emphasize on ESG issues within the 
relevant actors. It rises however an interesting question, does this mean that short-
term investments are to be regarded as non-responsible? The long-term 
perspective is definitely of utmost importance when it comes to climate change. 
Kiernan (2005) argues that short-termism is as a matter of fact a great challenge, 
especially when it comes to climate change. Measuring results every three month 
is not easy combinable with the long-term aspects of the climate change 
challenge. This was also discussed at the conference “Do Investors care about the 
Environment” arranged by the Ministry of the Environment and BI Norwegian 
Business School in June 2012.   
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.3. NBIM’s definition is of a responsible investor is “an 
investor who incorporates material ESG related risk factor considerations into 
fund management practices in order to improve long-term returns” (NBIM 2011c, 
1). Compared to the other definitions above NBIM’s definition seems to have 
slightly more emphasize on the financial aspect. ESG factors are regarded as an 
instrument for improving return, and as such it seems like ESG has limited 
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intrinsic value in NBIM’s definition. The Ministry does not have one explicit 
definition of responsible investing, but they write for instance that RI signifies to 
ensure a good return to safeguard future Norwegians, but also that this is 
dependent on sustainable development (Ministry of Finance 2010a, 4). This is 
very much in line with §2-1(1) in table 1, which forms the basis for the Ministry’s 
understanding of RI. Seitchik (2009, 296) is arguing that “the exploding capital 
market interest in climate solutions has little to do with social investing”. In this 
thesis however, climate change is regarded as part of the actors overall RI 
strategy. 
 
4.4 Review of literature discussing the GPFG in particular  
As mentioned above, the GPFG is often regarded as a pioneer in responsible 
investing and has thus been subject to attention from several scholars. This 
literature does unfortunately in general not emphasize climate change to any 
particular extent. As written in the introduction, the lack of research on exactly 
this part of the Fund is also the reason for why the topic has been chosen in this 
thesis. A few exceptions do nevertheless exist; Alm’s (2010) book chapter 
discusses whether GPFG has established a “gold standard” in international climate 
investments, and not only in responsible investments in general. The short answer 
is no, since the Fund is index-based. Alm (2010, 145) argues that there is “a large 
gap between the Fund’s ambitions and its actual climatic efforts”. Another 
relevant article is a case study of the Fund with emphasizes on climate published 
by Reiche (2010) in the level-two journal Energy20. The article gives an in depth 
overview of the ethical framework for the Fund, however much space is dedicated 
to the general aspects rather than climate change particularly.   According to 
Reiche (2010, 3576) the importance of the Fund in regards to climate change is 
somewhat limited, but should nevertheless not be undervalued. Positive screening 
is also discussed, an instrument which Reiche (2010, 3576) argues would 
strengthen the general picture. Another source discussing the Fund and climate 
change is Hammerlin’s (2008) report Zero emissions to get full pension!21, written 
for the environmental NGO FiOH. Despite not being a published academic 
source, the report gives some fruitful insight. Three suggestions to how the Fund 
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 Energy was however a level-one journal in 2010 when the article was published, see NSD 
(2012).  
21 My translation, the original report is in Norwegian: Null utslipp for full pensjon! 
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can improve the climate related work are outlined; include positive screening, 
allow for climate as an independent reason for divestment, and improve the 
corporate governance (Hammerlin 2008).  
 
As mentioned several times the Fund is often regarded as a pioneer in ethics, and 
much of the literature is concerned with discussing the importance of this role, 
and how it can be further improved. A somewhat different perspective is found in 
Clark and Monk’s (2010a) article The Norwegian Government Pension Fund: 
Ethics over Efficiency. The authors seem first of all to be concerned with what 
they regard as too tight ties with the political leadership in Norway. It is claimed 
that the Fund is organized in a way that is inefficient, since the Ministry of 
Finance has the ultimate responsibility and since NBIM is part of the Central 
Bank. Clark and Monk (2010a) argue that this kind of political intervention has a 
financial cost. This is mainly due to the ethical guidelines, of which the authors 
write the following “(…) procedures that give effect to moral beliefs are valued 
higher than those that give effect to financial value” (Clark and Monk 2010a, 15). 
Similar views are also presented in Clark and Monk (2010b). Trude Myklebust, a 
special advisor in the Ministry of Finance, has written a responding-article 
published in the same journal (Myklebust 2010) in which she presents the new 
initiatives implemented after the evaluation process of the ethical guidelines in 
2008.  
 
As mentioned above the Ministry of Finance opened up for an evaluation process 
of the Ethical Guidelines in 2008, and many of the contributions will be data 
sources for this research. However, two evaluations were formally requested 
through competitive tendering. One was written by two Norwegian professors in 
finance, Thore Johansen and Ole Gjølberg, and the other was prepared by 
professor Simon Chesterman together with the US consultancy firm the Albright 
Group (Ministry of Finance 2008e, 93; 2008b). Whereas the other contributions in 
the evaluation process have been left of in this section, these two evaluations are 
of more academic character, and are therefore included in this literature review. 
Johansen and Gjølberg (2008) are mainly discussing the financial impact of 
positive screening, to which they are quite reluctant. They give several reasons for 
why positive screening is not advisable; the size of the Fund, reduced 
diversification and increased risks. The report written by the Albright Group and 
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Chesterman (2008) assess both the role of corporate governance in NBIM, and the 
work conducted by the Council on Ethics, and concludes with 27 
recommendations for. The most relevant for this thesis is probably the 
recommendation to broaden NBIM’s focus on climate by working for disclosure 
and also collaborate with other investors about the issue (Albright Group LLC and 
Chesterman 2008, 5).  
 
Another initiative taken by the Ministry of Finance is the above mentioned 
research project on climate change conducted by consultancy firm Mercer, 
together with London School of Economics. Based on this general report Mercer 
submitted a tailored report for the GPFG in 2012. The general results of this joint 
research (Mercer 2011) and the tailored report (Mercer 2012a) will be discussed 
in chapter 6. To my knowledge, the Mercer report is, as of today, the most 
comprehensive study related to climate change performed on the GPFG. Still the 
Mercer report cannot be characterized as a purely traditional academic source. It is 
also based on a request from one of the actors, and despite being an independent 
work from Mercer, it was not an independent initiative from researchers.  
 
Surprisingly few master thesis’ have been written on the GPFG, however there are 
of course several thesis’ from various academic fields, like Måntrøen’s (2007) 
discourse analysis. NGOs are on the other side very interested in this topic, but the 
challenge is that these are rather normative in their publications. Recent academic 
sources discussing for instance climate change are lacking. There is however more 
academic literature from the years just after the establishment of the ethical 
guidelines, discussing the role of the GPFG in regards to responsible investing.  
This literature is, however, not very relevant for this thesis, since it is primarily 
discussing the role of the Council on Ethics and withdrawal. One example is 
Chesterman (2007).  
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5. Theoretical framework  
In this chapter the theoretical framework is presented. Research question 5 and 6 
from chapter 1.2 will be answered; what are the RI instruments available for 
investors? Moreover, what are the relevant principal-agent relationships are 
there any conflicts, and if so, can they have influenced the climate change work? 
The chapter is divided into two parts; first a section presenting responsible 
investment instruments, and thereafter a principal-agent framework is constructed 
in 5.2. Why does this form a reasonable theoretical framework? As outlined in the 
methodology chapter the distinctive institutional character of the GPFG makes is 
little suitable for testing theories. The principal-agent theory is included since it is 
argued that the Fund is placed in a distinctive organisational structure, as such it is 
also important to figure out what the principal and agents are. In the analysis there 
will be a discussion of the different RI instruments used by the three actors. 
Therefore, it is plausible to first give some general insight about these 
instruments. Again, a challenge is that the literature about RI instruments is quite 
a-theoretical and more practically oriented, often written by actors from the field. 
Consequently chapter 5.1 is not presenting a theory, simply because one such 
theory does not exist. Rather it is a presentation of the RI in practise, using ethical 
theories to explain the rationale behind. 
 
5.1 Responsible investment instruments in practice and the theoretical rationale 
behind   
As briefly mentioned in paragraph 3.1.1 several instruments are used to ensure the 
responsible agenda of the GPFG. There is however a large degree of heterogeneity 
when it comes to exactly how investors transform responsibility strategies into 
actions in practice. On a very simplified timeline, as shown in figure 2, four main 
instruments can be included. Two of them are pre-investment tools, whereas the 
other two are post-investment tools. There is of course a wide range of variety 
within each category, and it should also be mentioned that this is my own 
understanding of the instruments. These instruments are what I have called direct 
instruments, since they directly affect the investment decision, strategy, the 
investees or other stakeholders. In addition there are some instruments which 
could be called indirect instruments, since they do not explicitly affect the 
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investments, the investees or other stakeholders. These instruments are as such not 
directly connected to the simple pre- and post- time line as illustrated in figure 2 
below. Such instruments can be research and collaboration with other investors or 
participation in networks. These instruments can however affect the investment 
decision, for instance climate related research. Research might also lead to for 
instance changed screening criteria, and collaboration might affect corporate 
governance. It is furthermore interesting to discuss whether the investment 
decision in se also could be an instrument; after all it is the index-based portfolio 
that is affecting stakeholders, fiduciaries and owners. As discussed in chapter 3.3 
NBIM should, according to Norges Bank’s internal principles, incorporate ESG 
issues in the investment decision. It remains however uncertain how this 
eventually is done. 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
Responsible investing was part of religious institutions in its early stages, and the 
tool adapted was usually exclusion of certain sectors regarded unethical, mostly 
alcohol, tobacco and slavery (Sparkes 2006, 40). This is today commonly known 
as negative screening or negative selection, and refers to the exclusion of whole 
sectors from the investment portfolio based on what the Ministry of Finance 
(2009, 75) calls product-based argumentation. Hence, a fund using negative 
screening on tobacco will not include any company involved in tobacco 
production in the investment portfolio, and sometimes not even companies which 
are involved with tobacco through the supply-chain. Negative screening is thus a 
pre-investment tool and the rationale is that the product itself is unethical. 
According to Louche (2009, 53) negative screening is typically applied to 
controversial business activity. When it comes to the negative screening strategy 
of the GPFG, there are three product-based criteria; companies involved in the 
production of certain types of weapons that violate humanitarian principles, 
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production of tobacco, or companies that sell weapons to countries excluded from 
the fixed-income part of the investment universe22, are not eligible for investments 
(Ministry of Finance 2010c). However the word screening might allude to a more 
comprehensive instrument. Bøhren (2011, 175) is for instance arguing that only 
companies found ethically acceptable will pass the screen and be eligible for 
investments. This seems not to be in line with the GPFG, which is index-based, 
expect for the three above mentioned sectors. Nevertheless, since climate change 
is not part of the negative screening for the GPFG, this strategy will not be 
discussed further in the thesis.   
 
In the 1990s there was a major shift towards more use of ownership engagement, 
also called active ownership or corporate governance. This refers to investors 
discussing some kind of selected issues with the companies in which they have 
invested. It refers also the more formal use of shareholder rights like voting on 
general meetings (Sparkes 2006, 40). The concept is sometimes confused with 
shareholder activism, which refers to a tradition where NGOs or private persons 
buy shares in a company in order to have the right to participate and voice an 
opinion on the general meeting in that company. The objective is often to create 
media attention. It is mainly a tradition from the US, but not exclusively (Crane 
and Matten 2010, 266). In Norway this is the case for instance with Statoil. 
Corporate governance is thus a post-investment tool, since the communication 
with companies takes place after the investment. It is based on the opposite 
rationale than negative screening. Corporate governance is an important 
instrument for the GPFG, especially when it comes to climate change. It will be 
further discussed in chapter 6.2. 
 
Two other general tools are available for RI investors; positive selection or 
positive screening and divestment. Positive screening is also a pre-investment 
tool, with the opposite logic of negative screening; companies are selected as 
investees because they match some kind of selected profile, for instance being 
environmental friendly. This can be applied to whole sectors, or alternatively 
investors can look for best-in-class companies within sectors not traditionally 
regarded as environmental friendly (Johansen and Gjølberg 2008; Aslaksen 2003). 
Storebrand is one Norwegian investor applying best-in-class positive screening 
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 This applies currently to Burma (Ministry of Finance 2011, 106).  
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(Storebrand 2012). Positive screening will be discussed in the analysis about the 
Ministry of Finance in chapter 6.1.  
 
Divestment, or withdrawal, is a post-investment tool, based on a what the 
Ministry (2009, 75) calls conduct-driven argumentation. A company can be 
excluded from the investment portfolio even if it is not concerned with production 
applicable to the negative screening. If a company contributes to the following it 
can be excluded (Ministry of Finance 2009, 75): 
- serious or systematic human rights violations, such as, for example, 
murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of 
child labour and other child exploitation  
- serious violations of individuals’ rights in situations of war or conflict 
- severe environmental damage 
- gross corruption 
- other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms 
These are the Ministry’s criteria, and not universally applicable among investors, 
but also other investors applying divestment often uses criteria in line with these. 
The most important thing to note in regard of this thesis is that climate change not 
is included in the divestment criteria. In chapter 6.3 there will be a discussion of 
how severe environmental damage is interpreted by the Council on Ethics.  
 
As already mentioned it can be argued that screening, divestment and engagement 
are direct instrument. The Ministry of Finance has, however, also other tools in 
their overall RI strategy, which can be called indirect instruments, since they per 
se not affect the investment decision. Research and participation in international 
collaboration networks are such instruments. With regards to climate change it 
seems like research has been a very important instrument, due to the later on 
discussed Mercer project. 
 
Eurosif uses another fruitful distinction of different RI tools in their 2010 analysis 
of European SRI. They make a distinction between core SRI, and broad SRI. Core 
SRI is defined as using norm-or value-based exclusion with three or more criteria, 
or positive screening. Broad SRI is defined as simple screening based on one 
criteria, engagement and integration (Eurosif 2010, 9). As mentioned above there 
is large degree of heterogeneity when it comes to strategic and practice in RI. 
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According to Eurosif (2010, 12) “some strategies are clearly favored in certain 
countries”. Norm-based exclusion refers to divestment from companies that 
violates certain principles, and is, according to Eurosif very popular in Norway 
and Sweden.  
 
Different ethical schools are the background for the different instruments. 
Teleological reasoning, or consequentialism, is the moral background for the 
corporate governance strategy. Negative screening, or divestments, are on the 
other side more in line with deontological or non-consequentialist reasoning 
(Chesterman 2011, 47-48). In line with consequentialist reasoning it is the 
consequence or outcome of an action that should be assessed on a morality ground 
(Crane and Matten 2010, 97), and as such it is not unmoral to own shares in an 
unmoral activity, if the outcome of the ownership activity is morally acceptable. It 
can thus be argued that ownership engagement is a mode to achieve a moral 
outcome, which in the end gives a higher utility for everybody. As long as the 
total utility is higher than what it would have been without the activity, it does not 
matter how the outcome is achieved. This is also known as utilitarianism (Crane 
and Matten 2010, 101). When it comes to climate change this makes sense, since 
it is only if companies change their activity in a greener direction that the total 
utility, in this case less emissions, will increase. If ownership engagement in 
company x leads to less emissions, then it would be morally right to own shares in 
company x. On the other side, the outcome of the action, in this case to invest in 
company x, will per definition lead to emissions, since all activity does so. This is 
also the moral challenge about being an index-based investor; it is the aggregated 
sum of the indices creating climate change. Contrary, non-consequentialist 
reasoning is more concerned with the intrinsic value of the actions them self; a 
good outcome does not legitimize unmoral actions (Crane and Matten 2010, 98). 
Owning shares in an unmoral company is in itself unmoral, even if the outcome of 
eventually ownership engagement would have been a better company. This 
creates the rationale for the negative screening and withdrawal approaches.  
Positive screening might get support from both schools. It is in line with de-
ontological reasoning, since the action is good. On the other hand it is also in line 
with teleological reasoning if one regard the ideal outcome to be less emissions.   
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5.2. Agency theory  
When discussing the GPFG, which has a distinctive institutional character with 
several important actors, it is interesting to find out how the authority relationship 
is. Agency theory refers to situations in which one actor, called the principal, 
delegate power to another actor, called agent. The agent acts on behalf of the 
principal and the delegation of power takes place because the agent has superior 
knowledge. Delegation is thus regarded efficient, but there is often also a cost 
entitled with it (Shepsle 2010, 423). There is often a conflict of interest between 
the principal and the agent, due to diverging preferences. Information is also a 
challenge, since the agent often has superior information, and the principal cannot  
control every aspect of the agent’ work (Bøhren 2011, 29). The challenge, which 
is often referred to as agency problems, is the following; how can the principal 
trust that the agent acts according to his preferences? It is assumed that the actors 
act according to their own preferences, which is to maximize their own utility. 
Agency theory has been criticized for being based on the rational choice approach 
which generally denies the collaborative aspect of human nature. In Political 
Economy literature, see for instance Shepsle (2010) the principal is often referred 
to as the voters, whereas the agents are the politicians. It also often describes the 
politician as the principal and the bureaucrats as the agents. In corporate 
governance literature, among others Bøhren (2011) the principal is often the 
owner/investors, whereas the board or the Chief Executive Officer is the agent. In 
this thesis the two perspectives must be combined, since they are both relevant in 
the GPFG case. A multiple-level principal agency framework, which describes the 
logic of the Fund and the climate change challenge, can be as follows: 
Figure 3 
 
Contemporary 
Norwegians              
Storting   
Government 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Norges Bank 
NBIM 
Investees 
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Each level either delegate to the next level, or is affected by the previous level. 
Several levels include both a principal and an agent role. The contemporary 
Norwegian voters are the principal, since they are the owner of the Fund. 
However, the beneficiaries of the Fund are also future generations of Norwegians, 
and the inter-generation solidarity aspect is one of the Fund’s characteristics.  The 
complexity of this organizational structure becomes evident when we see that 
there are several levels, given that the voters are not delegating directly to the 
operational manager NBIM. That would have been outside our democratic 
societal organization. Instead the Storting, which constitutes of representatives of 
the Norwegian people, is the acting principal. Thus, the Storting is acting as the 
agent on behalf of the Norwegian people, but the Storting is also delegating to the 
Government, and is as such also a principal. The Storting has delegated the 
management of the Fund the government, in line with parliamentary procedures. 
Within the Government the day to day management has been delegated to the 
Ministry of Finance. According to Bellona (2012) the Ministry has a license to 
invest the oil revenues on behalf of the Norwegian population. The Ministry is 
delegating the operational management to Norges Bank and NBIM. As showed in 
table 1, the Bank has independent power to take the investment decisions, see §1-
1(3). NBIM is the operational manager, and is as such the ultimate agent in this 
regard, but NBIM has again delegated to the investees to create return. Thus, the 
companies in which NBIM has invested are the ultimate agents. The investees do 
affect the ultimate principal, the Norwegian owners, by contributing to climate 
change. What is also interesting to note with this remarkable long principal-agent 
chain, is that this institutional distinction might also lead to an institutional 
slowness. It is a complex structure, and changes must be approved at several 
levels, which is time consuming. However, this might also be a sign of quality, 
after all the GPFG is our common wealth.     
 
Each of these levels has a potential conflict of interest. First of all, how can the 
Norwegian voters be sure that the Storting is managing the Fund according to our 
preferences? If one uses the Norwegian media debate as a control instrument, it 
seems like the voters, i.e. the principal, are not always satisfied. As already 
mentioned it has not been any broad media debate about climate change and the 
GPFG. Instead the media debate is quite concerned with specific companies. 
Lastly was the criticism of the investments in monitoring technology, see for 
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instance Dagens Næringsliv (2012a, 2012b). Furthermore one can imagine a 
conflict of interest between the Storting and the Government, and maybe as well 
within the Government. There is a broad political agreement on the general 
regulation of the Fund, but in chapter 6 it will be referred to cases in which there 
is disagreement with some political parties in the Parliament. Thereafter there 
might be a conflict of interest between the Ministry and NBIM, for instance about 
the degree of independency. Figure 4 gives a more detailed, but also simplified, 
presentation of the role of the three most relevant levels. These are also the most 
active levels, since both the Government and Norges Bank has more formal roles 
with overall responsibility, but in practice it is the Ministry and NBIM that 
manage the Fund.  
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: (NBIM 2008a) and (Ministry of Finance 2009, 79)23 
 
Also Bøhren (2011, 175) discusses the GPFG in light of agency theory and place 
the Norwegian people and the government as principals, whereas NBIM is 
assigned the role as agent. Another interesting question when it comes to the 
organizational structure of the GPFG is the role of the Council on Ethics. It can be 
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 Part of the figure is inspired by the two sources, but the principal and agent roles have been 
assigned for the purpose of this thesis, and are as such my understanding of the structure. 
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argued that the council, due to its expertise role, is an agent. The Ministry has 
delegated the work with screening and assessing companies, but has maintained 
the power to take the final decision about divestment themselves. It seems 
reasonable to argue that the Council on Ethics is somewhat limited by its clear 
agent role. There is little reciprocity in the relationship with the Ministry, and one 
might imagine that the Council would have been far more proactive if it had been 
permitted to be so. As discussed in chapter 3 the Council on Ethics and NBIM has 
very different mandates, with the former having less leeway and no supervisory 
role. As shown in figure 4, as well as in the management mandate in table 1, 
NBIM should advice the Ministry about the overall investment strategy. NBIM 
also has a more complex role, since they act as the principal on behalf of the 
investees.  
  
There is no doubt about the distinctiveness in this institutional design. As already 
mentioned the GPFG has been subject to attention from scholars, also due to the 
organizational structure with the Council on Ethics, the Ministry and NBIM. 
Whereas many Norwegian (for instance Storebrand and KLP) and non-Norwegian 
(among others the Swedish AP funds and CalPERS) institutional investors apply 
some kind of ethical considerations, the GPFG is, as noted by Reiche (2010, 
3572) the only SWF with ethical guidelines. This is another proof of the Fund’s 
distinctive institutional design, it is a SWF, thus it is state-owned, but still subject 
to comprehensive RI regulation. Most other state-owned funds are from non-
democratic countries (Reiche 2010). However, according to Clark and Monk 
(2010a, 17) the structure around the GPFG is based on political legitimation, 
rather than functional efficiency.  
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6. The three actors climate change strategies in the period 
2006-2012 
By analysing annual reports, in addition to other written sources from the three 
actors, as well as data from the interviews, it is possible to identify how climate 
change is on the agenda. A few initiatives stand out as particularly relevant, and it 
is interesting to note that they are initiated from more than one of the actors. It 
seems like the Ministry and NBIM has alternately had the leading role. Research 
question 7 to 11, presented in chapter 1.2, will form the basis for this analysis. As 
emphasized in the methodology chapter, the analysis will have a historical 
perspective. To a large extent it is furthermore based on analysis of primary 
sources, with reference to the importance of “ad fontes”.  
 
6.1. The Ministry of Finance - how is climate change on the agenda? 
In this chapter the Ministry of Finance will be the main unit of analysis. The 
objective is to find out how climate change has been, and is, on the agenda for the 
period 2006-2012. As such the research questions 7 to 11 will form the basis for 
the discussion. To get a good starting point for the historical perspective a 
chronological analysis of the annual reports will be carried out. As pointed out in 
the methodology chapter the objective with the historical perspective is to identify 
consistency and continuation in the Ministry’s approach towards climate change, 
or contrary eventually inconsistency and discontinuation. A systematic analysis, 
i.e. the simplified content analysis, of the primary sources is important. Thereafter 
a few happenings, and/or RI instruments, will be highlighted and thoroughly 
discussed. To set the scene it should be briefly repeated that the Ministry’s RI 
instruments are the following; exclusion of companies, international collaboration 
and research, as well as initiating targeted investment programs. The Ministry also 
has the overall responsibility for the responsible investment strategy, hereunder 
also the corporate governance work. As such the Ministry possesses both pre-
investment instruments like screening, post-investment instruments like exclusion 
of companies, and indirect instruments like research. As presented in chapter 3 the 
Ministry has the management responsibility, according to the Law.  
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6.1.1. How is climate change on the agenda: a historical perspective 
A simplified content analysis of the annual reports to the Storting from 2006 to 
2012, in addition to the report from the Graver Committee, has been performed. 
The Graver Committee’s report was the first thoroughly discussion of the ethics 
related to the Fund, and it sat the premises for the following RI strategy. It was 
thus a prerequisite for the coming steps. As written in the methodology chapter, 
performing a content analysis of the central documents can give a general idea of 
the extent to which climate change is on the agenda, and whether any changes 
have occurred. In this case there is also a tight tie between the historical 
perspective and the content analysis, since the latter is performed chronologically 
on the period of interest. Still, a content analysis alone can, on the other side, not 
be used to draw conclusions. This is particularly important when it is as simplified 
as the one performed here. The general results are presented in table 3 below24. 
Table 3 
Report25 Frequency of the word 
climate  
NOU 2003: 22. Forvaltning for fremtiden: Forslag til etiske 
retningslinjer for Statens petroleumsfond (The Graver Report 
from 200326) 
23 
Report No. 24 (2006-2007) to the Storting: On the 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2006  
8 
Report No. 16 (2007-2008) to the Storting: On the 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2007 
21 
Report No. 20 (2008-2009) to the Storting: On the 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2008 
139 
Report No. 10 (2009–2010) to the Storting: The Management 
of the Government Pension Fund in 2009  
49 
Report No. 15 (2010–2011) to the Storting: The Management 
of the Government Pension Fund in 2010 
56 
Meld. St. 17 (2011-2012) Report to the Storting (white paper): 
The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2011 
58 
 
What is interesting to note is that in the annual reports about the Fund from the 
Ministry there has been a steady increase in the use of the word climate. This 
might signify that there has been consistency in the Ministry’s climate change 
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 The extended result can be found in appendix 1.  
25
 All the reports are found in the bibliography, under Ministry of Finance. The slightly 
inconsistency in the reports naming is in line with the original sources. 
26The search was conducted in the Norwegian document since the English version only is 
available as an internet page, and not as a searchable pdf-file. The English version might also not 
be complete. 
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strategy, since there might have been a gradually increase in the focus. An initial 
assumption is therefore that there has been continuity, i.e. one step as a 
prerequisite for the next. According to the Ministry themselves climate change has 
indeed become gradually higher on the agenda the last years (Ministry of Finance 
2012d). As already mentioned the Ministry’s most important RI initiative in the 
years just before the time-frame chosen in this thesis was the establishment of the 
ethical guidelines. These were however not particularly focused on climate 
change; the guidelines did not specify how or if the Ministry regarded climate 
change to be relevant, and eventually what measures could be taken. This might 
be connected to the relatively low frequency of the word climate in the report 
from the Graver Committee. As shown in table 3, climate was mentioned 23 
times. However, the Graver Committee (2003a, 98-100) discussed a wide range of 
topics, among them also climate change. It is for instance discussed whether UN’s 
Framework Convention on Climate Change could have been used to form 
legitimate requirements towards portfolio companies. The question was how 
eventually violations of the convention could be identified. The challenge with the 
Convention on Climate Change is that it is very general. The Committee argues 
that: 
In the case with greenhouse gas emission an alternative could be that 
the Petroleum Fund could exclude companies with high emissions. It 
would however be difficult to define a appropriate level for this, in 
addition it would be irrelevant and impossible to identify violations of 
the convention (Graver Committee 2003a, 100).   
It was therefore argued that the Convention not constitutes a fruitful foundation 
for negative screening or exclusion of companies. When it comes to 
environmental challenges, only two conventions are found specific enough by the 
Graver Committee (2003a, 141) to eventually be used as a rationale for negative 
screening. These were the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 
Climate was not included in the negative screening, or in the criteria for 
divestment. Moreover, it was left to NBIM to decide what to focus on in the 
corporate governance work. Therefore it can be argued that the establishment of 
the ethical guidelines was not a particularly important incident when it comes to 
climate change. It was however a decisive happening when it comes to 
responsible investing in general, and the guidelines of course also formed the 
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basis for the later work. The guidelines opened up for the use of instruments 
which later could, and in some cases has been, used in regards to climate change. 
As shown above it also remains clear that the Graver Committee as a matter of 
fact discussed climate change, and how to eventually include it in the suggested 
ethical guidleines, without finding the existent conventions satisfactory. This is a 
proof of the complexity of the climate change challenge; the lack of political 
commitment at the global level is a problem also for investors, because it is 
difficult to exclude companies that not violate any law. KLP (2012) argues that 
this is still a major challenge for investors when it comes to climate change. It is 
nevertheless tempting to suggest that if the Graver Report had pointed out climate 
change as the challenge to focus on, then todays RI strategy could have been 
different. However, there is no rationale for arguing that the low frequency of the 
word climate in the Graver Report equals that they not found the issue important.  
 
In the 2006 annual report to the Storting (Ministry of Finance 2006), which is the 
next unit of analysis and first year in period in this thesis, the word climate was 
mentioned only 8 times, as shown in table 3. This is the lowest frequency in the 
sample. In the report there is a separate chapter on ethics and ownership activity, 
in which climate change is mentioned. There is a presentation of NBIM’s 
corporate governance, which is very much based on NBIM’s annual report. The 
Ministry however add in the end that;  
the Ministry is supportive of Norges Bank’s ownership strategy and it 
believes that (…) the protection of the environment are amongst the 
important, fundamental ethical norms that the ownership influence 
should contribute to safeguarding (Ministry of Finance 2006, 72). 
This is the only time the Ministry was voicing their opinion about the ownership 
activity, otherwise they held a quite referring tone. In the report the Ministry 
furthermore presents the other pillar in the ethical guidelines, negative screening 
and divestment. Also here the Ministry held a neutral and descriptive tone, 
presenting facts and working methods, making no effort to for instance discuss 
what is meant by severe environmental damage, which is the most relevant 
conduct-based exclusion criterion in this regard. The Ministry is discussing and 
presenting their standpoints when it comes to for instance the use of exclusion 
versus the use of ownership engagement, or the importance of transparency, but in 
no case they come down to the specific areas. All in all it seems plausible to argue 
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that there is quite limited focus on climate change in the report, and this is as such 
in line with the findings presented in table 3. This does however not automatically 
mean that the Ministry was not concerned with climate change in 2006, it is just 
not expressed to any particular great extent in the annual report. There are 
however not found any other primary sources from the Ministry from 2006 which 
eventually could prove that they in fact were pro-active when it comes to climate 
change. It could therefore be argued that 2006 still was a period of consolidation 
of the ethical guidelines, in which the Ministry seemed satisfied with NBIM’s 
focus on climate change in the ownership activity.    
 
In the 2007 annual report (Ministry of Finance 2007) the word climate was 
mentioned 21 times, i.e. there was an increase from the previous year. However, 
also in 2007 the use of the word climate is almost exclusively connected to the 
presentation of NBIM’s ownership activity. The Ministry is however more 
detailed in its discussion of the responsible investment policy (the whole report is 
also larger than the year before). It is still very much replication of what NBIM 
wrote in their annual report, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The 
Ministry repeats that they are supporting NBIM’s focus areas, by using the 
exactly same sentence as the one cited above (Ministry of Finance 2007, 122). So 
far it seems to be reasonable to argue that the Ministry up to 2007 had taken few 
independent initiatives with respect to climate change, i.e. it is not easy to identify 
the Ministry’s own strategy towards climate change in the first years of the chosen 
period. However, the Ministry clearly supported NBIM’s climate change strategy. 
The establishment of the ethical guidelines stands out as the most important 
initiative up to 2007, even though it was not directly taking actions towards 
climate change. It can still be argued that there is consistency in the Ministry’s 
approach towards climate change in 2006 and 2007, since the Ministry is 
supportive of the initiatives taken by NBIM. 
 
In January 2008 the three actors together arranged an international conference 
about responsible investment, which was also the start of the evaluation of the 
ethical guidelines (Ministry of Finance 2007, 27). Therefore it is plausible to 
argue that the Ministry already in 2007 discussed the evaluation process, and that 
they might have discussed climate change internally. In an article in Aftenposten 
from November 2007 (Aale 2007) the State Secretary Roger Schjerva was 
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interviewed about the forthcoming evaluation process, and he emphasized the 
importance of climate change for an investor. The same article was also referred 
to on the Socialist Left Party’s webpage, with the title “will use the Oil Fund as 
climate tool”27 (Socialist Left Party 2007). This is a quite clear communication of 
how important then Ministry of Finance Kristin Halvorsen regarded climate 
change. Thus it seems reasonable that climate change was higher on the agenda in 
2007 (and maybe also in 2006) than what is expressed in the annual reports to the 
Storting.  
 
2008 stands out as a year with a remarkable focus on climate change in the annual 
report. The word climate was mentioned more than twice as many times as in 
2011, see table 3. The Report to the Storting about the management of the Fund in 
2008 (Ministry of Finance 2008e) was however somewhat different from the other 
years. In this year the Ministry summarized all the evaluations submitted to the 
Ministry as part of the evaluation of the ethical guidelines. As such one might 
conclude that the very high number of words containing climate in 2008 just 
reflects the contributors to be very concerned with climate change, and not the 
Ministry itself. When it comes to the contributions to the evaluation process in 
2008 and their view upon climate change, the Ministry argues that this is an issue 
that most of the contributions are concerned about. They furthermore divide them 
into two groups; the first arguing for using the Fund as a tool to prevent climate 
change, whereas the second group is more in line with today’s premises and 
instruments (Ministry of Finance 2008e, 104-105).  Alm (2010, 137) also stresses 
that climate was the issue which got most attention among the evaluations. The 
Ministry (2008e) itself emphasizes the importance and urgency of the climate 
change challenge, but they also emphasize that the GPFG not should meet all the 
ethical obligations of the Norwegian state, hereunder climate change. Though, 
they point at three main reasons for why the Fund still should be used to take 
some initiatives; the long-term perspective, the broad diversification, and the 
universal owner nexus (Ministry of Finance 2008e, 105-106). This is in line with 
the literature presented in chapter 4.1 about the relevance of climate change for 
investors. It is also in line with the discussion about the motivation behind actions, 
the Ministry’s arguments are rooted in self-interest, i.e. secure financial return.    
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The use of the word climate in the 2008 report (Ministry of Finance 2008e) is also 
different in another sense. Not only the frequency of the word, but also the variety 
of how the word was used, was different. Whereas there was what we might call a 
terminological consensus, or little variation in the expressions, in both the Graver 
report and in the reports to the Storting in 2006 and 2007, there was much more 
variety in 2008. Among the 139 times climate was used, there was 27 different 
combinations including the word climate, with the top three being climate change, 
climate challenge and climate friendly energy. The reason is probably that the 
2008 report is quite colored by the various contributions to the evaluation of the 
ethical guidelines.  
 
In 2008 several interesting issues were discussed in the report, in addition to the 
above mentioned presentation of the contributions to the evaluations process. The 
most interesting is that in 2008 the Ministry opened up for including positive 
screening in the investment strategy, by establishing an environmental program 
with focus on investments in infrastructure, un-listed equities, environmental 
bonds as well as general eco-friendly assets and technology. The program was 
aimed at reaching 20 billion NOK (Ministry of Finance 2008e, 18-19).  This will 
be further discussed in chapter 6.1.3. In 2008 the Ministry also announced that it 
would initiate research to assess the effects of climate change, which can be seen 
as a result of the evaluation process of the ethical guidelines (Ministry of Finance 
2008e, 23-26). This resulted in the Mercer report, which will be discussed in 
chapter 6.1.2. In the report the Ministry also asks “Norges Bank to prepare more 
documents outlining its expectations (…) a document regarding companies’ 
strategy to combat climate change is regarded as particularly relevant” (Ministry 
of Finance 2008e, 23). This document will be discussed in 6.2.2. It can be argued 
that climate change was high on the agenda both among the contributions 
submitted to the Ministry, as well as in the Ministry’s follow-up in the report. No 
other ESG issue received attention to the same extent.  
  
So far it can thus be concluded that 2008 was an important year when it comes to 
the Ministry’s approach toward climate change since several relevant initiatives 
were taken. The Ministry opened up for a broad and inclusive evaluation process 
in the beginning of the year, they adhered to the majority of the contributions 
favourable view on environmental positive screening, and they started the process 
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with a more in-depth analysis of climate change. So far it has been argued that 
2006 and 2007 might have been characterized by consolidation of the ethical 
guidelines, and observation of NBIM’s climate change strategy, rather than strong 
independent initiatives from the Ministry. It could still be argued that the Ministry 
is consistent in how they approach climate change, since the strategy has been 
gradually expanded to include new initiatives.  
 
An interesting observation is that the Ministry (2008e) in the annual report wrote 
about the new environmental program in the chapter about investment strategy, 
and not in the chapter about responsible investment. This trend continued, since 
the environmental program not was part of the new ethical guidelines from 2010. 
Another interesting point in this regards, noted also by FiOH (2012), is that the 
former ethical guidelines are now replaced with guidelines for NBIM’s 
responsible management and ownership activity and guidelines for observation 
and withdrawal, see Ministry of Finance (2012a). This signifies that the word 
ethical no longer exists in the guidelines, and that the Fund no longer has one set 
of guidelines, but rather one for each of the agents. It should however be noted 
that also the former ethical guidelines were concrete about the tasks of NBIM and 
the Council on Ethics respectively. The new guidelines are only concerned with 
corporate governance, negative screening and withdrawal/observation of 
companies. Climate is not mentioned in neither of these two guidelines since it is 
not part of the Council on Ethics mandate, and since the focus areas in the 
ownership activity not are specified. However, in the Ministry’s pamphlet about 
responsible investments, both the environmental program and instruments like 
research is presented as part of the overall RI strategy (Ministry of Finance 
2010a). There is thus a difference between the official guidelines, and how the 
Ministry presents the overall work with responsible investing. This is especially 
true for climate change, which is mentioned only in the latter. On the other side, 
climate change is given a great amount of attention in the pamphlet.   
 
In the annual report to the Storting in 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2009) the word 
climate was mentioned 49 times. This is a lot less than the year before, but is 
however not argued that this decline represents an inconsistency in the Ministry 
approach to climate change. The reason is that 2008 was a particular year when it 
comes to the annual report, due to the high influence of the evaluations. 
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Contrarily, the frequency of the word in 2009 represents a continuation, since it is 
used more than in 2007. There is however a remarkably different use of the word 
in the 2009 report. As discussed above the 2006 and 2007 reports were 
characterized by lack of independent initiatives from the Ministry, and climate 
change was almost only mentioned as part of NBIM’s corporate governance 
strategy. In 2009 the Ministry took several independent initiatives, and this comes 
through also in the text. Instead of only noting, and agreeing, about NBIM’s focus 
on climate change, the Ministry in the 2009 report write about their own climate 
change initiatives, like the Mercer research project.  In the fall 2009 the Ministry 
signed a contract with Mercer about the above mentioned research project on 
climate change (Ministry of Finance 2009, 19). This marks a very important 
initiative.  
 
In the 2010 annual report to the Storting (Ministry of Finance 2010b) the word 
climate was mentioned 56 times. The development from 2009 continues also in 
2010, i.e. the report is more characterized by the Ministry own climate change 
initiatives than in the first years. In 2010 a new word combination not used in the 
previous years was found; climate breakdown. This has a logical explanation, 
since climate breakdown is one of the scenarios from the Mercer report, to which 
the Ministry refers. The Mercer report will be discussed in 6.1.2. In the 2011 
annual report (Ministry of Finance 2011a) the trend continued. Climate was 
mentioned almost to the same extent as in 2010.  
 
In the written material from the Ministry of Finance it becomes clear that climate 
change has become gradually higher on the agenda. It makes sense to speak of a 
pre- and post- 2008 era when it comes to the visible climate change strategy. 
Before 2008 such strategy almost exclusively relied on NBIM’s work with 
climate change. After 2008 the Ministry has taken several important and 
independent initiatives. This does, however, not signify that the Ministry was not 
concerned with climate change in 2006 and 2007, however eventually concerns 
were not sufficiently communicated to the public, and did not lead to concrete 
initiatives before 2008. As already noted, Kristin Halvorsen began to publicly 
voice a more pro-active climate change strategy at the end of 2007. This might at 
that time already have been maturing internally in the Ministry for some time. As 
discussed in chapter 5 the institutional complexity surrounding the Fund might 
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also lead to some institutional slowness. It might very well have been that the 
initiatives that emerged after 2008 already were planned in 2006/2007. After all, 
the Ministry’s climate change strategy has been gradually expanding with one 
factor forming a prerequisite for the following.  
6.1.2 Climate change on the agenda – the Mercer research 
In chapter 6.1.1 a historical analysis of the Ministry of Finance was presented, and 
it was argued that the Ministry’s climate change strategy has evolved gradually, 
and thus there has been a process characterized by consistency. However, the 
Ministry’s interest in climate change was rooted in NBIM and other actors’ 
emphasis on this issue in the early years, i.e. up to 2007. This changed in 2008 
when the Ministry opened up for an evaluation process with a considerable focus 
on climate change. Many, maybe the majority, of the evaluations submitted as a 
part of this process, expressed a concern with the Ministry being too passive. In 
the end of 2008 the Ministry took the initiative to a research project on climate 
change, and in 2009 when they formally initiated the Mercer project. This 
happening definitely marked a change in the Ministry’s role, and forms the 
rationale for a separate chapter about the Mercer project.  
  
As a first step it is interesting to pose the question; why did the Ministry initiate 
the Mercer project? According the Ministry (2012c) itself  it was naturally for a 
long-term investor to ask the question; which factors will affect the return from 
the equity markets in the future? The answer they found was that climate change 
can be such a factor. This is in line with the discussion about universal owners and 
externalities like climate change in chapter 4. One might ask why the Ministry not 
reached that conclusion earlier, considering that there had been discussions on 
investors and climate change since in the early 1990s, at least in the UK (Pfeifer 
and Sullivan 2008). Or alternatively, if the Ministry had considered the potential 
risk climate change pose earlier, which should not be unlikely, why did they not 
take any initiatives until 2008-2009? One possible explanation is that they relayed 
on NBIMs ownership activity. Another plausible explanation is that the RI work 
has evolved since the establishment of the ethical guidelines, and that is was just a 
casual reason for why climate change not was among the first issues to prioritize. 
It chapter 5.2 it was also argued that the complexity of the institutional design 
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might lead to an institutional slowness, and this might also be the case for the 
work with climate change in the Ministry.    
 
Nevertheless, 2008/2009 marked a change. The Ministry (2012c) argues that it 
was convenient to enter into a joint collaboration with the consultancy firm 
Mercer, since Mercer had plans for such a project and had teamed up with other 
institutions with expertise had expertise knowledge about the issue. All political 
parties in the Parliament, except the Progress Party, were positive towards the 
Mercer report and welcomed such research as important and relevant (Stortinget 
2012, 16). The Ministry was the first of 14 funds to sign the contract with Mercer 
and they claim that it probably was important for some of the other funds that the 
GPFG already had signed the contract, since the Norwegian fund is internationally 
acknowledged as an forth runner in responsible investment (Ministry of Finance 
2012c). Such research collaboration regarding the economics of climate change 
had never taken place among investors (Ministry of Finance 2010b). A complete 
list of the 14 participants can be found in appendix 4, there were funds from 
Netherland, Sweden, UK, Singapore, USA, Canada and Australia, in addition to 
Norway. The research was conducted together with the Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at London School of Economics 
and Vivid Economics. The process was, according to the Ministry (2012c), 
characterized by several meetings. Moreover, Mercer was the leading actor, but 
the funds gave input on for instance methodology and the analysis. The research 
resulted in a report presented in London the 15th February 2011 (Ministry of 
Finance 2010b, 29). Most of the participants are cited in the beginning of the 
report, being quite generous about the importance of the project and the findings. 
Bruce Duguid from the Carbon Trust argues that:   
The findings undermine the notion of a conflict between ‘green’ 
investing and acting in beneficiaries long-term financial interests. This 
will have profound implications for fiduciary duties and places a clear 
obligation to increase analysis of the consequences of climate change 
for portfolio management” (Mercer 2011)28    
This is interesting with regards to the literature presented in chapter 4.1. Half a 
decade ago Kiernan (2005) and Dickinson (2005) argued along the same lines 
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when it comes to climate change and fiduciary duties. The statement above proof 
that fiduciary duty however has remained traditionally interpreted. 
 
In 2012 Mercer published a tailored report for the GPFG. It is based on the 
analytical framework and findings from the first report, but it is applied on the 
GPFG. This report will therefore form the basis for the discussion below. The 
framework consists mainly of two set of analytical tools, with the first being a set 
of climate change risk factors, named the TIP factors: Technology, Impacts and 
Policy. The second is the use of four climate change scenarios: regional 
divergence, delayed action, Stern action and climate breakdown. The first is the 
most likely scenario, in which it is assumed that different regions will have 
divergent responses to the climate challenge, due to lack of international 
agreement. Delayed action is second in likeliness, and describes a scenario 
characterized by measures being taking late. The Stern action is less likely, and 
refers to coordinated international action, in line with the Stern recommendations. 
The least likely scenario is however the Climate breakdown, which is a scenario 
in which no action is taken. Mercer (2012) thereafter assesses how sensible asset 
classes like listed equities, fixed income, commodities, real estate, private equity 
and infrastructure are towards the TIP factors. The sensitivity is measured on a 
four step scale, from low to very high. The four scenarios have positive, neutral or 
negative impact on each of the assets classes.  
 
Global equity (a sub category of listed equities) has low sensitivity towards the 
TIP factors. The Stern action scenario has positive impact on this asset class, 
whereas the delayed action scenario has negative impact. The regional divergence 
and climate breakdown has neutral impact. Thus, the third less likely scenario is 
the only one with positive impact on this asset class, which is a huge part of the 
GPFG. Delayed action, which is the second most likely scenario, is expected to 
have a negative impact on global equity. Each asset class is analyzed with the 
same method. Four asset classes are expected to be positively affected by three of 
four scenarios; sustainable listed equity, efficiency/renewables listed and un-listed 
equity, as well as efficiency/renewable infrastructure.  All of these have however 
high or very high sensitivity towards the TIP factors, as well as a negative impact 
of the climate breakdown scenario. In addition to asset classes different regions 
are evaluated as to their sensitivity to the TIP factors and impact of each of the 
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scenarios. EU, Japan, Russia, and India/South Asia has moderate sensitivity, 
whereas the US and China/East Asia has high sensitivity (Mercer 2012a, 5-9). It is 
a comprehensive analysis and it is particularly relevant that Mercer, even though 
they both emphasize that the report not should be used as investment advice, and 
also clearly stress the uncertainty and long-term perspective, draw some general 
lines. Many asset classes get different results in the four different scenarios, which 
complicates the picture. Mercer (2012a, 52) therefore emphasizes that the 
recommendations depends on whether the Ministry valuate the likelihood of the 
scenarios in the same way as do Mercer. Mercer (2012a, 52-57) explicitly lists a 
set of key actions to consider, given that that the Ministry agrees with the 
likeliness of the scenarios. It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss 
Mercer’s suggestions in detail, however, some main points should be briefly 
touched upon. Mercer argues that if the delayed action or Stern action scenarios 
should become real, the Fund should re-allocate towards assets classes in new 
technology. As explained above, Mercer regards the delayed action and Stern 
Action to be respectively the second most likely, and second least likely. In the 
most likely scenario, regional divergence, Mercer recommends exposure towards 
technology, but it is regarded more risky than in the other two scenarios. Mercer 
furthermore argues that the Fund is best positioned to tackle the least likely 
scenario, the climate breakdown, and explicitly write that “in the other scenarios, 
which we believe to be more likely, the Fund is less optimally positioned and 
would benefit from considering a change in the portfolio mix that introduces a 
focus on climate-sensitive assets which exhibit exposure to TIP factors” (Mercer 
2012a, 53). These assets are infrastructure, real estate, private-equity (priority 
one) and sustainable equity and energy efficiency/renewables (priority two). 
Bellona correspond with the suggestion from Mercer, and argues that this is very 
much in line with what they suggested themselves in 2008 (Bellona 2012, 2011). 
As already mentioned NBIM will increase the real estate investments in the 
coming years.  
 
The first Mercer report gave more general advice than the above ones (Mercer 
2011). It is however not easily understandable how the Ministry regards the 
outcome of the first Mercer report. In the 2010 annual report to the Storing they 
wrote that the preliminary conclusion was that the Mercer report not would 
necessitate changes in the investment strategy  (Ministry of Finance 2010b, 31). 
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However, this preliminary conclusion was based on the general report, which did 
not give any particular advice to the GPFG. It seems thus like the Ministry might 
have been waiting for the tailored report. In the subsequent annual report to the 
Storting the Ministry (2011a, 55) writes that “major uncertainty means that it is 
not possible, based on Mercer’s calculations, to draw concrete conclusions about 
the consequences for the Fund’s future returns”. Mercer also emphasize the 
uncertainty aspect, especially since the conclusions depends on the likeliness of 
each scenario. This is as such a proof of the complexity of the climate change 
challenge for investor. Though, the overall discussion of the tailored Mercer 
report has a remarkable evasive and to some extent self-defensive tone. The 
Ministry emphasizes the climate change focus in NBIM’s corporate governance 
strategy. This is important, but not related to the investments themselves, which is 
what Mercer discusses. Furthermore the Ministry argues that both the 
environmental mandates, which will be discussed in the next chapter, and the real 
estate investments, are in line with Mercer’s recommendations. That being said, 
these investments are currently each around, or below, one percent of the Fund. 
Mercer recommends more substantive re-allocation. However, the somewhat 
unclear tone in the chapter about the Mercer report (in the 2011 annual report to 
the Storting) makes this material difficult to analyze. It can therefore not be 
concluded based on this that the Ministry disagrees, or not wishes to consider 
Mercer’s recommendations. There might be numerous reasons why they are 
unclear. A plausible explanation might be that the Ministry has not yet decided 
whether the Mercer report should lead to major changes. According to Mercer’s 
own follow up report, a third of the 14 participants will allocate more of the 
portfolio to climate sensitive assets (Mercer 2012b). As such it seems like the 
Ministry is not the only Fund which is now evaluation how to cope with the 
Mercer results. This is yet another proof of the complexity of the issue.   
 
In the historical analysis in chapter 6.1.1 it was argued that the Mercer report is 
one of the most important initiatives from the Ministry, and probably the most 
important since 2008 when the Ministry opened up for positive screening. The 
Mercer report as such represents continuation in the Ministry’s approach towards 
climate change, since it is part of an expanding strategy. Nevertheless, the 
concrete importance of the Mercer reports depends also on the following-up from 
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the Ministry, and so far it remains uncertain if and how the Ministry eventually 
will change the investment strategy.  
6.1.3 Positive screening and climate change 
Even though it might seem like the Ministry, and especially NBIM, see NBIM 
(2008b) are quite reluctant to positive screening, the Fund has in fact a history of 
some positive selection. This is outside the main timeframe in this thesis, but a 
short description serves as a useful background in order to analyze the continuity 
of the Ministry’s climate change strategy. In 2002 the original mandate from 1997 
of the then-called Petroleum Fund was changed (note that this mandate is not the 
same as the 2010 mandate described in section 3.2) and the following was 
included in §2 in the mandate: “a certain amount, decided by the Ministry of 
Finance, should be placed in the Environmental Portfolio” (Lovdata 2002). The 
environmental portfolio had been a fact already in 2001 with one billion NOK to 
be invested by NBIM in listed equities in certain developed countries. NBIM was 
supposed to make the investments in companies accomplishing environmental 
criteria in the FTSE index or in companies identified by the British responsible 
investment research agent EIRIS (Ministry of Finance 2002). The value of the 
Fund when the environmental portfolio was established in 2001 was 
approximately 304 billion NOK (Ministry of Finance 2001). The value of the 
environmental friendly investments was thus well below 1 percent of the total 
value of the Fund. Bellona criticized the Ministry and NBIM for lack of 
transparency, since they only published the index, and the entire list from EIRIS, 
and not the companies in which NBIM actually invested. In spite of that, this was 
changed, and Bellona argued that this happened after pressure from themselves 
(Bellona 2003). Another environmental NGO, the FiOH, criticized the 
investments themselves. Among the companies included in the Environmental 
Portfolio were for instance the later on excluded Rio Tinto, as well as several oil 
companies (FiOH 2002). The environmental portfolio was thus a very good 
example of how glossy reports and good reporting can make clearly non-
environmental friendly companies and sectors appear more environmental 
friendly. This is also a challenge with todays’ Investor Expectations, which will 
be discussed in chapter 6.2.2. It is difficult to assess whether a company actually 
has improved or not as long as the compliance is based on self-reported material  
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The environmental portfolio saw its end in 2004 due to several reasons. First of 
all, the Ministry wanted an ethical profile of the whole portfolio, in line with the 
Graver Committee suggestions. The economic effects of the separate 
environmental portfolio had also been unclear or negative, and moreover the 
environmental effects were unclear (Ministry of Finance 2004). There was as such 
a quite short, and maybe not very successful, experience with positive selection 
for the Fund. After the establishment of the ethical guidelines in 2004 there was 
no positive screening, since Graver Committee not recommended the use of such 
instruments. They did not, however, explicitly argue against positive selection per 
se. The Graver Committee argued that best-in-class screens on the whole portfolio 
would limit the investment universe too much, and that eventually partly positive 
screening should be decided on after the evaluation of the environment portfolio 
was done (Graver Committee 2003b). Reiche (2010, 3575) argues that the 
experience with the environmental portfolio nevertheless could be useful for 
future initiatives in the same direction. This is also the rationale for including this 
in the thesis. 
 
It might seem like there was a rupture with part of the Fund’s stakeholders, owing 
that several Norwegian actors continued to argue in favor of positive screening. 
This might have been the reason for why the Ministry asked for viewpoints on 
positive screening when they initiated the evaluation process of the ethical 
guidelines in 2008 (Ministry of Finance 2008d). A total of 57 evaluations were 
submitted to the Ministry of Finance as a part of the evaluation process of the 
ethical guidelines in 2008. Among those 29 were in favor of some kind of positive 
screening, 6 evaluations were against such instruments, whereas 22 did not 
comment on positive screening. The detailed results are found in appendix 3. 
Among the evaluations with no comment there were many evaluations focusing 
on specific areas, like tobacco, fixed bounds and so on. There certainly was a 
majority of pro-positive screening suggestion among the evaluations, and almost 
all of these suggested investments in the renewable sector or similar. Even so, it 
should be mentioned that there was a plurality of suggestions which I have 
classified together as pro-positive screening. There was also a wide range of 
different actors; other ministries, NGOs, other investors, RI experts, employee’s 
organizations and universities. Thus it was not merely radical NGOs which were 
in favor to the idea of positive environmental screening. The Ministry also 
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concludes that the evaluations in general were positive to such screening (Ministry 
of Finance 2008e, 18).  However, one of the two evaluations requested from the 
Ministry, Johnsen and Gjølberg (2008), were explicit in their criticism of positive 
screening, which they not regarded to be an appropriate instrument for a fund of 
the GPFG’s size. The broadly diversification would be too reduced and thus the 
risks would be increased. Joly (2008) argued that that Johansen and Gjølberg’s 
analysis was not precise, and that positive screening in se not would lead to 
increased risk.  
 
When summing up the evaluation process in the 2008 Report to the Storting, the 
Ministry (2008e, 23) concluded that they would establish an investment program 
targeted environmental friendly investments. It could therefore be argued that the 
Ministry adhered to the principles of overlapping consensus, by including a 
measure demanded by the Fund’s stakeholders. The Ministry opened up for the 
introduction of a new RI instrument, or the re-introduction, if one considers the 
former environmental programme. Even though the discussion on positive 
screening in 2008 was an opening up for re-introducing an RI instrument, there 
were differences between the use of the instrument in 2001 and in 2008. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze the two programmes in details, but 
when it comes to the Ministry’s consistency it is important to note that that the 
new programme not was a copy of the one from 2001. This was a clear 
introduction of a new instrument, since earmarking or positive screening not was 
part of the ethical guidelines form 2004. The ministry furthermore discussed 
several possible options for how the program should be build up, as well as the 
challenges with this kind of earmarking. By for instance overweighting low 
carbon companies, i.e. increase the amount of these equities with respect to the 
benchmark index. Risk might increase in other areas. An example is banks, which 
have low emissions, but high risks in other areas (Ministry of Finance 2008e, 68, 
73). 
 
The new environmental programme was discussed in the 2009 annual report to the 
Storting. First of all it is stated that the investments should meet the standard 
requirements to risk and return. Thereafter the Ministry discuss possible designs, 
environmental bonds, environmental equity indices and active management with 
environmental criteria, are outlined as the most likely ones. However, after 
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communication with Norges Bank the conclusion is that the Ministry not 
distributed any particular rules for these investments. The reason seems to be that 
NBIM regarded such targeted regulation as inappropriate, and that the 
environmental programme could be managed within the existing investment 
universe (Ministry of Finance 2009, 41-42). However, the environmental 
mandates have been included in the Management Mandate, as shown in table 1 in 
chapter 3.2, and this clearly represents a sign of commitment from the Ministry of 
Finance.  
 
According to Reiche (2010, 3574), informants in his study argued that 10 percent 
of the total assets could be subject to the new positive screening mechanism. It has 
turned out to be far less extensive. In 2010 there were ten environmental 
mandates, seven of them were externally managed, with a total value of 
approximately 25 billion NOK. Three of the mandates were within environmental 
technology, three were within water management and the last three within 
renewable or clean energy. All these investments had the same requirements to 
return as the rest of the portfolio (NBIM 2010b, 39). The Fund’s external 
mandates which invest according to environmental criteria, for instance in green 
technology and renewables, are separate from the ownership activity and the 
climate change focus. It is part of the general diversification policy, in which risk 
and return always are considered. The renewable sector might grow fast, but also 
be exposed to major risks. The investments are made on the same basis as all 
other investments when it comes to expected returns (NBIM 2012b). It should 
also be remembered that 25 billion, despite being a significant amount, is well 
below 1 percent of the Fund’s total value. According to Bellona (2012) there 
should be a higher percentage of green investment. They argue that a 15 percent 
target is achievable. The FiOH (2012) is quite explicit when they argue “we want 
the GPFG to use more positive screening”. Former Minister of the Environment 
Erik Solheim is also arguing in favor of positive selection, suggesting that there 
should be a certain amount set aside to invest in green technology, for instance 
wind- and water power in China. Several possible designs exist; among them a 
separate portfolio, place part of the fund in Norfund, or make a whole new fund. 
Nevertheless, he emphasizes that it should not be based on non-profit, it should be 
investments giving a high return (Solheim 2012). According to Kiernan (2005, 
221) it is surprising that most investors handle the climate change risk mostly by 
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ownership engagement, and to a little extent by what he calls the next level, 
namely overall investment strategies with concrete changes in the portfolio. In 
2005 this was however about to change, Kiernan (2005) points at emerging 
environmental investment strategies among US funds like CalPERS.  What is 
interesting to note in this regard is that in Norway went in the opposite direction 
in 2004, and only re-introduced such measures in 2008. According to Syse (2012) 
the evaluation of the first environmental program in 2004 indicated that such 
programs are not effective, and that this was in line with the experts at that time as 
well. NBIM’s advice was that environmental politics should be left to the 
Government, since investors have other tasks.  
 
To sum up it is argued that the re-introduction of positive screening supports the 
claim about continuation in the Ministry’s approach towards climate change. 
However, there was a period with no use of such instruments, and as such there 
has been some inconsistency in this part of the Ministry’s climate change strategy. 
Nevertheless, the new environmental programme is part of an expanding climate 
change strategy.  
 
6.2. Analysis of NBIM – how is climate change on the agenda? 
In this chapter there will be an analysis and discussion of NBIM, with the annual 
reports and other written material29 as the departing point. The main questions to 
answer are in line with research question 7-11 presented in chapter 1.2. How is 
climate change on the agenda for NBIM in the period, and what were the major 
happenings? Has NBIM been consistent in their approach? This section will also 
look at how NBIM, more concrete, use corporate governance in the work with 
climate change. As with the previous chapter about the Ministry of Finance, the 
chapter will be characterized by the historical perspective.  
6.2.1 How is climate change on the agenda: a historical perspective  
As described in the methodology chapter, a small content analysis was performed 
for some of the written primary sources. In NBIM’s case the analysis was 
performed in the annual reports from 2006 to 2012. It was clarified in chapter 3 
that there was nothing about climate change in NBIM’s mandate or in the central 
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principles from the Executive Board of the Central Bank. Climate change is, 
however, included in NBIM’s understanding of ESG issues, as emphasized in the 
NBIM’s responsible investment policy, see page chapter 3.3. When it comes to 
the annual reports, climate was mentioned several times. In table 4 there is an 
overview of the number of words containing climate in the annual reports30.  
Table 4 
Report Frequency of the 
word climate 
 
NBIM’s Annual Report 2006 12 
NBIM’s Annual Report 2007 41 
NBIM’s Annual Report 2008 3 
NBIM’s Annual Report 2009 11 
NBIM’s Annual Report 2010 11 
NBIM’s Annual Report 2011 9 
 
The frequency of a word can say something about how high priority that particular 
issue is given over a given amount of time, i.e. in a historical perspective. 
Nevertheless, there is room for considerable dubiousness since there by no means 
can be sat an equal sign between how an issue is dealt with in written material, 
and how the same issue is dealt with in reality. Having this in mind, there seems 
to be some tendency in how the word climate is exposed in the report. As become 
clear from the results in table 4, climate is normally mentioned approximately ten 
times in the annual reports. This might not seem that little, but for instance the 
word return was mentioned 25 times in the 2011 report just in the summary, 
content list and foreword. Having this in mind, it becomes clear that climate is far 
from being a most-used word for NBIM. That yet not expected from an actor like 
NBIM, which primarily obligation is to create return. What is furthermore 
interesting to note is that there is not an increasing trend as was found in the 
Ministry’s reports. The picture is thus less clear, but there is a remarkable increase 
in the use of the word climate in 2007, and then again it was almost not mentioned 
in 2008. Probably reasons for this will be discussed below. 
 
2005 was the starting year of the separate corporate governance section within 
NBIM (NBIM 2005, 24). Climate change was not yet identified as a focus area, 
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and as a consequence it was not mentioned in the report either. There is a five-
page chapter on corporate governance in the report, in which the establishment of 
the separate unit in NBIM is presented, as well as the foundation and principles of 
the ownership activity. It is clearly written that this establishment is a direct 
consequence of the ethical guidelines (NBIM 2005, 24). However, in a letter from 
Norges Bank to the Ministry in the beginning of 2003, i.e. before the Graver 
Committee published its report, the bank is clearly positive to the use of 
shareholder rights. In the then valid management mandate (not the current 
mandate referred to in chapter 3) it was stated that the bank not should use such 
instruments unless it was necessary to secure financial return. In the letter Norges 
Bank suggested to change this formulation (NBIM 2003). Consequently, it is not 
possible to claim that NBIM not would have enhanced corporate governance 
without the ethical guidelines. However, it remains uncertain whether the current 
corporate governance strategy of NBIM would have been the same if the ethical 
guidelines not were established.   
 
In NBIM’s 2005 annual report it is also emphasized that the objective with the 
corporate governance work is to ensure financial return. For a universal owner 
like NBIM, well-functioning markets in the future are also essential and thus 
factors like environment are important (NBIM 2005, 24). It is not easy to identify 
the direction of NBIM’s ownership activity at this point in time. It remains 
unclear what NBIM actually planned to do. As a matter of fact NBIM got 
substantial criticism from Hans Petter Graver, the former head of the Graver 
Committee, for not fulfilling their part of the ethical obligations. As already 
mentioned, the ethical guidelines had two pillars, one of them left to NBIM. When 
it comes to climate change the Graver Committee (2003a, 157) had explicitly 
stated that they regarded ownership engagement as a more fruitful instrument than 
screening and divestment. In a chronicle in Dagens Næringsliv Graver explicitly 
stated that he was disappointed, and that “the bank has not yet not followed up the 
ethical obligation they got from the Storting and Government”31 (Graver 2006). It 
might therefore seem like the Graver Commission had intended NBIM’s 
ownership activity to be more pro-active. As will be showed below, NBIM’s 
ownership activity has, however, evolved, and at least some of the issues 
emphasized by Graver in 2006 are now in place.  
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The above paragraph on 2005, which is outside the main time frame in the thesis, 
sat the scene, and serves as an exemplification of how the climate change strategy 
in NBIM evolved in the coming years. In NBIM’s 2006 annual report, the word 
climate was mentioned 12 times. There was also a 8-page chapter on corporate 
governance and ethics in the main part of the annual report, in addition to a six-
page feature article about the chosen priority areas for the corporate governance 
strategy (NBIM 2006). Both these chapters are closely-written. In the report the 
corporate governance strategy is repeated (cf. last paragraph, it was presented 
already in 2005). The following is made clear; exercise of ownership rights should 
be conducted with the objective of achieving financial return, it should be founded 
on a long-term perspective and considering the universal owner aspect. 
Furthermore it should be based on Global Compact and various guidelines from 
OECD (NBIM 2006, 40). This is also in line with §2-2 (1) and §2-2 (2) in the 
Management Mandate, as presented in table 1 in chapter 3.2.  
 
The corporate governance section counted 6 man-years in 2006, and had a budget 
of 10 million NOK. In 2006 the work was taken one step further by identifying six 
focus areas for the corporate governance work, one of them being companies’ 
lobby activity towards climate change (NBIM 2006, 41). As such 2006 therefore 
marks a clear continuation of the strategy commenced in 2005, since the corporate 
governance strategy was specified in 2006. When it comes to climate change, 
2006 marks a beginning-year in NBIM. Several reasons for choosing the specific 
areas are outlined  by NBIM (2006, 41-42). Among them was the importance of 
the selected areas for the long-term financial return. When it comes to climate 
change it has already been discussed why it is relevant for universal owners. 
Moreover, NBIM emphasized the probability they had to contribute to changes as 
a key motivation. It was also important for NBIM that they had the possibility to 
identify single companies to work with, and finally the probability to cooperate 
with other investors was emphasized. In 2006 NBIM also worked with making the 
corporate governance work commonly known, through participation in panels and 
conferences (NBIM 2006, 41-42). Voting at companies general meetings is a key 
instrument for NBIM in the corporate governance work. Most of the voting is by 
so-called proxy-voting, the use of a representative voting on behalf of NBIM. In 
2006 NBIM voted on most of the companies in which they had invested (NBIM 
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2006, 41). In addition NBIM has direct contact with some companies. NBIM also 
collaborates with other investors, and write the following:  
The costs will be borne by the investors conducting the activities while the 
results achieved will benefit all the shareholders. Owners will be able to 
strengthen their influence by coordinating their activities. NBIM therefore 
recognizes the strategic importance of participating in informal and more 
formalized networks (NBIM 2006, 43). 
Despite not writing it directly, it becomes clear that NBIM regards corporate 
governance as a common good, and sees cooperation as a way to solve the 
prisoner’s dilemma. NBIM is member of International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN), and participated in Council of Institutional Investors (CII) in the 
US. In 2005-2006 NBIM also contributed to the establishment of the UNPRI 
(NBIM 2006, 43).    
 
In the feature article in the annual report about the Fund in 2006 the focus areas 
are more thoroughly presented. It is stated that NBIM “aims to become known as 
one of the world’s most prominent and professional active shareholders over the 
coming four-year period” (NBIM 2006, 68). NBIM aimed at working with areas 
which are not part of the responsibility of the Council on Ethics. Furthermore 
NBIM emphasizes that it was important that NBIM is not regarded as a political 
actor, or a non-consistent actor (NBIM 2006, 68-69). Syse (2012) argues that this 
is one of the key issues in order for NBIM to be successful in its corporate 
governance activities. NBIM furthermore stated that climate change is a threat for 
a universal and long-term owner, by referring to the Stern report. According to 
NBIM there is a limited room for action for investors, since single companies’ 
reduced emission not will contribute to solve the global challenge. Therefore, they 
argue, it is policy initiatives and regulation which will make a difference. Since 
several companies lobby against such regulation, especially in the US, as such 
they lobby against the interest of a long-term investor like NBIM. NBIM wishes 
to use corporate governance to contribute to a more transparent kind of lobbying, 
in which companies not lobby against climate regulation which would benefit 
NBIM as a whole (NBIM 2006, 72-73). The later Mercer research (2011; 2012) is 
a proof of how valid NBIM’s choice was, since it is climate regulation that now is 
causing major uncertainty as to how the Fund should be positioned.   
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The 2007 annual report (NBIM 2007) is organized in the same way as the one 
from 2006. There was a 17-page long chapter in the main report about ethics and 
corporate governance, and 15-page feature articles about corporate governance 
and the focus areas in the end. Climate was mentioned 47 times in this report, by 
far the highest frequency in the sample. In 2007 there were ten man-years in the 
corporate governance section. Much of the content in the 2007 annual report is 
similar, but there is one significant difference. In the 2007 report (NBIM 2007, 
42-43) there is a chapter in which NBIM’s contact with companies is discussed. 
NBIM was in contact with 90 companies in 2007, mostly within the six focus 
areas for the corporate governance work. The companies were chosen based on 
analysis performed by or for NBIM, the general meetings or other happenings like 
media attention. Also the share owned by NBIM, and the size of the company is 
considered. When companies are identified NBIM make a plan for the dialogues, 
including the objective with the conversation and the timeframe. The 
communication is mainly with the chairman of the Central Board. According to 
NBIM there is in general availability from the companies, but they also write that 
dialogue is easier in countries with disclosure regulation and tradition for 
shareowner communication (NBIM 2007, 42). Between the lines we can read that 
the communication is not always easy. In the report NBIM shows to ten examples 
of how they are in communication with companies. All of them are very 
anonymised, and only one of them is about climate change conversations. 
Nevertheless, NBIM declares that this example is only one of approximately 20 
dialogues about climate. Thus, this is the most precise information you can get 
from NBIM about company dialogue: 
NBIM visited the chairman of a large power producer at its head office to 
discuss, among other things, developments in climate legislation. The 
chairman, who is also the CEO and in active contact with legislators, 
subsequently came to Oslo on his own initiative to continue these discussions 
with NBIM’s management. This dialogue is continuing, and is just one of 
around 20 ongoing dialogues on climate legislation (NBIM 2007, 43).  
This is a clear transparency challenge. During a hearing in the Committee on 
Finance it was pointed out by the environmental NGO Rainforest Foundation that 
for instance the Swedish AP funds are more transparent in their ownership activity 
(Løvold, Olsen and Ranum 2012). The Swedish AP funds have organized their RI 
work in a different way that the GPFG. The four funds have one common ethical 
council, which also has the responsibility for the dialogue with companies. From 
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the 2011 annual report (Etikrådet 2011) it becomes evident that there is a higher 
degree of transparency. However, ongoing dialogue with companies is not always 
made public in Sweden either. Nevertheless, both dialogue which was fulfilled in 
2011, as well as ongoing dialogue, is presented in the report. Both name of the 
company, sector, and country is presented. Each company is given a vote on a five 
step scale from very positive development to no positive development. In addition 
there is an in-depth presentation of the dialogue with Coldcorps, as well as 
anonymised presentations of ongoing dialogues (Etikrådet 2011, 14-26). The total 
amount of information is substantively more than what is published by NBIM. 
One should remember that the Swedish council embraces both the role of the 
Norwegian Council on Ethics and NBIM’s corporate governance section. The 
Council on Ethics is publishing the names of companies that are under 
observation.   
 
It is interesting to note that whereas NBIM had six focus areas in 2007, among 
them two of more social and environmentally character, namely children’s rights 
and climate change related lobbying, NBIM had an investor expectation document 
only for children’s rights. Thus there is a slightly excess focus on children’s rights 
in the 2007 annual report. The focus on climate change started with a quite narrow 
focus on lobbying in 2007, this narrow focus was by, among others, the Albright 
group criticized as far too narrow in its evaluation of the ethical guidelines 
(Albright Group LLC and Chesterman 2008). According to Syse (2012), who was 
the head of the corporate governance section when the focus areas were shaped, it 
was intentional to focus on a relatively narrow set of issues. He furthermore 
argues that some of the criticism might be due to the angle that was chose when it 
comes to climate change. NBIM’s line of reasoning was to point out where they as 
an investor could make a real difference, and that was found to be when 
companies lobby against climate regulation. Binding regulation is in the end what 
is needed in order to avoid climate change. For a universal and long-term owner it 
is especially problematic if companies work against the optimal state of affairs for 
the whole portfolio in the long run (Syse 2012). According to Syse (2012) the 
corporate governance section had support from the Chief Executive Officer and 
the Central Board for selecting the area. Furthermore he argues that many 
companies actually changed their standpoint on climate regulation during 2006 
and 2007, but it is of course difficult to claim that NBIM’s standpoint was 
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decisive. However, Syse (2012) argues that many companies listened to NBIM, 
and the fact that a large fund chose to emphasize this aspect might not have been 
irrelevant for many companies. The Albright Group and Chesterman (2008, 16-
17) argue that the focus areas was chosen after a one-year process in which also 
external expert were included, however they also claim that the process was too 
internal, since general public was left out of the process. Contrarily Alm (2010, 
143) argues that NBIM selected climate change as a priority area also because it 
was in line with what most Norwegians were very concerned about in 2006. As 
such it was in line with the principle of overlapping consensus. Whereas for 
instance Clark and Monk (2010a) argue that the rationale of the Fund is based on 
a political legitimacy rather than a functional one, the Albright Group and 
Chesterman (2008) argue that NBIM should be more concerned with anchoring its 
priorities among Norwegian stakeholders. The reason is that the focus areas in that 
way would be more robust in case of for instance political changes. This argument 
is in line with the discussion in chapter 3.2 about the challenge with climate 
change not being included in the most of the central regulations and guidelines for 
the Fund.  
 
So far it has been argued that 2005, in which the corporate governance strategy 
was formulated, sat the premises for the further specification of this strategy and 
the inclusion of climate in 2006. In the same way the Graver Committee’s report 
from 2003 and the ethical guidelines from 2004 formed the rationale for NBIM’s 
change from a passive owner, to an active owner with concrete focus areas. Each 
year is as such a premise for the next year. There is continuation in how NBIM 
approach the issue. This has also been expressed in the written material. There is 
consistency in the amount of pages dedicated to ownership activity as well as 
climate change, the layout is similar (with closely-written pages), and an increase 
in the use of the word climate, in line with this issue becoming gradually more 
important from 2006. In 2008 there seems however to be a discontinuity in how 
NBIM express their climate change strategy. In the 2008 annual report climate 
was mentioned only 3 times (NBIM 2008). This should, in line with the critical 
discussion about the limitations of content analysis, not be emphasized too much. 
However, there is a remarkable difference from the previous years, especially 
from 2007.  
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There are also other indicators stressing the discontinuity in the written material in 
2008. The annual reports from NBIM includes a special thematic part each year, 
or feature articles. In 2007 this part of the report was partly dedicated to social and 
environmental issues, whereas the thematic part in 2008 was about risk in the 
equity markets and traditional corporate governance issues like shareholder 
voting. This difference might of course account for some of the decrease in the 
mentioning of climate in 2008. Nevertheless, there was a remarkable difference 
also in the main part of the report between 2007 and 2008. Al already mentioned, 
in 2007 there was a 17-page long chapter on ethics and corporate governance with 
concrete examples on how the work had proceeded. It was almost without 
exception closely written pages. In 2008 there was an 8-page chapter about the 
same, with considerably more air and figures on most of the pages. Within this 
chapter there was only a short two-page section on climate change, stressing a 
continued focus on lobbying and climate regulation. NBIM voted on 80 
environmental issues in 42 companies in 2008, mostly related to concrete 
suggestions to reduce CO2 emissions. In addition NBIM continued the more 
detailed contact with 10 companies within the energy sector in the US (NBIM 
2008a, 54). However, in 2007 NBIM had contact with more than 20 European and 
American companies about climate related risks, and there is not written anything 
about whether, and eventually why, they only continued the contact with ten 
companies in the US in 2008.  
 
As already underlined, analysis of the annual reports might not say anything about 
how a concrete issue, in this case climate change, was on the agenda, or how high 
on the priority list it was. Annual reports can serve as simple window-showing, 
and the frequency of a word, or the space dedicated to an issue is not necessary a 
good measure of what was done. Nevertheless, this is the unit of analysis publicly 
available, and a remarkable difference is noted. Whether it was due to some kind 
of more occasional organizational gap in the corporate governance section, or 
whether it reflects an actual change in prioritizing, is difficult to assess. One 
reason might be that there was a change in staff members at the end of 2007. 
Henrik Syse, a well-known Norwegian philosopher, was headhunted to NBIM in 
2005. The Graver Committee had suggested a work-sharing between NBIM and 
the Council on Ethics, where NBIM should be responsible for one of the 
responsible investments pillars, namely the ownership activity. NBIM had until 
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this been a passive owner. Syse, with outspoken opinions about ethics, was asked 
to form the corporate governance section within NBIM. The section had five staff 
members in the beginning, and was later expanded to approximately eight before 
Syse left NBIM at the end of 2007. Today the section has approximately ten staff 
members (Syse 2012). According to the Albright Group and Chesterman (2008, 
12) one of these employees worked with climate change, a division they argue 
seemed suitable. Since there was such a remarkable difference in the frequency of 
the word climate between 2007 and 2008, and also a general difference in how the 
climate strategy is expressed, there is tempting to suggest that this might have 
been connected to the fact that Syse left the position as head of the corporate 
governance section. This does not mean that the new leader, Anne Kvam, was not 
as interested as Syse in climate change, it can simply mean that there was what we 
might call an organizational gap in between.  
 
Another plausible explanation is that NBIM was more transparent in 2007. The 
shorter and more general presentations in the latest reports might be symptom of 
NBIM being less willing to share information with the public. It might also be that 
is does not reflect any change within the corporate governance section, but rather 
a change in the power relations within NBIM. Maybe Syse was better at 
promoting corporate governance within NBIM and thus gained more space 
dedicated to these issues in the annual report than his successor. This assumption 
is supported by the fact that there also was a change in the top management of 
NBIM in this period. Yngve Slyngstad was the new Chief Executive Officers as 
of 1st January 2008. It might also be that there was a change in the importance 
given to wordy presentations of a strategy. It might also be that the corporate 
governance strategy and the climate change issue had been so thoroughly 
presented in 2006 and 2007, that it was regarded unnecessary to repeat it in 2008. 
To sum up; it is not easy to conclude with one answer as to why this difference 
between 2006-2007 and 2008 was found.   
 
One could argue that the focus on climate change in NBIM’s ownership activity 
has evolved from focusing on a narrow area, to become broader, i.e. emphasizing 
more aspects of climate change. This might have been a process in line with the 
evolvement of the corporate governance section during the same period. One 
could also argue that NBIM answered to the criticism from the evaluation process 
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in 2008 by widening the focus area. The Albright Group and Chesterman (2008, 
19) explicitly wrote that the focus seemed narrow. This line of reasoning could be 
turned the other way around, by arguing that it is not usual for an ownership 
engagement to start with companies lobby activity, rather the contrary. Multiple 
investors which NBIM can be compared with, and which they collaborate with, 
does not talk about lobbying. The reason is that lobbying is a sensitive area which 
can easily be regarded too political. It was controversial when NBIM launched 
lobbying in 2007, especially since there was a discussion in the US at that time 
about whether SWF were used as political tools (NBIM 2012b).  
 
In 2009 there was again an increase in the frequency of the word climate in the 
annual report, but it was still very far from the 2007 level. There was a ten-page 
chapter on corporate governance in the main part of the 2009 report, but the 
feature articles were dedicated to other aspects. The pages are less closely-written 
than in 2006-2007, and as such more in line with the 2008 report. However, 2009 
serve as a good example of why it is challenging to assess NBIM purely looking 
at the annual reports. The reason is that even though there was not a very large 
focus on corporate governance and climate change in the annual report in 2009, a 
side-path appeared this year. In august 2009 NBIM published its Investor 
Expectations on Climate Change  document (NBIM 2009b). This document 
represent on one side a continuation in NBIM’s corporate governance work, since 
such document already existed with regards to children’s rights. On the other side 
it represent a new moment in the climate change strategy, and also a new way to 
communicate with the general public.  
 
Up to 2009 climate change was only commented on in the annual reports, and as 
such it is a side-path to move the focus into other documents. The expectation 
document clearly represented a shift in the focus on climate change since there 
was no longer only a focus on lobbying. The work was also made far more 
concrete with this document, which is followed by a Sector Compliance Report 
each year. The challenge is however that by moving the focus on climate change 
from the annual report to more targeted documents, these areas might be less 
visible for the general public. The reason is that the annual reports are 
summarized in the reports to the Storting, and it is also my impression that they 
are read by several actors. Contrarily, other written material might suffer from less 
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attention. There will however be a separate analysis of these documents in the 
next subchapter.     
 
In 2010 climate was mentioned with the same frequency as in 2009 in the annual 
report. Also in this report there was a chapter on corporate governance in the main 
part, this year it was six pages long. In 2010 there was also published a new 
version of the document describing the NBIM’s expectations when it comes to 
climate change. In 2010 NBIM also launched their new real estate investments 
(NBIM 2010b). In this regard it is interesting to note that these should give 
importance to, cf., §2-1(3) from the management mandate (see table I, chapter 
3.1) “energy efficiency, water consumption and waste management”. In theory, 
i.e. in the written management mandate, the real estate investments are as such a 
new factor which contributes to enhance the overall climate change strategy. This 
was also noted by Alm (2010). Despite not being part of NBIM’s outspoken 
climate change strategy, which is related to ownership engagement, the real-estate 
investments could be said to contribute to further enhance NBIM’s overall work 
with climate change. However, the energy efficiency aspect is not mentioned in 
NBIM’s 2010 annual report. Instead they write that they will focus on 
“investments in well-developed markets and traditional property types, such as 
offices and retail premises” (NBIM 2010b, 24). The real-estate investment were 
however very new in 2010. 
 
In 2011 climate was mentioned nine times, so almost the same as the two previous 
years. The chapter about corporate governance was only three pages long (NBIM 
2011a, 46-47). Again, there is less content on each page than what was the case in 
2006-2007. The feature article in 2011 was about the real estate investments. The 
energy-efficiency aspect does not seem to be prioritized in NBIM’s real estate 
investments so far (in London and Paris). However NBIM (2011a, 65) write that 
“when assessing prospective investments (…) environmental issues will also be 
addressed as set out in the regulations governing the fund”. It is therefore 
reasonable to argue that real estate investments in the future might add a factor to 
the overall climate change strategy, but at this point in time the issue has not yet 
been prioritized by NBIM. As mentioned in the introduction the investments are 
also so far limited (0.3 percent), and thus it is not possible to analyze the real 
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estate investments from a climate change perspective yet. This might be an 
interesting topic for future research.   
 
The amount of space dedicated to corporate governance and climate change in the 
annual reports reach the lowest level in 2011. There has been a continuing trend 
from 2008 and onwards. The 2006-2007 reports had more text, less air and 
figures, as well as less irrelevant photos than the reports from 2008-2011. This 
trend is so clear that it is tempting to argue that there has been a commercializing 
of the reports. If this is the case, and if it eventually has been done deliberately is 
not easy to say.  
 
When it comes to the extent to which climate change seems to be on the agenda, it 
might be plausible to argue that it is an issue of growing interest and attention. It 
has turned out to be one of six focus areas in the ownership activity, there is an 
employee dedicated and responsible for the issue, and expectation documents and 
compliance reports have been developed. As such there has been continuity in 
NBIM’s climate change strategy, which has gradually evolved. There has 
however been some inconsistency in how climate change specifically, and 
corporate governance generally, has been expressed in the annual reports. It is not 
legitimate to argue that NBIM’s interest and effort related to these issues has 
decreased. The possible explanations discussed above seem more likely. Still, this 
consists of a communication challenge for NBIM, since it seems like they actually 
are more concerned with these issue than what is communicated through their 
most important information channel, namely the annual reports.  
 
However, it remains uncertain whether the increased interest in climate change 
also is followed up at the top management level in NBIM and Norges Bank. The 
fade-out of climate change, responsible investing and corporate governance issues 
in the annual reports might signify that these issues have been totally delegated to 
the governance section. The fact that climate change not is included in any of the 
guidelines at higher levels seems to support this line of reasoning. Another 
interesting observation is that nor the Governor of Norges Bank Øystein Olsen, 
nor the Director of NBIM Yngve Slyngstad, mentioned responsible investing, 
corporate governance or climate change in their presentation of the Fund in 2011 
at the hearing in the Committee on Finance in the Parliament the 17th of April 
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2012. It is not reasonable to expect these issues to be the main unit of attention in 
such a presentation, but it seems somewhat strange that it was not at least 
mentioned. Ethical challenges, climate change, environmental issues like 
investments in the rain forest, the use of corporate governance versus withdrawal -  
these where however all issues at stake in the subsequent question round. Several 
members in the Committee on Finance, from parties like Venstre, the Christian 
Democratic Party (KrF) and the Socialist Left Party (SV) were all quite concerned 
with these issues.  
6.2.2. Corporate governance and climate change - NBIM’s Investor 
Expectations document and the Sector Compliance Reports   
Today there is a broad general agreement in Parliament about the active 
ownership strategy of NBIM. This has not always been the case. In 1999 the first 
Bondevik Government suggested that NBIM should use its shareholder rights to 
vote in a way that would benefit environment and human rights. This was 
suggestion was not approved in the Parliament (Ministry of Finance 2004). It 
seems as such quite clear that there has been a remarkable development. This 
section will look closer at corporate governance and climate change.  
 
In 2009 NBIM launched their first investor expectation document on climate 
change. According to the Ministry of Finance (2012d) NBIM’s investor 
expectations are interesting, and show how minority owners can explicitly 
formulate expectations. Besides, the Ministry argues that NBIM has managed to 
operationalize something difficult, which might be valuable for other investors 
(Ministry of Finance 2012d). NBIM had already issued such a document on one 
of the other focus areas, namely children’s rights, and the outline is more or less 
the same. It remains uncertain why NBIM decided to make an expectation 
document for one of the focus areas in 2007, but only in 2009 for the other one. 
Several possible reasons could however be discussed. It might be that NBIM’s 
newly established corporate governance team regarded children’s rights to be 
more urgent or important than climate change. Nothing has been found that 
support this assumption. It might also be that the corporate governance team, due 
to for instance limited resources, simply had to pick one focus area first. Yet it 
seems a bit awkward that it took two years to make the other expectation 
document. Though, this could be in line with the assumption about a possible 
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institutional slowness due to the complex structure surrounding the Fund. It was 
also shown in table 1 in chapter 3.2 that according to §2-2 (3) NBIM has to 
consult the Ministry before they make “major amendments to the Bank’s priorities 
in its active ownership” (Lovdata 2010). As mentioned in chapter 6.1.1, the 
Ministry invited NBIM to prepare an expectation document on climate change in 
the annual report to the Storting for 2008 (Ministry of Finance 2008e, 23). It 
might have been internal communication between the bank and the Ministry, 
which might have delayed the process, but also embedded the final outcome in 
both institutions. However, the Ministry’s request for an expectation document is 
a proof of their role as principal with regards to NBIM. In §2-2 (3) it is further 
stated that there should be a public consultation before NBIM send eventual 
proposals to the Ministry (Lovdata 2010). Indeed it was opened up for 
commenting NBIM’s first version of the expectation document (NBIM 2009c). 
Unfortunately is neither the first version of the document, or the comments, 
publicly available. Consequently it is difficult to assess whether NBIM eventually 
changed the document after receiving the comments. 
 
Another possible explanation as to why NBIM not had an expectation document 
on climate change in the period of 2006-2009, is that a single event urged NBIM 
to concretize the expectations on children’s rights first. In 2006 the Council on 
Ethics recommended divestment from the biochemical company Monsanto due to 
severe risk that continued ownership would contribute to what is labelled “the 
worst forms of child labour” (Council on Ethics 2006a, 16). The Councils 
conclusion was quite clear, however, the Ministry decided to not divest, and 
instead try to influence Monsanto though pursuing active ownership (Ministry of 
Finance 2008a). Therefore it seems reasonable to argue that Monsanto was the 
first real possibility for NBIM to show that corporate governance might be more 
efficient than divestment, and that since this case was related to child labour, and 
not climate change, they chose to focus on this first. If the first real case had been 
related to climate change, the situation might have been the other way around. I 
would therefore argue that there is no reason to believe that NBIM intentionally 
regarded either one of the focus areas less important. It is however interesting that 
NBIM themselves has admitted that children’s’ rights is the focus area which has 
led to the most clear results (Slyngstad 2012). Rather than a confession of the 
importance of either of the focus areas, this statement should be regarded as an 
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acknowledgement of how complicated climate change is as a focus area in 
corporate governance work. In addition to unclear reporting routines and political 
risk related to uncertain policy initiatives, it is a challenge that there is today no 
global climate change law. This is opposed to for instance conventions on labour 
standards or children’s rights, which might be the reason why it is easier to see 
results in the corporate governance work with children’s rights.  
    
The investor expectation document was slightly updated in December 2010. I will 
mostly consider the updated version (NBIM 2010c) in this section. Some 
comparison with the original document will be done, in order to assess NBIM’s 
consistency. The document is at the core of how NBIM regard climate change, 
and many of the issues discussed in chapter 4 are addressed here. It can be called 
the governing document when it comes to climate change. Still, we should not 
forget that this document is placed quite low on the hieratical list of documents 
presented in table 2. As problematized in chapter 3, since climate change is not 
included in the overall mandates, there is nothing preventing NBIM or the 
Ministry from changing their minds in the future.  
 
Like most of the written material from NBIM, at least after 2007, the document is 
quite short and concise. NBIM (2010c, 3) writes that having expectations towards 
companies is a priority for investors because “there is overwhelming scientific 
evidence that climate change threatens long-term financial returns”. NBIM has as 
such a very concrete understanding of the link between climate change and future 
return. This impression was also confirmed by both Syse (2012) and by NBIM 
themselves (NBIM 2012b). An initial assumption was that NBIM incorporated 
climate change in the focus area due to political will. Nothing has been found to 
support this hypothesis. 
 
The expectations are divided in four main categories; A) strategy for optimized 
investment in climate change risk mitigation, B) specific action to implement 
climate change strategy, C) effective and efficient governance for risk 
management, and D) transparency and disclosure. Within each category NBIM 
offers concrete questions and expectations to companies. Under A) companies are 
for instance asked to identify the material threats and opportunities from by 
climate change in itself, but also from regulation concerning climate change. The 
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same also applies to companies’ investment in major projects where future profit 
can be affected by the above mentioned. Under A) companies are also asked 
whether it has environmental policies, and if so, whether they are frequently 
updated (NBIM 2010c, 5). The expectations under B) address specific action that 
NBIM recommends companies to take. NBIM encourages company boards to 
reflect over several issues, for instance about concrete actions to mitigate climate 
change risk, both in direct operations, but also in the supply chain. One concrete 
example is whether the company has introduced or increased the use of more 
environmental-friendly raw material. NBIM also asks whether companies 
contribute to research (NBIM 2010c, 6).  
 
Under C) NBIM addresses good corporate governance as a key element for 
companies in order to implement the expectations. NBIM asks company boards to 
consider whether there is a clear responsibility structure in the company, whether 
reporting and monitoring on climate change exists, and finally whether the board 
explicitly integrates climate change in the company’s risk management (NBIM 
2010c, 6). The last category D) is concerned with transparency and disclosure. 
This is important since NBIM uses this information to assess the companies. 
NBIM consider companies CO2 emissions in tonnes, and the production or 
revenue per tonnes of emission. NBIM’s initial focus on lobbying has not been 
left out either, NBIM still expects companies to reflect around how they interact 
with regulating authorities, and what the position on climate related legislation is 
(NBIM 2010c, 7).   
 
NBIM’s investor expectation document is quite concrete and NBIM is to some 
extent clear about what they expect companies to do. I would say this gives NBIM 
a quite pro-active role. Nevertheless, NBIM is still using quite general 
formulations like “companies should be” or “key questions for boards to 
consider”. The updated expectation document is longer and more detailed than the 
first document from 2009. As such it seems reasonable to suggest that the work 
with climate change has evolved and matured over the last years. This is part of 
the consistent process in which NBIM is gradually expanding its climate change 
strategy. The list of what company boards are recommended/expected to focus on 
is long, and as pointed out by Syse (2012) it might be harder to see results when 
one has a broad focus area. There is also a terminological difference which makes 
                                                 
Page 83 
it unsure whether NBIM is clearer about what they actually expect from portfolio 
companies now. In the 2009 version of the document NBIM always used the 
formulation “NBIM expect companies to…” instead of the vaguer emphasize on 
what company boards might focus on in the 2010 version. This is a quite 
significant difference. At a fist glance it might seem like NBIM has taken a step 
backward by being less explicit in the new document. However there might be 
good reasons for using broader formulations. Climate change is after all a very 
complex challenge, both for NBIM and the investees, and as such more openly 
formulated expectations might be better suited to encounter the climate change 
challenge.  
 
NBIM has followed up the expectation document with an annual Sector 
Compliance Report. According to the Ministry of Finance (2012d) the compliance 
reports contribute to further concretization of NBIM’s climate change strategy. 
The report is based on public information, and companies are assessed as either 
compliant or non-compliant. Companies that do not have sufficient disclosure 
routines are evaluated to be non-compliant. According to NBIM (2010d, 5) 
“companies must have addressed the relevant indicator in their publicly available 
material” in order to be regarded compliant. Even though NBIM has not included 
all its investees in the sample, the expectations are meant to reach all the 
approximately 8000 companies in which it has invested (NBIM 2012b). Results 
from the compliance survey, alongside information from other sources, can be 
used to identify companies that may be inclined to change management and 
disclosure practices following a constructive dialogue with a large shareholder 
(NBIM 2012b). The compliance level was low in 2009, and NBIM wrote the 
following in the report “(…) the absolute compliance level are still low given the 
high and sustained level of shareholder concern on these specific issues” (NBIM 
2009d, 2). Between the lines it could be understood that NBIM has had a 
considerable effort with regards to climate change, and that they are disappointed 
about the results. This is also a proof of how challenging this issue is. The 
compliance level was low also in 2010, and NBIM (2010d, 3) explicitly write “we 
found little to suggest an overall improvement between this report and the first 
assessment in 2009”. A low compliance level with regards to investor 
expectations on climate change seems to be nothing new. In a study from 2006 
performed by Insight Investment it was found that the European electricity sector 
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not met their investor expectations towards climate change. It is also argued that 
the same applied of other sectors, and the challenge was especially poor disclosure 
(Sullivan and Kozak 2006).     
 
In the 2009 report there were 476 companies from six energy-intensive sectors 
included in the sample, which were evaluated on basis of nine indicators (NBIM 
2009d, 2-3). In 2010 NBIM assessed 452 of the same companies as in 2009, in 
addition to 47 new companies (NBIM 2010d, 5). In 2011 they assessed 453 
companies (NBIM 2011e, 3). The indicators on which NBIM assessed the 
companies on in 2009 and 2010 are the following (NBIM 2009d, 2010d);  
- Integration of climate change impacts into strategic business planning 
- Action plans for sector specific risks and opportunities 
- Continuous risk assessment 
- Participation in sector relevant research 
- Mitigation of climate change risk in supply chain 
- Disclosure of climate change performance 
- Disclosure of reduction plans and quantified targets 
- Disclosure of policy position in regard to regulation 
- Transparent and functioning governance structure for climate change 
policies/ programmes 
In 2011 the indicators were slightly changed, probably in line with the updated 
investor expectation document. They are however quite similar, but for instance 
disclosure of climate change performance has been replaced with disclosure of 
current greenhouse gas emission, which arguably can be regarded as an even 
more concrete measurement indicator.  
 
In 2009 there was, as already mentioned, a low level of compliance. Only the 
power generation sector scores around 50 percent on most of the indicators.  The 
transport sector, on the other side, scores around 10 to 20 percent on most of the 
indicators (NBIM 2009d, 5). In 2010 the picture was quite similar. There were 
still substantial differences between the sectors. The power generation sector is 
still the most compliant, whereas the transport sectors score low (NBIM 2010d, 
6).  The level of compliance on each of the indicators in 2010 is then compared to 
the compliance level in 2009. There is a separate analysis for each sector. In the 
transport sector, where the compliance level is in general very low, there was 
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however a small increase in compliance from 2009 to 2010 on six of nine 
indicators. In the power generation sector the overall level was higher, but there 
was a small decrease in the 2010 compliance level in six of nine indicators (NBIM 
2010d, 7, 12).  In 2011 the overall compliance level was considerably higher than 
in 2009 and 2010, but there are big differences both between different sectors, as 
well as between the different indicators. The score of the sectors are in line with 
the previous years, i.e. power generation is most compliant and transport least 
compliant. On average all sectors score lowest on the most concrete indicators like 
disclosure of current emissions and plans to reduce these, as well as lobby 
activity. In 2011 real estate was also included as a separate sector (NBIM 2011e, 
6). The overall compliance level in this sector was high (NBIM 2011e, 13). This 
is interesting, given that real estate both is a recommended asset class by Mercer, 
and also that energy efficiency should be stressed in NBIM’s real estate 
investments.  
  
The compliance has in general been low in the three years NBIM has surveyed 
companies. What does this mean? Does it mean that NBIM is not successful with 
regards to meet their own expectations? On a general basis this assumption seems 
to be far too simple. Evidence from for instance CalPERS back in the 1980s and 
1990s support the fact that ownership engagement can be an efficient instrument.  
Smith (1996) found that 71 percent of 51 companies addressed by CalPERS 
changed attitude after CalPERS intervention. However, the example from 
CalPERS might not be transferable to NBIM’s work with climate change, which 
is less visibly connected to short-term return than the issues dealt with by 
CalPERS some decades ago. Several factors make NBIM’s work challenging. 
During the conference “Does Investors care about the Environment” arranged by 
the Ministry of the Environment and BI Norwegian Business School in June 2012 
it was emphasized by several actors from different sectors, among others 
professor in climate strategy Jørgen Randers, former head of Storebrand Idar 
Kreuser, director of NBIM Yngve Slyngstad and environmental minister Bård 
Vegard Solhjell, that lack of standardized reporting regimes makes it very 
challenging for investors to evaluate how companies assess climate change risk.  
This is a challenge also for NBIM. Moreover it is a methodological challenge with 
NBIM’s compliance reports; they are based on what companies publish them self. 
Since NBIM not perform any independent analysis or data collection, and the 
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information to a large extent is based on companies self-reporting, there is not 
necessarily a link between a high score and actually adhering to the expectations. 
The energy sector for instance (power generation and oil & gas) scored higher 
than other sectors in 2009 (NBIM 2009d, 5), but as Bellona (2012) points out; this 
does not necessarily mean that this sector is compliant with NBIM’s expectations. 
It might simply mean that they are better at reporting what they do. 
 
According to NBIM (2012b) their expectations are regarded controversial and 
challenging among some companies, especially in Asia and in family-owned 
companies in which there is no culture for dialogue with owners. Time and 
patience are highlighted as essential when it comes to communication with 
companies about climate change. It could be argued that NBIM is little successful 
in accomplishing the desired results with regard to their expectations. However it 
could also be argued that the low compliance level is a sign of quality, since it 
necessarily signifies that NBIM sets high standards.  According to Bellona (2012) 
the data published in NBIM’s sector compliance report are too aggregated and 
thus there is almost nothing to learn from it. Of course NBIM cannot say who they 
are in dialogue with, since such information might be sensitive and lead to change 
in the stock exchange values. Nevertheless, Bellona (2012) argues that there could 
exist a compromise with for instance more detailed, but still anonymised 
information for sub-sectors. That would have been in line with what for instance 
the AP funds are publishing. In 2006 the Ministry wrote that when a process 
towards an individual company was brought to an end, they assumed that NBIM 
would make both its efforts and the outcome public in a suitable manner (Ministry 
of Finance 2006, 81).  This has not been the outcome, cf. the discussion above. As 
such, NBIM is less transparent than what might have been expected.    
 
Even though the investor expectation document could have been even more 
clearly spelled out, NBIM deserves approval for explicitly formulating some 
expectations. The challenge is how they follow it up, and to what extent they have 
any sanction options toward companies not adhering to the expectations. Even 
though there is a growing acceptance of the materiality of climate change for 
investors, Sandberg et al. (2009, 522) refers to an investigation of ESG factors in 
which it was found that the G - governance aspect -  is by far the one given most 
attention by investors. This might seem disappointing with respect to climate 
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change, but as Syse (2012) argues, traditional governance issues are closely linked 
to the results an owner can achieve when it comes to social and environmental 
issues. The owner must for instance receive board documents in due time and in a 
comprehendible language. Otherwise it is very difficult to try to influence the 
company.   
 
Divergent views about NBIM’s corporate governance strategy and climate 
changes exist. Hessen (2012) and Solheim (2012) are among those being 
skeptical, raising the question about the extent to which corporate governance has 
the potential to contributing to change. The environmental NGO Bellona is placed 
somewhere in the middle, in favor of influencing companies by having shares 
rather than only selecting high achievers or “clean companies”. Simultaneously 
they argue that there are two main challenges for NBIM; first of all, that they are 
working with more than 8000 companies. Secondly, that NBIM always must 
consider that in the stock market the value of the equities is sensitive to every 
action they perform (Bellona 2012).  
 
6.3. Analysis of the Council on Ethics  
One of the initial hypotheses was that the most important actor would be the 
Council on Ethics. This assumption was probably colored by the attention given 
to the Council on Ethics in the Norwegian media debate, as well as in academic 
literature. However, it turned out that the Council on Ethics has a quite limited 
role, and they have no explicit mandate on climate change. Consequently, the 
analysis of the Council on Ethics is less extensive than the analysis of the other 
two actors. Since climate change is not a specific part of the Council mandates, 
there has not been conducted any content analysis on climate in the reports, and 
the reports have not been subject to systematically analysis as in the case with 
NBIM’s annual reports. The lack of a mandate which includes climate change is 
of course also governing for the Council’s written material. Climate change is 
rarely mentioned in the reports.  
 
According to Syse (2012) there is a tendency in Norway, among the NGOs and in 
the media debate, that exclusion of companies is regarded more ethically correct 
than for instance ownership activity. In Alm’s (2007) assessment of the media 
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debate it was also found that the media is very concerned with divestment. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the morality or the successfulness of the 
various instruments. The discussion below is as such not an attempt to argue in 
favor of climate change based exclusions. It is simply a discussion of the 
Council’s interpretation of their mandate. Moreover, it is not a criticism of the 
important work the Council does when it comes to local environmental damage. 
This is certainly an important aspect, but outside the topic of this thesis.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3.4, climate change is not a focus area of the Council on 
Ethics, or more precisely, it is not explicit part of the mandate from the Ministry. 
This is supported by Dag Hessen as well, a member of the Council. He argues that 
climate change should be part of the overall investment strategy of the Fund, and 
that the Council’s narrow mandate results in a very passive strategy (Hessen 
2012). Passive in this regard can be connected to the deontological rationale, 
which is more concerned with not contributing to immorality. Excluding a 
company certainly makes the Fund less responsible for the conduct, but as noted 
by Nagell (2011) exclusion of a company does not equals that the Fund no longer 
has responsibility. The complicity is only sold to another investor.   
 
At the Council on Ethics homepage (The Government 2012b) there is a list of 
frequently asked questions, among others “why does not the Council recommend 
that more money is invested in green companies?”32. The answer is that it is 
beyond the Council’s mandate to recommend in which companies and sectors the 
Fund should be invested. According to Nilsen (2010, 114)33 the Council on 
Ethics’ Secretariat (2007) claimed the following about the issue; “it is beyond the 
mandate of the Council on Ethics to have an opinion on climate-political issues in 
general. The Council's assessment will always be linked to single firms”. Nilsen 
(2010, 114) holds that the Council has no official authority to support this 
argumentation, i.e. she argues that it is not included in the Council mandate that 
they should not focus on climate-political issues. The Council is clearly a 
subordinated actor with little leeway. Whereas NBIM, or Norges Banks, has a 
supervisory role included in their mandate (see §1-7 (1) in table 1) the Council is 
given a narrower task. It can be said that the principal, in this case the Ministry, 
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 My translation 
33
 Council on Ethics Secretariat (2007), cited in Nilsen (2010,114). The original source is a letter 
to Nilsen, which has not been consulted in this regard.   
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has given the two agents different leeway, with the Council being given a far less 
flexible mandate. It seems like there is an institutional skewness, but one should 
remember that the two actors not are comparable.  
 
The Council on Ethics’ mandate is to recommend the exclusion of companies that 
violates the Ministry’s criteria of company conduct. According to both the former 
ethical guidelines, and the new guidelines for observation and withdrawal (see 
page 55), a company can be excluded from the portfolio if it contributes to severe 
environmental damage (Ministry of Finance 2009, 75). That is a quite diffuse and 
broad concept, but it could also have been an advantage for the Council to have 
some definitional freedom. It has been argued that the Council has a quite narrow 
mandate with little leeway, but since the criteria in the mandate from the Ministry 
are general, the Council has in fact the power to define how a criterion should be 
interpreted. This should not be underestimated. As presented in chapter 5.1, the 
other criteria are also quite general. However it could be argued that severe 
environmental damage is among the criteria with most definitional leeway, being 
more flexible than for instance worst forms of child labour.  
 
In their 2006 annual report the Council had a conceptualizing discussion of how 
severe environmental damage should be interpreted. This was related to the 
recommendation to exclude Freeport MacMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. from the 
portfolio due to the above mentioned (Council on Ethics 2006b, 38-42). In 2006 
climate change was mentioned only once in the annual report, during this 
discussion. The outcome of this conceptualising discussion was a narrowing, or 
specification, of how the Council interpreted severe environmental damage. The 
criteria they argued for are; huge damage with irreversible and long-term 
consequences,  huge negative impact on humans life and health, a violation of 
national and international laws and norms, the company has not acted to prevented 
the damage and has not acted to repair the damage, and the probability that the 
practice will continue (Council on Ethics 2006b, 42). These criteria form the basis 
for the assessment of companies in 2007 (Council on Ethics 2007), as well as in 
2008 (Council on Ethics 2008) and 2009 (Council on Ethics 2009, 38). Climate 
change, or greenhouse gas emission, is not explicitly part of how the Council has 
interpreted severe environmental damage. As shown in chapter 3.3 NBIM 
includes climate change in their understanding of environment.  Storebrand, 
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another pioneer in responsible investing, has interpreted the exclusion criterion 
somewhat different. Storebrand excludes companies which contribute to severe 
climate- and environmental damage. This formulation might make it easier for 
Storebrand to exclude companies with very high emission levels. They explicitly 
state that34:   
Storebrand, within the most climate-intensive industries, should only invest 
in the most climate-friendly companies. The criterion is among others based 
on the Climate Convention with the following Kyoto Protocol, the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Stockholm Convention on persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs), the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal (Storebrand 2011, 2). 
Storebrand has thus interpreted the possibility to use the Climate Convention as a 
criterion for exclusion diversely than what did the Graver Committee in their 
report. As it was discussed in chapter 6.1.1 the Graver Committee did not find the 
Climate Convention precise enough. KLP uses the same formulation as the 
GPFG, i.e. severe environmental damage, and they do also without exception 
follow all exclusions made by the Ministry. KLP (2012) states that there currently 
is not any internationally climate change regulation that entitles investors to 
exclude companies based on greenhouse gas emission, i.e. argumentation in line 
with the Graver Committee.  
 
According to an analysis by Trucost, submitted as part of Greenpeace’s evaluation 
of the ethical guidelines in 2008, it would be beneficiary to replace the risk that 
the Fund contributes to severe environmental damage with the risk that the Fund 
contributes to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (van Ast 2008, 15). 
In addition it was argued from Bodø Graduate School of Business that exclusions 
based on conduct should include climate, i.e. severe environmental damage should 
be interpreted as to include contribution to climate change (Lindberg and Nilsen 
2008). The FiOH (2012) also argues that climate should be included in the 
exclusion strategy. The same applies to Hammerlin (2008, 12-13, 17) who also 
stressed that the Council’s understanding of severe environmental damage is a 
result of interpretation. An inclusion of climate in this understanding would 
consequently not necessitate a change in the existing guidelines. Also Solheim 
(2012) is in favor of including climate change as part of the exclusion criteria. 
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According to World Economic Forum (2011) climate change was one of the 
biggest risks in 2011, with both high impacts and high likelihood. The literature 
presented in chapter 4.1 also clearly emphasized the relevance of climate change 
for universal owners. It is also stated in the Fund’s management mandate’s §2-
1(1), see table 1, chapter 3.2, that future return is dependent upon sustainable 
development in environmental terms. It seems as such debatable that the Council 
on Ethics has interpreted severe environmental damage restrictively, rather than 
inclusively, i.e. the Council has applied a narrow understanding mostly connected 
to locale environmental damage where the causality between action x and 
outcome y is clear and visible. A broader and more inclusively understanding 
would also be applicable on climate change. It seems as such that the Council has 
given very much importance to the Graver Committee’s discussion, and tentative 
conclusion, about the challenges with including climate change as rationale for 
exclusion. However, the Graver Committee discussed a wide range of issues and 
it is almost ten year old. When it comes to for instance tobacco, the Graver 
Committee (2003a, 151) did not come to a joint recommendation about whether it 
should be excluded from the portfolio or not. This has been included in the 
guidelines later on though, and has therefore made a demonstration of the non-
static nature of such guidelines. Bellona (2012) argues furthermore that there is no 
explicit international convention that support the decision to exclude tobacco 
producers, and as such the decision is political. It could therefore have been 
possible to also exclude companies based on a political climate change rationale 
(Bellona 2012). It seems like it would have been legitimate for the Council to 
eventually interpret the possibility of including climate change in the 
understanding of severe environmental damage diversely than what did the Graver 
Committee. Hessen (2012) on the other hand points out that even though climate 
change is not explicitly part of how severe environmental damage is understood, 
the companies examined often are what we could call “worst case companies” 
when it comes to contribution to climate change. The existing understanding 
severe environmental damage is often more than enough to initiate an 
investigation of these companies, since they often are involved in local 
environmental damage which is more easily identified than for instance CO2 
emissions. 
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In 2010 the Council had forecasted that they would initiate more research on some 
environmental areas, in relation to the revised ethical guidelines (Council on 
Ethics 2010, 21-22). This is further elaborated in their 2011 annual report 
(Council on Ethics 2011, 16-23), and some areas are emphasized as important for 
further research. The Council had already initiated research on the following 
issues; especially polluting oil production, mining activity with especially high 
waste challenges, illegal and other especially damaging felling, illegal and other 
damaging fishery, very damaging dams, and protected areas. The most relevant in 
this regard is probably the first category, since the others seems to be more related 
to local environmental damage, which is in line with what the Council has done 
earlier. What is interesting to note is that the Council has initiated a research on 
companies involved in oil sand, in order to find out about eventually negative 
consequences with regards to for instance water use and indigenous populations. 
NBIM has invested in 30 companies engaged in such activity (Council on Ethics 
2011, 16). The Council did however not mention high CO2 emissions as an area 
of further research when it comes to oil sand, something that could have been 
possible, given the extensive debate about the issue, with regards to for instance 
Statoil’s project in Canada. Climate change is furthermore not mentioned in the 
2011 report, even though part of the report is dedicated to extensive discussion of 
environmental issue. The emphasis is still on local environmental damage and the 
Council preserves the Graver Committees rather restrictively understanding of the 
issue. Having this in mind, and considering the secretariats response to Nilsen 
(2010, 114), it might seems like the Council interprets their mandate narrowly. 
Nilsen (2010) is correct in arguing that there is no visible rationale for this narrow 
interpretation. Nevertheless, it might be beneficial if also the Council was given 
leeway to come with advice on the investment strategy, given that the Council 
holds different knowledge than Norges Bank.  
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7. Concluding remarks about the climate change strategy 
during the period 2006-2012 
The rationale for this thesis topic has been my fascination for the growing interest 
for climate change among investors. Being the second largest SWF in the world it 
is very interesting and relevant to investigate how the GPFG manages the climate 
change challenge. The aim of the research has thus been to discuss how climate 
change is, and has been, on the agenda of the Ministry of Finance, NBIM and the 
Council on Ethics in the period between 2006 and 2012. Within the respective 
period the analysis had a historical perspective that aimed to discuss the 
consistency and continuity, or eventually inconsistency and discontinuity, in the 
actors’ climate change strategy. The most relevant findings will be discussed and 
summarized below.  
 
When it comes to the actors’ mandate, which constitutes the underlying premises 
for the actors, the first interesting finding was that climate change was not 
embedded in the law or the official management mandate of the Fund. Climate 
change is consequently not anchored in the top governing documents. It is 
however stated that financial return, which is the Fund’s primary motivation, is 
dependent on sustainable development also in environmental terms. This is the 
rationale behind the focus on climate change, and in line with the universal owner 
nexus discussed in chapter 4; everything is internal for a broadly diversified 
owner. Since climate change is expected to create cost across all markets, 
universal owners will be highly affected, since they per definition own a share of 
every market. To answer the why question it seems like both NBIM and the 
Ministry have a clear understanding about the direct link between climate change 
and future return. Climate change is also part of NBIM’s understanding of ESG 
issues, as well as focus area in their corporate governance work. The Ministry has 
not explicitly included climate change in any definition, but it is stated in their 
responsible investment presentation that this issue is important and prioritized. 
Climate change is not part of the Council on Ethics mandate, which is quite 
narrow, and it is not explicitly part of their interpretation of severe environmental 
damage. This does not mean that the Council not regards the issue to be 
important.  
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The premises for the climate change strategy thus seem to be; two of three actors 
have climate change included in some sort of definition, as a focus area, or 
explicitly state that they regard it important, but climate change is not anchored in 
the top governing documents like the management mandate. It remains uncertain 
how this should be interpreted. When the original documents were published, 
climate change might not have been as urgent as it is today. However, the 
documents, especially the management mandate, have been updated several times. 
As such it could have been possible to include climate change at a later stage. 
However, it might be that the Ministry, which is issuing/drawing the documents, 
regarded climate change to be an issue better dealt with in other written material. 
Nevertheless, both the environmental mandates, and the energy efficiency aspect 
of the real estate investments, are included in the management mandate. In this 
thesis it is argued that these are either part of the overall climate change strategy, 
or has the potential to be part of it in the future. The Ministry thus seems willing 
to include climate change related issues in the mandate. When the overall climate 
change strategy is not mentioned, it might be because it is difficult to identify the 
climate change strategy. Rather it makes sense to speak of the climate change 
strategies, since the three actors have different strategies. The question is whether 
an eventual inclusion in the top governing documents is essential for the attention 
given to that particular issue. According to the findings in this thesis it does not 
seems to be the case. However, an inclusion of climate change in the management 
mandate might have been a sign of commitment, as well as stating an example. 
 
As highlighted both above and in chapter 6 there are several important strategies 
when it comes to climate change and the GPFG. This is also why it, 
methodologically wise, makes sense to speak of the GPFG as a case placed within 
a distinctive institutional design, whereby the different actors each constitutes a 
case, i.e. a multiple case study. In chapter 5 there was a short presentation of 
different types of responsible investment instruments. Pre-investment instruments 
are only partly applied on climate change in the GPFG case. Negative screening is 
not used, but positive screening is used to some extent since 20-30 billion NOK is 
set aside to environmental mandates. This is well below one percent of the Fund’s 
total value and might as well also be regarded as part of the Fund’s regular 
diversification strategy. However, the environmental mandates are included in the 
management mandate as of 2012, and this is a sign of commitment. Among the 
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post-investment instruments it is undoubtedly corporate governance which is 
applied most clearly on climate change. NBIM has had a corporate governance 
team since 2005, which today consists of ten employees. NBIM uses both formal 
shareholder rights like voting, as well as in-depth dialogue with some selected 
companies, to address the climate change risk. The other post-investment 
instrument, exclusion of companies, might be used if there is a risk that the 
company contributes to severe environmental damage. Climate change is not 
explicitly understood as part of this criterion. In addition climate change is part of 
what was called indirect instruments, and in this regard climate change research is 
the most important. The investment decision in se, i.e. the portfolio composition, 
is not used as a climate change instrument, so far.  
 
The Ministry could be called the leading actor in the years just prior to 2006, by 
introducing a crucial premise for the later work with climate change, namely the 
ethical guidelines. These suggested a two-pillar system, with NBIM being 
responsible for corporate governance, and the Ministry and an independent 
council being responsible for negative screening and exclusion of companies. 
When NBIM in 2005 decided to establish a corporate governance section within 
the bank, it was as a direct consequence of the obligation to implement their part 
of the ethical guidelines. However, since the ethical guidelines did not mention 
climate change, it cannot be said that these alone marked a significant incident. 
Nevertheless, they formed the basis for the latter strategies, and as such it can be 
argued that the ethical guidelines were decisive as a prerequisite. However, the 
agenda-setting role of the Graver Committee has not been exclusively positive 
when it comes to climate change. The reason is that the Graver Committee 
regarded climate change as difficult to incorporate in the screening and exclusion 
criteria. This argumentation has governed much of the later work, especially 
within the Council on Ethics, and as a consequence climate change is not directly 
part of product- or conduct-based exclusions from the portfolio.     
 
Climate change has been the topic of increased attention in the Ministry’s annual 
reports over the period, especially from 2008 and onward. After the establishment 
of the ethical guidelines few initiatives were taken from the Ministry with respect 
to climate change. In the analysis in chapter 6 it was argued that the Ministry 
presumably relied on what was done by two agents (NBIM and the Council on 
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Ethics) in the period 2006-2008. Climate change was not a big topic in the 
Ministry’s annual reports, and when it was discussed it was in general only with 
respect to NBIM’s ownership activity. Meanwhile NBIM were quite proactive 
whit regards to climate change. Within the newly established corporate 
governance section it was in 2006 decided to select climate change as one of two 
focus areas. The focus on climate change was in the first years further narrowed 
down by NBIM. The emphasis was on how companies lobbied with regulating 
authorities with regard to climate change. This focus was criticized as too narrow 
by several actors in the later evaluation of the ethical guidelines. However, it 
could contrarily be argued that this initial focus was quite courageous and 
targeted, since after all clear government regulation is exactly what is lacking in 
the climate change challenge. This was also made clear in the Mercer research, 
published half a decade later. The recommendations to the Fund depend on 
exactly how climate change will be addressed by global authorities. NBIM had, 
however, no expectation document for climate change in the first years. To focus 
on climate change was NBIM’s decision, but it was supported by the Ministry. 
NBIM incorporated climate changes in line with what they believed most 
Norwegians found important (Alm 2010). Furthermore, the Ministry’s 
establishment of the ethical guidelines was the premise for NBIM’s further work. 
As such it could be said that one actors’ first step was necessary for a second 
actors’ next step. However, as it was clarified in chapter 6.2.1., NBIM had also 
before the establishment of the ethical guidelines started to argue in favor of using 
shareholder rights. As such it is not possible to claim that there is only causality 
between the ethical guidelines and NBIM’s corporate governance strategy, but it 
seems plausible to argue that the former influenced the design of the latter.  
 
In the years 2006-2007 it apparently seems like NBIM was the most proactive 
actor when it comes to climate change. It was selected as focus area, and it was 
extensively discussed in the annual reports. The Council on Ethics spent these 
years to interpret and conceptualize severe environmental damage. The outcome 
was a quite restrictive definition, in line with the Graver Committee’s 
understanding of the issue. Climate change was not included in the interpretation, 
due to lack of clear international conventions, and the emphasis was laid on local 
environmental damage. The Council on Ethics thus chose to interpret their 
mandate narrower than what would have been necessary, given that other actors, 
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like Storebrand, has interpreted severe environmental damage inclusively, i.e. as 
to include climate change. Even though the Ministry appeared quite passive in 
2006-2007, it was argued in chapter 6.1.1 that the Ministry most likely discussed 
climate change internally in 2007, and maybe as early as in 2006. In the end of 
2007 former Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen officially expressed that 
climate change should become a crucial issue in the years to come. And as a 
matter of fact there was a change from late 2007 and onwards. In the beginning of 
2008 the Ministry of Finance launched an evaluation process of the ethical 
guidelines.  
 
2008 marked a change in several ways. In 2008 the Ministry opened up for a 
broad and inclusive evaluation of the ethical guidelines, and as already mentioned 
the Ministry started to openly argue for a stronger emphasis on climate change. 
From 2008 and onward the Ministry initiates several independent measures when 
it comes to climate change. This was also expressed in the written material, 
climate change was a topic which gained increased space in the Ministry’s annual 
reports to the Storting. The 2008 report stands out as the one with a remarkable 
focus on climate change. This was probably caused by the interest in this issue, as 
well as other social and environmental issues, among the numerous evaluations 
submitted to the Ministry. As a consequence of the evaluations process the 
Ministry initiated a large research project with focus on the financial effects of 
climate change for asset managers, which resulted in the above discussed Mercer 
reports. Moreover, the Ministry decided to re-introduce the use of some positive 
screening by establishing an environmental programme. After dialogue between 
Norges Bank and the Ministry it turned out that the environmental programme 
could be handled within the existing investment strategy. It furthermore seems 
like the result was a less regulated programme than the Ministry initially had 
outlined, but the Ministry expressed their satisfaction with NBIM’s environmental 
mandates. It could however be argued that these mandates only were part of 
NBIM’s regular diversification strategy. However, in 2012 the environmental 
programme was included in the management mandate, in §2-4, see table 1, 
chapter 3.2. This is a clear sign of commitment towards these investments.  
Several actors argue that the 20-30 billion target seems unambitious.  
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2008-2009 were as such years in which the Ministry became more visible, and 
marked a continuation of the establishment of the ethical guidelines. The Ministry 
has as such been a consistent actor, even though 2006-2007 were years in which it 
is difficult to identify their strategy. In 2009 the Ministry signed the contract with 
Mercer about the large research project on the financial risks of climate change. In 
the 2010 annual report to the Storting the Ministry discussed the finding in the 
first Mercer report, which was about climate change and asset managers in 
general. In the subsequent report to the Storting the Ministry discussed the 
tailored Mercer report, which analyzed only the GPFG.       
 
From 2008 and onward there was noted a change in NBIM’s annual reports, 
which had apparently less focus on corporate governance and climate change. 
Several possible reasons were discussed in chapter 6.2.1; among others that it 
might have been an organizational gap caused by change in leadership in 2008. In 
2006-2007 the annual reports included long parts about corporate governance and 
climate change. Whatsoever the reason behind, the consequence is that NBIM 
seems to have a communication challenge towards the owners, the Norwegian 
people. The reason is that there seems to be inconsistency between the amount 
dedicated to these issues in the different annual reports, which is NBIM’s primary 
communication channel, and what is actually conducted. Whereas the climate 
change strategy has been expanded, and the corporate governance team has 
increased, this does not sufficiently come to expression in the annual reports. 
Even though 2008 was the year in which climate change had the lowest 
frequency, it turned out that the tendency from 2008 continued. There has been 
less focus on corporate governance and climate change in the reports each year. In 
the 2011 annual report there was only a short 3-page about these issues. 
Compared to more than 30 closely-written pages in 2007, it seems to be a 
remarkable difference. NBIM’s annual reports are dedicated also to present new 
issues, in 2011 the feature article is therefore about real estate investments. As 
discussed above the real estate investment does in theory, i.e. in the management 
mandate (see §2-1(3) in table 1), strengthen the overall climate change strategy of 
the Fund. However, the energy efficiency aspect has not yet been prioritized by 
NBIM, and the real estate investments are so far limited. And thus it is not yet 
possible to analyze whether they also in practice will add an element to the 
climate change strategy. In 2007 corporate governance and climate change were 
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still new issues for the bank. It seems legitimate that more space is dedicated to 
new issues, however it is problematic for NBIM when important issues are not 
prioritized in the annual reports. In 2009 NBIM launched their Investor 
Expectation Document on climate change, with subsequent Sector Compliance 
Reports. It seems like NBIM from 2009 and onward has moved the emphasis on 
climate change from the annual reports to more targeted documents. This might be 
part of a strategy to clearly place this responsibility within the corporate 
governance section.  
 
During 2009-2012 NBIM’s climate change strategy seems nevertheless to be 
enhanced, however the compliance level among the surveyed companies remains 
low as to NBIM’s expectations. As it was argued in chapter 6.2 this might also be 
a sign of quality, since it means that NBIM has high expectations toward 
companies. However, it might be legitimate to argue that NBIM should consider 
to further developing their strategy, in order to better achieve their high 
expectations. This could be done by strengthen the governance section. After all a 
governance section counting approximately ten staff members seems to be little, 
when the Fund is invested in more than 8000 listed companies. Secondly, NBIM 
should consider dedicating more space to corporate governance and climate 
change in the annual reports, in line with the 2006-2007 reports, since climate 
change is a main focus area. In this way NBIM could better communicate their 
strategy with owners and other stakeholders. 
 
As already mentioned the Ministry enhanced their climate change strategy from 
2008 and onward. Contrarily to what is the case of NBIM, climate change has 
been a topic of growing attention in the Ministry’s annual reports to the Storting. 
In this way there has been consistency between the Ministry’s increased focus, 
and what is expressed through their reports. The 2010 and 2011 annual reports to 
the Storting dedicate quite some attention to the Mercer reports. The last Mercer 
report is tailored for the GPFG, and is as such very interesting. Mercer’s finding 
confirms the complexity of the climate change challenge for asset managers. The 
recommendations to the Fund depend on the likeliness of four different scenarios. 
The scenarios differ for instance in how climate change will be regulated by 
authorities in the future. Thus, there is no single answer as to how the GPFG 
should incorporate climate change risk. However, Mercer argues that in the two 
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most likely scenarios, according to Mercer, the Fund should significantly re-
allocate towards climate-sensitive assets. It remains uncertain how the Ministry 
will respond to the Mercer report. In both the annual report to the Storting in 2010 
and 2011 the Ministry discusses the findings with an ambiguous tone. The 
material is therefore not easily analyzable and conclusions should be drawn 
carefully. However, it can be argued that the Ministry is taking the Mercer results 
seriously, but that they need time to evaluate if and how eventually changes in the 
investment portfolio should be taken. It is challenging for a fund of the GPFG’s 
size to re-allocate, especially since many of the markets suggested by Mercer are 
relatively small.   
   
As a concluding remark it is argued that; climate change has been a topic of 
increased attention over the period 2006-2012. It has gradually become higher on 
the agenda of both the Ministry and NBIM, and there has as such been continuity 
in how these two actors have approached climate change. The two actors have 
however approached climate change in different forms, or by the use of different 
measures. The Council on Ethics has no clear mandate on climate change. The 
Council has interpreted severe environmental damage in a consistent matter 
throughout the period, this interpretation has however been restrictive and has not 
included climate change. The Ministry had few independent initiatives before 
2008, and has as such enhanced their climate change strategy most in the last four 
years. This has especially been done by the use of research, but also through the 
re-introduction of positive screening. There has been consistency between the 
Ministry increased focus on climate change, and what has been expressed in their 
written material. NBIM were on the other side quite pro-active already in 2006-
2007, by selecting climate change as one of two focus areas in their corporate 
governance strategy. In 2009 NBIM published the Investor Expectation Document 
on climate change, and the subsequent sector compliance reports. It has thus been 
a gradually expanding climate change focus in NBIM. However, there has been 
some inconsistency in how NBIM expresses their climate change strategy through 
their annual reports, and what has actually been done. Whereas the climate change 
strategy seems enhanced, in the annual reports it has been a decreasing focus on 
this issue. It is therefore argued that NBIM has a communication challenge 
towards their owners when it comes to climate change.  
 
                                                 
Page 101 
For future research it will be interesting to follow up on whether the compliance 
level with regard to NBIM’s expectations increases, if there will be significant 
changes in the overall investment strategy as a result of Mercer’s research (and 
eventually future research), if energy efficiency will be prioritized in the coming 
real estate investments, if the environmental mandates will be a gradually 
increased, whether the Council on Ethics will interpret their mandate as to include 
climate change and whether the Council on Ethics in the future also will be 
allowed to give more general advice.    
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Appendix:  
Appendix 1 
 
Content analysis of words containing climate in the Ministry of Finance’s Annual Reports 
NOU 2003: 22. Forvaltning for fremtiden: Forslag 
til etiske retningslinjer for Statens petroleumsfond 
(The Graver Report NOU 200335) 
 
Total words containing climate: 23 
climate change 9               climate emission 9 
climate affect 1         climate convention 3 
climate questions 1 
Report No. 24 (2006-2007) to the Storting: On the 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 
2006: 
 
Total words containing climate: 8 
Climate change 5 
Climate-related problem 1 
Climate problem 2 
Report No. 16 (2007-2008) to the Storting: On the 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 
2007: 
 
Total words containing climate: 21 
Climate change 7 
Climate issue 2 
Climate panel 1 
Climate-related legislation 4 
Climate regulation 1 
Climate measure 2 
Climate proposal 1 
Climate quota system 1 
Climate solution 1 
Climate risk 1 
 
Report No. 20 (2008-2009) to the Storting: On the 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 
2008: 
 
Total words containing climate: 139 
Climate change 55                Climate system 1 
Climate effects 1                 Climate requirements 1 
Climate negotiators 2            Climate field 1   
Climate friendly energy 15    Climate legislation 1 
Climate change regulation 1   Climate 8                                
Climate change panel 3         Climate challenge 20 
Climate development 1          Climate technology 2 
Climate exposure 1                Climate agreement 4 
Climate policy 7                    Climate treaty 3 
Climate related measures 2   Climate profile 1 
Climate lobbying 1                 Climate strategies 1 
Climate issue 2                    Climate offenders 1              
Climate profile 1                 Climate fund 2                     
Climate work 1 
Report No. 10 (2009–2010) to the Storting: The 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 
2009:  
 
Total words containing climate: 49 
Climate change 37                 Climate threat 1 
Climate impact 1                    Climate effects 1 
Climate negotiators 1              Climate challenge 2 
Climate agreement 1                Climate policy 1 
Climate work 1                        Climate strategies 1 
Climate scenarios 1                 Climate risk 1 
Report No. 15 (2010–2011) to the Storting: The 
Management of the Government Pension Fund in 
2010: 
 
Total words containing climate: 56 
Climate change 34                 Climate breakdown 7  
Climate emission 1                Climate 3 
Climate issues 1                     Climate policy 1 
Climate scenarios 3                 Climate risk 5 
Climate friendly technology 1 
 
Meld. St. 17 (2011-2012) Report to the Storting 
(white paper): The Management of the 
Government Pension Fund in 2011: 
 
Total words containing climate: 58 
Climate change 33                    Climate targets 1 
Climate breakdown 3               Climate 1 
Climate issues 1                       Climate risk 10 
Climate policy 2                       Climate area 1 
Climate related investments 2  Climate challenge 1 
Climate friendly technology 2 
Climate friendly infrastructure 1 
 
                                                 
35 NB search in Norwegian, the terms are translated by myself. 
                                                 
Page 110 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Content analysis of words containing climate in NBIM’s Annual Report 
 
NBIM Annual Report 2006 
Total words containing climate: 12 
Climate change 10 
Climate initiatives 1 
Climate problems 1 
 
NBIM Annual Report 2007 
Total words containing climate 41 
Climate change 19             Climate factor 1 
Climate problem 1             Climate proposal 1 
Climate system 1               Climate solutions 1 
Climate legislation 8          Climate debate 1 
Climate issues 5                Climate policy 1 
Climate measures 2 
NBIM Annual Report 2008  
Total words containing climate 3 
Climate change 2           
Climate 1 
NBIM Annual Report 2009 
Total words containing climate 11 
Climate change 11 
NBIM Annual Report 2010  
Total words containing climate 11 
Climate change 8 
Climate change risk 1 
Climate change risk management 2 
NBIM Annual Report 2011 
Total words containing climate 9 
Climate 2 
Climate change 3 
Climate change risk 4 
 
 
Appendix 3 
Overview of evaluations submitted to the Ministry of Finance 
Pro positive 
screening: 29 
Amnesty, Asa Kasher, Attac, Bellona, Atle Midttun BI, Carlos Joly, Changemaker, 
the Norwegian Church, Teologiske Menighetsfakultet, ForUM, Framtiden i våre 
hender, Greenpeace, Handelshøgskolen Bodø, Kirkens Nødhjelp, LO, 
Miljøverndepartementet, Niklas Kreander, Norfund, Norsk senter for 
menneskerettigheter, Redd Barna, SAM Sustainable Asset Management, SIGLA as, 
Storebrand, United Nations Global Compact Office, Universitetet i Oslo (SUM), 
Utenriksdepartementet, WWF-Norge, YS 
Against positive 
screening: 6 
Martin E. Sandbu, HSH, Norges Bank, KLP, NHO, Sparebankforeningen 
 
No comment on 
positive screening: 
22 
American Chamber of Commerce in Norway, Den Norske Burmakomité, Council of 
Ethics, Finansnærings hovdorganssasjon, Folketrygdfondet, FORUT, Government 
Pension Fund Thailand, Helsedirektoratet, Kreftforeningen, Kristian Alm BI, LHL, 
Norges Astma- og Allergiforbund, Forskningsrådet, Norsk Tamilske Forum, Norske 
Pensjonskassers Forening og De selvstendige kommunale pensjonskasser, Publish 
What You Pay Norway, Regnskogfondet, Riksrevisjonen, Robert A. G. Monks, 
Robert C. Pozen, SLUG, The Elfenworks Center for the Study of Fiduciary 
Capitalism, Tobakksfritt 
Source: (Ministry of Finance 2008c) 
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Appendix 4 
Participants in the Mercer project (Mercer 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Finance 
Corporation               
(IFC) 
 
Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation (GIC), 
Singapore 
Carbon Trust, United Kingdom  
 
California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS), 
USA 
 
Maryland State Retirement 
Agency, USA 
All Pensions Group (APG), 
Netherlands 
 
California State Teachers’ 
Retirement System (CalSTRS), 
USA 
 
Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund, Norway 
Första AP-fonden (AP1), Sweden  
 
Environment Agency Pension 
Scheme, United Kingdom 
 
Ontario Municipal Employees 
Retirement System (OMERS), 
Canada 
AustralianSuper fund, Australia  
VicSuper Pty Ltd., Australia 
British Columbia Investment 
Management Corporation 
(bcIMC), Canada 
 
PGGM Investments, 
Netherlands 
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Summary 
This preliminary thesis report summarizes the most important ideas that will be 
further elaborated in my final thesis in Political Economy. The topic of the thesis 
is Social Responsible Investment (SRI) related to climate changes, and a case 
study of the Norwegian Pensions Fund Global will be carried out.   
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1. Introduction 
 1.1. The topic - and why it is this interesting for a MSc thesis in Political 
Economy 
This preliminary thesis report will give an outline of the first chapters in my final 
master thesis in Political Economy. The research area is Social Responsible 
Investments (SRI) and climate changes and environmental concerns. A case study 
of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG)1 and its investment 
strategy related to climate changes will be carried out. Climate changes were one 
of Norwegian Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the Fund's manager, focus 
areas in the corporate governance strategy in the period 2007-2010 (NBIM 2007, 
89). In addition approximately 20 billion NOK of the Fund was set aside in 2008 
in an environmental program (Ministry of Finance 2008, 16). Focus on 
environment and climate changes has been part of GPFG’s strategy as a 
responsible investor for some years, and thus it will be convenient to use a 
historical approach in part of the analysis. Is there consistency or has there been 
any disruptions in the focus on climate changes?  
 
Another major interesting question is why NBIM chose to emphasis climate 
changes as a part of the strategic focus area; was it a result of a political will or 
pressure from the owner, the Ministry of Finance? Is it in line with the principles 
of overlapping consensus, i.e. does most Norwegians find it appropriate to focus 
on climate? Does Norway wish to use the Fund as “a best in class” investor to 
show off on the international scene? Did NBIM chose to focus on climate changes 
due to international regulation or participation in network organizations like UN's 
Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI)? Or was it due to a concern with 
how climate changes will affect the financial markets and the probability of 
securing long term return? After all GPFG’s primary motivation is, as stated by 
both the manager NBIM and the owner Ministry of Finance, to secure long term 
financial wealth for future generations of Norwegians.  
 
                                                 
1
 Commonly known as the Petroleum Fund, hereafter called the Fund or the abbreviation GPFG 
will be used.  
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It is furthermore interesting to note that environment not only has been a focus in 
the corporate governance strategy, and in the above mentioned environmental 
fund, but also in the work performed by the Council of Ethics when it comes to 
negative screening of investments and divestments. According to the Ethical 
Guidelines, if there is risk that a company contribute to severe environmental 
damages, the Fund should divest from that company (Ministry of Finance 2010). 
Thus, the Fund is operating with several tools that interact with climate changes 
and environment.  
 
Despite the somewhat agreeable statement that the GPFG is a pioneer in SRI with 
its ethical framework for investment and the work performed by the Council of 
Ethics, this is might not be the case for the work with climate challenges (Alm 
2010). This research seeks to understand why, and how, the use of ownership 
rights, screening and divestment can influence GPFG role as an important actor in 
climate governance. Why is this topic interesting and relevant? Climate change 
and environmental concerns are highly relevant research areas, which have been 
on the international agenda for several decades, and recently discussed in the Cape 
Town meetings in 2011. In the aftermath of the 2008 finance crisis a more 
responsible financial sector has also been a heated debate topic. The "Occupy 
Wall Street" movement is a proof of the continued demand for a responsible 
finance sector. It is no longer only a matter of anti-globalization movements, 
many ordinary people have lost faith in the financial sector’s capability of being 
self-regulatory and act responsible. In this setting it is very interesting to study big 
institutional investors like GPFG. Acting in a social responsible way as an 
investor is of course a very broad idea, and there is no commonly accepted 
definition of SRI. Definitions often include what is called ESG principles, the 
incorporation of Environmental, Social and Governance aspects in the investment 
decisions (Louche 2009)2.  
 
Instead of focusing on the whole ethical framework, the narrower emphasize on 
climate/environment makes the research more interesting, as well as part of a less 
researched field. To my knowledge there is not much research done on GPFG and 
climate changes. Despite being a big investor, and one of the largest Sovereign 
                                                 
2
 This paragraph has earlier been submitted as a part of a term paper in GRA 5915 
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Wealth Fund (SWF3) in the world (Shemirani 2011, 39), one single actor cannot 
alone influence climate changes, so this research aim to contribute with a 
conceptualizing discussion on what is being done in GFPG, and why, rather that 
actually measuring the outcome.  
 
Political Economy is an academic field which seeks to understand the boundary 
between the economics and politics. The GPFG is placed in such a setting by 
being a public owned investment fund, subscript to government regulation, but 
still operating in the private market through their investments. As such it is also 
interesting to look at why and how the Fund is regulated by the Norwegian state, 
but also how it interact with other supranational regulating authorities.  
 
1.2 Research design and structure of the preliminary thesis report 
As mentioned above, this report will give some insight to the first part of the final 
thesis. A preliminary problem definition and some precise research questions will 
be presented in the next chapter. This will form the basis for the thesis, but might 
be subject to some minor changes. Thereafter a chapter discussing methodology 
and data will follow. A short background chapter will also be provided. This will 
help to conceptualize important issues. Lastly a chapter reviewing some relevant 
literature and sketching the theoretical framework will also be presented. All the 
chapters are short drafts and will be rewritten in the final thesis, but they still 
provide some key ideas. The main part of the thesis will of course be to answer 
the research questions by analyzing the collected data, but no draft of the analysis 
will be presented in this report. 
 
 
2. Problem definition 
 
Based on the above short outline of the research area, the developed research topic 
that will form basis for this research is: 
 
                                                 
3
 Sovereign Wealth Fund is a quite new term, which refers to public owned investment Funds. 
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Why and how is climate change/(environmental concerns) on 
the SRI agenda for the Government Pension Fund Global, and 
has it been successful?  
 
To operationalize the study the following six research question will be used: 
 How is climate change on the agenda for the three different actors; NBIM, 
the Council of Ethics, and the Ministry of Finance? 
 How are the four different instruments negative screening, positive 
screening, withdrawal, and corporate governance used in the work with 
climate changes?  
 Has there been consistency in NBIM’s work with climate changes in the 
corporate governance strategy in the period 2007-2010? 
 Why did NBIM incorporate climate changes in their focus area for 
corporate governance?  
 How important are soft-law actors like UNPRI for the work performed by 
GPFG?  
 To what extend has the GPFG been successful as an important climate 
change actor?  
 
The analysis will consist of four main sections, which together aim to answer the 
research problem:  
 Section one: discussion of the three actors (NBIM, the Council of Ethics, 
and the Ministry of Finance) and the SRI instruments adopted. The focus 
will of course be on the work relative for climate/environment, which is 
only a small part of what for instance the Council of Ethics is concerned 
with. A few cases might be given more attention, most likely how the 
Fund placed itself as a climate investor with for instance the divestment 
from the mining company Rio Tinto. The first two research questions will 
be discussed in section one.  
 
 Section two: NBIM and the corporate governance strategy. In this section 
the third research question will be discussed. NBIM and active ownership 
is part of the actors/instruments that will be discussed in section one, but a 
separate and more in-depth section is nevertheless dedicated to NBIM. 
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Furthermore it will be discussed how the work with climate has evolved 
from a quite narrow focus (see below), why water was included in the 
strategy, and lastly, the new focus on green real-estate projects. 
 
 Section three: regulation and the rationale for choosing climate. In this 
section regulation of GPFG will be discussed. The emphasize will firstly 
be on regulation from the Norwegian state, and secondly, regulation 
understood as participation in international network 
organizations/guidelines like UNPRI. The aim is to answer research 
question four and five in this section.  
 
 Section four: overall discussion of the findings and assessment of the 
Fund’s work with climate changes. Whether the Fund can be regarded as 
an substantial and successful actor with its climate change work will be 
critically discussed. 
 
Based on the introduction to the topic, and the above research problem and 
research questions, several hypothesis or assumptions will be derived. At the time 
of writing the following hypothesis has been derived:  
 
Hypothesis 1: GPFG has the potential to become an important actor in climate 
change governance, but at the time of writing it is not expected that the Fund can 
be regarded as successful in the work with climate, as in the overall work with 
ethical investments.  
 
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. The methods adapted in this research 
This research project will be a case study of the GPFG with emphasize on SRI 
and climate changes. The research carried out will be of qualitative nature and 
thus analysis of documents and interviews will be the main sources of data.  
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Slightly different methodological approaches will be used in the four different 
sections. Section one will consist of a comparative analysis of the work with 
climate changes done by the three actors NBIM, the Council of Ethics, and the 
Ministry of Finance. The emphasize will be on how negative screening, positive 
screening, withdrawal, and corporate governance is used to ensure that 
investments not contribute to increased climate changes. A historical approach 
will be adopted in the section looking at how climate change has evolved as a 
focus area in NBIM’s corporate governance strategy. Is it possible to identify any 
red line in the documents throughout the whole period, or has there been any 
changes in the guiding principles? The governance section in NBIM has for 
instance been through a change in leadership in the actual period. Has this had any 
implications for the focus on climate changes?  
3.2. Dependent and Independent variables 
Identifying the independent and dependent variables is not as straightforward in 
qualitative research. At the time of writing I understand the dependent variable as 
the research problem, and the independent variables used to answer the research 
problem are the research questions. Nevertheless, a more precise definition of the 
variables will be outlined in the final thesis.  
3.3. Data sources and data collection 
This research will be conducted by using multiple data sources. Triangulation, 
using different types of data and methodology, makes a research sounder. When 
both interviews and document analysis is used, the researcher can test for 
consistency in the data by comparing the results. Interview respondents might for 
instance be biased, and comparing the results with analysis of documents will 
make the research less vulnerable (Patton 2002, 248). It is important to keep track 
of the difference between the primary sources, the basic documents provided by 
the involved actors, and secondary sources like the academic interpretation and 
analysis of the primary sources. This is important because the use of primary 
sources entitles the me the possibility to analyze the raw material, whereas use of 
secondary source is  the analysis of somebody else's interpretation of primary 
sources. Thus, to create my own independent opinion primary sources are 
essential, but of course secondary sources will be very important data sources as 
well. 
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3.3.1. Primary sources – documents 
The data used in this research will be primary sources like official reports from 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ethical Council and of course NBIM. The above 
mentioned Graver Report, in Norwegian known as “NOU2003:22 Forvaltning for 
fremtiden” is one example. Annual reports and strategy reports are other 
examples. International guidelines and consensus documents that are relevant for 
GPFG are yet other examples. Getting access to the data should not cause major 
problems, the Ministry of Finance and NBIM have both emphasized the 
importance of openness. Nevertheless, the data collection has not yet stared, and it 
remains to see how easy available different material will be.  
 
3.3.2. Primary sources – interviews 
To get additional information interviews will be conducted. A tape recorder will 
be used in order to transcribe the interviews and turn it into a written primary 
source. The unit of analysis should be what the informants actually said, not what 
the interviewer noted herself. This will thus be a case-analysis approach, in which 
a case is written for each person interviewed. Contrarily, with a cross-case 
approach answers from different respondents are grouped together according to 
themes, and thereafter compared. However, the usefulness of each approach 
depends on the form of the interviews, and it might turn out that cross-case 
analysis of some of the interviews conducted is more fruitful (for instance among 
respondents from NBIM) (Patton 2002, 440). At the time of writing nor the 
interview guide, nor the interview approach, has been decided. However, semi-
structure interviews might be the best suited. In an interviewing situation it is 
difficult to not be influenced by the informants, the use of tape recorder will partly 
cancel out the problem. Nevertheless, even when recording the interview there 
remains a certain risk of being influenced by the informant, it will be essential to 
be conscious about this challenge, as well as being well-prepared.   
 
Hopefully it will be possible to interview actors from the Council of Ethics, the 
Ministry of Finance and NBIM. In addition it would be fruitful to interview 
independent experts. List of planned interview objects (is still to be confirmed 
since they are not yet contacted).  
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NBIM: 
Anne Kvam 
Ola Petter Gjessing 
Christopher Wright 
 
The Ministry of Finance: 
Trude Myklebust 
 
The Council of Ethics: 
Eli Lund: Head of Secretariat, Council of Ethics 
One member of the Council 
 
Independent actors/experts: 
Henrik Syse: PRIO 
Atle Midttun: BI 
Øyvind Bøhren: BI 
Jørgen Randers: BI 
Danyel Reiche: American University of Beirut 
Carlos Joly 
NGO’s? 
Among the informants in this category it should be some of those participating in 
the evaluation process of the ethical guidelines from 2008, like Carlos Joly. It is 
furthermore important to distinguish different types of informants. Some of the 
potential informants might be used more for exchange of views, recommendations 
or discussion, rather than being primary sources them self.  
3.3.3. Secondary sources 
Several secondary sources will be used to enlighten my understanding and 
analysis of the primary sources. Most important is of course academic literature. 
In addition media might be consulted, some journalists have been writing a lot 
about GPFG. Material from Mercer will also be a substantial source since they 
have conducted research on climate changes and investors in general and about 
GPFG in particular. Nevertheless, the most important source in this regard is the 
53 contributions submitted to the Ministry of Finance in 2008 as a part of the 
evaluation of the ethical guidelines.   
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3.4 The way forward 
The first priority now will be to start the data collection. A huge amount of 
primary sources must be obtained and organized. Similarly, informants must be 
contacted. This is quite urgent, as some informants might have a very buzzy 
schedule. There is also a lot of preparation to be done before any interviews can 
be conducted, and most likely I will have to develop a few different interview 
guides. Hopefully all the data will be collected by March 2012. During the same 
period I will also focus on the theoretical framework, which is the weakest part of 
this preliminary thesis report.   
 
 
4. Background 
4.1. Short about the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global and SRI 
The Fund was established in 1990 and was labeled the Norwegian Petroleum 
Fund, since it was established due to the revenues gained through fossil resources 
that Norway had experienced for some decades. The objective with the 
establishment was to safeguard the long term financial security of the Norwegian 
population. In 2006 the Fund was renamed the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund – Global (Ministry of Finance 2011). The Fund is managed by Norwegian 
Bank Investment Management (NBIM), and is one the world's biggest Sovereign 
Wealth Funds. The Fund has a market value of approximately 3077 billion NOK 
(the value is continuously changing), has invested in 69 countries, and owned on 
average 1% of the listed equities in 2010 (NBIM 2010).  
 
Since 2004 GPFG has been subscript to ethical guidelines, which were evaluated 
in 2008. As mentioned above the contributions submitted to the Ministry of 
Finance as a part of this evaluation process will be one data source in the analysis. 
The Fund seeks to both maximize long term financial return, and invest in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the Funds owner, the Norwegian people 
(Ministry of Finance 2011). Thus GPFG’s primary motivation is to ensure intra-
generation solidarity by securing future generations of Norwegians a stable 
financial situation. The intra-generation versus inter-generation solidarity is an 
interesting aspect which also will be touched upon in the thesis.  
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The Ethical Guidelines derived from a report written by the Graver Committee in 
2003. The Graver Committee (2003) emphasized that the ethical principles are 
supposed to be in anchored in the general ethical standards of the Fund's owner, 
namely the Norwegian people. It is of course difficult to identify a common 
ethical standard that applies for everybody in Norway, but the Graver report is 
concern with overlapping consensus, i.e. investments should be in line with what 
most Norwegians find appropriate. The notion of overlapping consensus will be 
discussed thoroughly when answering the question about why NBIM chose to 
focus on climate change in the corporate governance strategy. 
 
The Graver Committee (2003, paragraph 5.1) launched three instruments that 
should be used when managing the Fund: 
 Exercise of ownership rights, or corporate governance. 
 Negative screening, i.e. not invest in certain companies. 
 Withdrawal, i.e. the Fund divests from companies that violate the ethical 
standards promoted by the Fund. 
 
Positive screening was not among the mechanisms suggested by the Graver 
committee, but it has been a topic in the public debate in Norway. Furthermore 
several of the contribution submitted to the evaluation of the Ethical Guidelines in 
2008 emphasized positive screening as an alternative, among others the 
environmental organization Bellona (2008) and the expert Carlos Joly (2008). 
However, also contributions which did not recommend positive screening should 
be mentioned, like professor in finance Thore Johansen and professor in 
economics Ole Gjølberg (Johansen and Gjølberg 2008). Also the manager, NBIM 
(2008, 7) was reluctant when it comes to positive selection. The Ministry of 
Finance decided however that a certain amount (approximately 20 billion NOK in 
2008) was to be invested in accordance with some positive selection, in an 
environmental program (Ministry of Finance 2008, 16). The establishment of this 
environmental program will of course be critically discussed in the thesis.  
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4.2. Norwegian Bank Investment Management and the corporate governance 
strategy: climate changes 
In the annual report for 2006 NBIM launched that they had an ambition to become 
a leading actor in perusing of ownership rights or good corporate governance. 
Furthermore, environment was one of two focus areas in the years to come (the 
other one was children's rights, despite being interesting and important, it will not 
be discussed in this thesis). Nevertheless, the focus on environment was narrow: 
how companies interact with national and supranational governments in questions 
related to environment and climate changes. Thus, how companies lobby, and 
how NBIM could encourage to more transparency and responsibility (NBIM 
2006, 72-73). The focus on lobbying was criticized as being too narrow by, 
among others, the Albright Group (2008, 19) which submitted one of the most 
comprehensive evaluations of the ethical guidelines in 2008.  
 
Furthermore, in the 2006 report NBIM puts forward some arguments explaining 
why the two focus areas were chosen. First of all it was important for NBIM to 
focus on areas with relevance for investors. The Stern report and the possible 
scenario that climate changes can affect the economic markets negatively in the 
future is one reason. Furthermore it was emphasized that the possibility of 
achieving good dialogues within the selected area, and of course ensuring 
financial return (NBIM 2006). NBIM’s argumentation, its own understanding of 
itself as an climate investor, and how active ownership is used, will of course bee 
important in section three where the reasons for choosing climate will be 
analyzed. In this section it will also be important to look at how the focus on 
climate has evolved over the period, for instance why focus on water was included 
in the strategy in 2009 (NBIM 2009). Among others, Gjessing and Syse's (2007) 
article about universal ownership will be used in this section.  
4.3. Social Responsible Investment – global regulation and principles 
At the national level, GPFG is subscript to a very comprehensive SRI regulation. 
SRI regulation at the global level tends to be in the soft-law corner, with voluntary 
principles and networking, rather than binding laws. One example is the United 
Nations' Principles of Responsible Investments (UN PRI), launched in 2006. This 
is a partnership network among UN and global investors, designed to increase 
investors’ interest in ESG issues. The principles have been signed by 900 
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signatories from 49 different countries (UN 2011). UNPRI are regarded as an 
important feature in global SRI work. Efama, the association for the European 
investment management industry, awards much of the success to the collaborative 
nature of the process resulting in the principles (Efama 2011). Both NBIM and the 
Ministry of Finance have signed UNPRI (UNPRI 2012). The more recent “2011 
Global Investor Statement on Climate Change” which has been signed by 285 
investors is another example with a more narrow focus area (UNEP FI 2011). This 
statement is very relevant and will of course be used in the analysis. NBIM has 
signed this statement (Wright 2011). Another important network organization is 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds4 which in 2008 agreed on the 
Santiago Principles, an investment framework for SWF (IWG 2008).  
 
 
5. Literature review and theoretical framework 
5.1 Review of literature  
In the final thesis the literature review will cover mainly two types of literature; 
firstly the main academic studies concerning SRI in relation to climate changes 
will be critically discussed. Literature discussing the challenges facing 
institutional SRI investors in general will also be consulted. Examples are Tessa 
Hebb's (2012) The Next Generation of Responsible Investing, and Responsible 
Investments in Times of Turmoil by Vandekerckhove et.al. (2011). Secondly, 
literature discussing GPGF in particular as an responsible investor will be 
assessed. As mentioned above GPFG is often regarded as a “best in class” 
investor and has thus been subscript to attention from several scholars. Some 
serious academic literature discussing the fund as an responsible investor exists. 
Unfortunately does this literature in general not emphasize climate changes 
particularly. On the other side, the lack of research on exactly this part of the Fund 
is also the reason for why it has been chosen in this thesis. A few exceptions does 
nevertheless exist; my supervisor Dr. Kristian Alm is the author of a book chapter 
in Veggeland’s (2010) book about Innovative Regulatory Approaches. In the 
chapter Alm (2010) discusses whether GPFG is an pioneer also in international 
climate investments. The short answer is no. Another very relevant article is 
                                                 
4
 Previously International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) 
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written by Danyel Reiche (2010), this is a case study of GPFG with emphasize on 
climate. According to Reiche (2010, 3576) the importance of the Fund as an 
climate actor is somewhat limited, but should not be underestimated.  
5.3 Theoretical framework 
At the time of writing the plan is to use three theoretical frameworks to support 
the analysis in my final thesis. The first concept it is important to discuss, and 
which of course will be an important framework, is the notion of Social 
Responsible Investments. The second theoretical framework will discuss 
regulation theory. The last theoretical approach that will be useful is agency 
theory with emphasize on corporate governance theory.  
5.3.1 The concept of Social Responsible Investments 
There is a lack of agreement in the literature when it comes to definition of SRI, 
and as reviewed by Sparkes and Cowton (2004, 46) terms like green, strategic, 
development, social and creative are found in the literature on responsible 
investments. SRI is sometimes also referred to as shareholder activism, especially 
in the US (Louche 2009). Nevertheless, the most used terms appears to be ethical 
investment and social responsible investment (Sparkes and Cowton 2004, 46). 
Moreover, there is no clear and universal understanding among investors of what 
SRI implies, and the concept cannot be understood by a single framework (Efama 
2011). According to Eurosif (2010, 8), a forum for sustainable investments in 
Europe, two issues are crucial in order for investments to be regarded responsible:  
 
1. A concern with long-term investment; 
2. Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues as important  criteria 
in determining long-term investment performance. 
The following definition by Céline Louche, a well-known researcher in the field, 
might be applied in the thesis: “SRI is defined as the constructing and managing 
of investment funds through the use of social, environmental and ethical 
considerations in addition to conventional financial criteria” (Louche 2009, 53). 
Most SRI Funds, also GPFG, gives financial return the highest priority (NOU 
2003). The definition of SRI implies a dual concern for investors, which is also in 
line with how GPFG is understood. This duality will of course be further 
discussed in the thesis.  
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Another fruitful approach is outlined by Louche (2009, 55-62); the understanding 
of SRI through new institutionalism, thus SRI in a process of global convergence 
and isomorphism in which norms and laws will become more similar. UNPRI, the 
"2011 Global Investor Statement on Climate Change”, and the Santiago principles 
will all contribute to global convergence. Contrarily SRI can be understood as a 
process of local divergence where the development will follow national specific 
patterns. The development and regulation of SRI is following both paths, Louche 
(2009, 62) points out that SRI is “a concept that becomes global in its diffusion 
but fragmented/diverging in its practices”.   
 
5.3.2 Regulation theory 
Regulation theory will be applied in the thesis since some of the research 
questions are concerned with regulation. As for the concept of SRI, there is a 
variety of definitions and ways to understand regulation. The objective of 
regulation can be understood as “producing outcomes that are in the interests of 
everyone” (Hix and Høyland 2011, 189), thus the notion of overlapping consensus 
will be relevant to discuss also when it comes to regulation. Positive versus 
normative theories of regulation will have different understanding of how and 
why the government should intervene in order to obtain pareto improvements 
(Hix and Høyland 2011, 189). According to Baldwin, Scott and Hood5 (1998, 
cited in in Jordana and Levi Fleur 2004, 3) three main issues are often included in 
defining regulation;  
- target rules,  
- all state intervention in the economy,  
- mechanisms of social control.  
 
The GPFG can be said to be subscript to regulation in all three categories. Even 
though NBIM is an independent manager of the Fund, the state does clearly 
regulate several aspects of the activity, for instance through the ethical guidelines, 
which must be understood as targeted rules. The last aspect of regulation includes 
a quite broad understanding of regulation, encapsulating also the evolution of 
social norms, voluntary agreements and international consensus driven regulation 
                                                 
5
 Unfortunately I could not get hold of Baldwin, Scott and Hood in due time. 
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without strong enforcing mechanisms. It can be referred to as regulation as a 
multi-level governance process. Regulation of GPFG which can be included in the 
third category might be both the participation in voluntary agreements like 
UNPRI and the Santiago Principles, but also the above mentioned concept of 
overlapping consensus. Adapting such a broad understanding of regulation will of 
course makes it easier to see many of the process which has shaped GPFG as a 
regulatory pattern. When it comes to the regulatory authorities, several 
dimensions can be identified. Figure 1 (Berger et al. 2007, 11) illustrates the 
dynamics of the regulatory approaches that can be adapted by authorities. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The policy instruments range from a soft-law approach where the regulator 
 
Policy instruments within category one and two can be understood as part of 
Baldwin, Scott and Hood’s (1998, cited in Jordana and Levi Fleur 2004, 3) third 
definition of regulation as a mean of social control. Again, one interesting 
question is; to what extent has such soft-law approaches shaped the Fund, and 
especially NBIMs' decision to focus on climate?  The two last categories are more 
in the traditional hard-law regulation pattern. Financial and economic instruments 
are a way of re-introducing market incentives in regulation. One example of 
policy instruments in the third category is the Dutch case where return from 
investments in green environmental friendly projects has been exempted from 
income taxes since 1995 (OECD 2007).  
 
Policy instruments in general 
 
1. Informational or endorsing instruments:               
Campaigns, guidelines, trainings 
 
2. Partnering instruments: 
Networks, partnerships, dialogues 
 
3. Financial or economic instruments: 
Economic incentives, subsidies, grants                      
 
4. (Mandating instruments): 
Laws, regulations, decrees 
 
“Soft-law” approach 
Regulatory approach 
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5.3.3 Agency theory and corporate governance theory 
In addition to regulation theory it will be fruitful to use some agency theory and 
theories of corporate governance. At the time of writing this section has not yet 
been elaborated.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This Preliminary Thesis Report has presented the topic that will be discussed in 
my final MSc thesis in Political Economy. A draft of the introduction, problem 
definition, methodology and partly some theory/literature chapters have been 
outlined. The research problem that I aim to look further into is why and how 
climate changes/environmental concerns are on the agenda for GPFG, and to what 
extent the Fund has been a successful actor in this regard. Several research 
question that will help operationalize the research has been presented, and will be 
answered in four main sections in the final thesis. The preliminary hypothesis is 
that GPFG not can be regarded as successful in the work with climate changes as 
in the overall work with ethical investments.  
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